英：biology:法：biologie
弗洛伊德的著作中充满着对生物学的参照。弗洛伊德把生物学视作一种严密科学的模型，而且把精神分析的新科学奠定在此模型的基础之上。然而，拉康却强烈反对任何试图把精神分析建构在一个生物学模型之上的做法，并且指出把生物学（抑或行为学/心理学）的概念 (诸如适应[ADAPTATION]等)直接应用于精神分析，都将不可避免地是误导性的，而且也会消抹自然（NATURE)与文化之间的本质性区分。根据拉康的观点，有关人类行为的此种生物学化的解释，皆忽视了象征秩序在人类存在 (humanexistence)中的首要性。一些精神分析家把欲望混淆于需要，并且把冲动混淆于本能，拉康在他们的著作中看出了此种“生物学主义”(biologism), 而他则坚持强调要对这些概念加以区分。
这些论点明显可见于拉康非常早期的精神分析作品。例如，在其1938年论及家庭的著作中，他便拒绝任何试图基于纯粹生物学资料来说明家庭结构的做法，并且指出人类的心理是由情结而非由本能来调节的 (Lacan, 1938:23-4).
拉康认为，他对生物学还原论的拒绝并非是同弗洛伊德的某种矛盾，而是对于弗洛伊德著作之本质的某种返回。当弗洛伊德使用那些生物学模型的时候，他这么做只是因为生物学在当时总的来说是一种严密科学的模型，也是因为推测科学在那时还尚未达到同样的严密程度。当然，弗洛伊德并未把精神分析混淆于生物学或是任何其他的精确科学，而当他借用一些来自生物学的概念（诸如冲动的概念）时，他都会彻底地对它们进行改写，从而使它们完全变成全新的概念。例如，死亡本能的概念就“不是一个生物学的问题”(E, 102)。拉康以一则悖论来表达他的观点：“弗洛伊德式的生物学与生物学没有丝毫关系。”(S2,75)
同弗洛伊德一样，拉康也使用了一些借自生物学的概念 (例如：意象①、开裂2)，然后又在一个全然象征性的框架内对它们进行了改写。或许，对此最重要的例子就是拉康的阳具 (PHALLUS)概念，他将其构想为一个能指，而非一个身体器官。因而，尽管弗洛伊德是根据阴茎的在场与缺位来构想阉割情结与性别差异的，然而拉康是在非生物学的、非解剖学的面向上（根据阳具的在场与缺位）来对它们加以理论化的。这已然成为拉康理论对于某些女性主义论者而言的主要吸引力之一，她们将拉康的理论看作对于性别化的主体性 (gendered subjectivity)建构一种非本质主义说明的方式。
然而，虽然拉康一贯拒绝所有形式的生物学还原论，但是他也同样拒绝完全忽视生物学相关性的文化主义立场 (Ec, 723)。如果“生物学化”(biologising)得到正确的理解 (也就是说，不是把精神现象化约为粗糙的生物学决定，而是探明生物学资料影响精神领域的确切方式)，那么拉康就会完全赞同生物学化的思想 (Ec, 723)。对此，最清楚的例子就是拉康借助一些来自动物行为学的例子论证了形象充当释放机制 (releasing mechanisms)的效力。因此，拉康在其有关镜子阶段的说明中便提到了鸽子与蝗虫 (E, 3),而且在他有关拟态 (mimicry)的说明中也提到了甲壳纲动物 (S11,99)(见：格式塔[GESTALT]).
因而，在拉康有关性别差异的说明中，他便遵循弗洛伊德的观点，拒绝“解剖抑或习俗”(anatomy or convention)之间的错误二分 (Freud, 1933a: SE XXII, 114)。拉康关心的不是给任何一者赋予特权，而是要说明此两者在采取某种性别位置的过程中如何以复杂的方式相互作用。
(biologie) Freud's work is full of references to biology. Freud regarded biology as amodel of scientific rigour on which to base the new science of psychoanalysis. Lacan, however, is strongly opposed to any attempt to construct psychoanalysis upon abiological model, arguing that the direct application of biological (orethological/psychological) concepts (such as ADAPTATION) to psychoanalysis willinevitably be misleading and will obliterate the essential distinction between NATUREand culture. Such biologising explanations of human behaviour ignore, according to Lacan, the primacy of the symbolic order in human existence. Lacan sees this 'biologism'in the work of those psychoanalysts who have confused desire with need, and drives withinstincts, concepts which he insists on distinguishing.
These arguments are evident from the very earliest of Lacan's psychoanalyticwritings. In his 1938 work on the family, for example, he rejects any attempt to explainfamily structures on the basis of purely biological data, and argues that humanpsychology is regulated by complexes rather than by instincts (Lacan, 1938:23-4).
Lacan argues that his refusal of biological reductionism is not a contradiction of Freudbut a return to the essence of Freud's work. When Freud used biological models, he did so simply because biology was at that time a model of scientific rigour in general, andbecause the conjectural sciences had not then achieved the same degree of rigour. Freudcertainly did not confuse psychoanalysis with biology or any other exact science, andwhen he borrowed concepts from biology (such as the concept of the drive) he reworkedthem in such a radical way that they become totally new concepts. For example, theconcept of the death instinct'is not a question of biology' (E, 102). Lacan expresses hispoint with a paradox: 'Freudian biology has nothing to do with biology' (S2,75).
Lacan, like Freud, uses concepts borrowed from biology (e.g.imago, dehiscence), andthen reworks them in an entirely symbolic framework. Perhaps the most significantexample of this is Lacan's concept of the PHALLUS, which he conceives as a signifierand not as a bodily organ. Thus while Freud conceives of the castration complex andsexual difference in terms of the presence and absence of the penis, Lacan theorises themin non-biological, non-anatomical terms (the presence and absence of the phallus). Thishas been one of the main attractions of Lacanian theory for certain feminist writers whohave seen it as a way of constructing a non-essentialist account of gendered subjectivity.
However, while Lacan consistently rejects all forms of biological reductionism, healso rejects the culturalist position which completely ignores the relevance of biology (Ec, 723). If 'biologising'is understood correctly (that is, not as the reduction of psychicphenomena to crude biological determination, but as discerning the precise way in whichbiological data impact on the psychical field), then Lacan is all in favour of biologisingthought (Ec, 723). The clearest examples of this are Lacan's appeals to examples fromanimal ethology to demonstrate the power of images to act as releasing mechanisms; hence Lacan's references to pigeons and locusts in his account of the mirror stage (E, 3), and to crustaceans in his account of mimicry (S11,99)(see GESTALT).
Thus in his account of sexual difference, Lacan follows Freud's rejection of the falsedichotomy between 'anatomy or convention' (Freud, 1933a: SE XXII, 114). Lacan'sconcern is not to privilege either term but to show how both interact in complex ways inthe process of assuming a sexual position.