英：act;法：acte
拉康在所有动物皆参与其中的纯粹“行为”(behaviour)与象征性的且只能归于人类主体的“行动”之间做出了一个区分(S11, 50)。一个行动的基本性质，即在于行动者是能够对其承担责任的：行动的概念因而是一个伦理学的概念（见：[[ethics 伦理学]])。
然而，精神分析的责任概念却非常不同于法律上的概念。这是因为责任的概念联系着整个的意向性(intentionality)问题，由于精神分析发现，除了主体的那些有意识的计划之外，他同样还具有一些无意识的意向，从而复杂化了意向性的问题。因此，某人很可能会干出他宣称并非故意的行动，但是分析会将此一行动揭示为某种无意识欲望的表达。弗洛伊德将这些行动称作“动作倒错”(parapraxes)或“过失行动”（英：bungled actions;法：acte manqué)：然而，只有从有意识的意向的观点来看，它们才是“过失的”，因为它们皆成功地表达了某种无意识的欲望（见：Freud, 1901b)。虽然在法律上，除非可以证明行动是蓄意的，否则一个主体便无法被判决犯有谋杀罪（举例而言），但是在精神分析治疗中，主体则面对着甚至得为表达在其行动中的那些无意识欲望承担责任的伦理性义务（见：[[beautiful soul 美的灵魂]])。哪怕是那些明显意外的行动，他也必须将其承认为表达了某种意向的真正的行动一尽管是无意识的意向一并且把此种意向当作其自身的而承担下来。行动搬演(ACTING OUT)与行动宣泄(PAS SAGE TO THE ACT)都不是真正的行动，因为主体并未对自己在这些行动中的欲望而承担责任。
精神分析的伦理学也同样责成分析家对自己的行动承担责任，即他在治疗中的那些干预。在这些干预上，分析家必须由一种恰当的欲望所引导，拉康将其称为分析家的欲望。只有当一个干预成功地表达了分析家的欲望一也就是说，当它有助于分析者走向分析的结束之时一—它才能够被称作一个真正精神分析性的行动。拉康将其一个年度的研讨班专门用于进一步讨论精神分析性行动的本质(Lacan,1967-8)。
如前所述，从无意识的观点来看，过失行动是成功的。不过，此种成功却也只是部分的，因为无意识的欲望是以一种经过扭曲的形式而获得表达的。由此可知，“自杀是唯一完全成功的行动”，因为当自杀被充分地且有意识地承担起来的时候，这一行动便在当时完全表达了一种既是有意识的又是无意识的意向，是对无意识的死亡冲动的一种有意识的承担（另一方面，那种突发的冲动性的自杀企图则并非是一种真正的行动，而很可能是一种行动宣泄)。死亡冲动因而在拉康的思想中被紧密联系于伦理学的领域(见：恩培多克勒的例子一 E,104:以及拉康对于《安提戈涅》的讨论-S7,ch.21)。
(acte)Lacan draws a distinction between mere 'behaviour',which all animals engage in,and 'acts',which are symbolic and which can only be ascribed to human subjects(SI1,50).A fundamental quality of an act is that the actor can be held responsible for it;theconcept of the act is thus an ethical concept(see ETHICS).
However, the psychoanalytic concept of responsibility is very different from the legalconcept. This is because the concept of responsibility is linked with the whole question ofintentionality, which is complicated in psychoanalysis by the discovery that, in additionto his conscious plans, the subject also has unconscious intentions. Hence someone maywell commit an act which he claims was unintentional, but which analysis reveals to bethe expression of an unconscious desire. Freud called these acts 'parapraxes',or'bungledactions' (Fr. Acte manque); they are 'bungled', however, only from the point of view ofthe conscious intention, since they are successful in expressing an unconscious desire (see Freud, 1901 b). Whereas in law, a subject cannot be found guilty of murder (forexample) unless it can be proved that the act was intentional, in psychoanalytic treatmentthe subject is faced with the ethical duty of assuming responsibility even for theunconscious desires expressed in his actions (see BEAUTIFUL SOUL). He mustrecognise even apparently accidental actions as true acts which express an intention, albeit unconscious, and assume this intention as his own. Neither ACTING OUT nor aPASSAGE TO THE ACT are true acts, since the subject does not assume responsibilityfor his desire in these actions.
The ethics of psychoanalysis also enjoin the analyst to assume responsibility for hisacts,i.e.his interventions in the treatment. The analyst must be guided in theseinterventions by an appropriate desire, which Lacan calls the desire of the analyst. Anintervention can only be called a true psychoanalytic act when it succeeds in expressingthe desire of the analyst-that is, when it helps the analysand to move towards the end ofanalysis. Lacan dedicates a year of his seminar to discussing further the nature of thepsychoanalytic act (Lacan, 1967-8).
A bungled action is, as has been stated, succesful from the point of view of theunconscious. Nevertheless, this success is only partial because the unconscious desire isexpressed in a distorted form. It follows that, when it is fully and consciously assumed, suicide is the only completely succesful act' (Lacan, 1973 a: 66-7), since it then expressescompletely an intention which is both conscious and unconscious, the consciousassumption of the unconscious death drive (on the other hand, a sudden impulsive suicideattempt is not a true act, but probably a passage to the act). The death drive is thus closelyconnected with the ethical domain in Lacan's thought (see the example of Empedocles, E, 104, and Lacan's discussion of Antigone in S 7, ch. 21).