‌‌‌‌　　英：woman; 法：femme

‌‌‌‌　　弗洛伊德有关性别差异 (SEXUAL DIFFERENCE)的说明乃是基于以下的观点：存在着一些可以被称作“男性”(masculine)的精神特征，而其他的精神特征则可以被称作“女性”(feminine), 而且它们彼此之间也有显著的不同。然而，弗洛伊德一贯拒绝对“男性”和“女性”这些术语给出任何定义，认为它们都是精神分析理论可以使用却无法阐明的基本概念 (Freud, 1920a:SEXVⅢ，171).

‌‌‌‌　　此种对立的一项特征，即在于这两项术语并非以某种恰好对称的方式而运作。男性特质 (masculinity)被弗洛伊德拿来当作范式，他宣称只有一种力比多，即男性的力比多，而女孩的精神发展则起初与男孩的相同，只是在后来的时刻上才有所偏离。因而，女性特质 (femininity)便是从男性范式中偏离出来的东西，弗洛伊德将其看作某种神秘莫测的、未经探索的领域，即“黑暗大陆”(Freud, 1926e: SEXX, 212)。“女性特质的本质之谜”(Freud, 1933a:SEXXⅡ，113)在弗洛伊德的晚期作品中渐渐占据了他的思想，并且驱使他问出了一个著名的问题，即“女人想要什么？”(见：Jones, 1953-7: vol. 2,468)。男性特质是一种自明的给定，而女性特质则是一个神秘的地带：

精神分析并不试图去描述什么是一个女人一那将会是它几乎不可能完成的一项任务一而是着手去询问她是如何生成的，即一个女人是如何从一个带有双性倾向的孩子发展而来的。

(Freud, 1933a:SEXXⅡ，116)

‌‌‌‌　　除了对于母亲 (MOTHER)在家庭情结中的作用有少数的评论之外 (Lacan, 1938), 拉康“二战”前的著作并未着手处理关于女性特质的争论。在1950年代早期偶然出现在拉康著作中的几则有关此一主题的陈述，也都是根据得自克劳德·列维-斯特劳斯的措辞来表达的，女人们被看作像符号一般在亲属关系群团之间流通的交换对象 (见：Lcvi-Stauss, 1949b)。“女人们在现实的秩序中充当着…亲属关系的基本结构所需要的交换的对象。”(E, 207)拉康指出，女人被推向了一个交换对象的位置，正是这一事实构成了女性位置的困难性：

‌‌‌‌　　对她来说，在象征秩序中被置于一个对象的位置；而另一方面，她对于象征秩序的臣服又丝毫不亚于男人，在这一事实中存在着某种无法克服的东西，让我们说，是无法接受的东西。

‌‌‌‌　　(S2,262)

‌‌‌‌　　拉康有关杜拉个案的分析也得出了同样的观点：杜拉无法接受的恰恰是她在自己父亲与K先生之间作为交换对象的位置（见：Lacan, 1951a)。处在这个交换对象的位置上，即意味着女人“跟象征秩序之间具有一种次等的关系”(S2,262; 见：S4,95-6).

‌‌‌‌　　在1956年，拉康接纳了癔症 (HYSTERIA)与女性特质之间的传统联系，指出癔症其实无非就是女性特质本身的问题，这个问题可以被表述为“什么是一个女人？”。这对男性与女性的癔症患者而言皆是如此。“女人”这一措辞在此指涉的并非是某种生物性的本质，而是象征秩序中的一个位置，它是“女性位置”(feminine po-sion)这一术语的同义词。此外，拉康还声称“就其本身而言，并不存在女人性别的任何象征化”，因为由阳具所提供的那个“极其盛行的符号”并没有任何女性的等价物 (S3,176)。此种象征性的不对称，便迫使女人采取了跟男孩同样的道路来通过俄狄浦斯情结，即认同父亲。然而，这对女人而言是更加复杂的，因为她必须把一个异性成员的形象作为其认同的基础 (S3,176).

‌‌‌‌　　在1958年的一篇题为“针对一届有关女性性欲的大会的指导性言论”(Lacan, 1958d)的文章里，拉康又回到了女性特征的问题上。在这篇文章里，他注意到一些僵局阻碍了精神分析对于女性性欲的探讨，并且指出女人既是对于男人们而言的大他者，同时又是对于女人们而言的大他者：“男人在此充当着中继，女人从而变成了对她自己而言的这一大他者，正如她是对他而言的这一大他者那样。”(Ec, 732)

‌‌‌‌　　如同弗洛伊德一样，拉康对于有关女性特征的争论所做出的那些最重要的贡献，在很晚的时候才出现在他的著作当中。在1972一1973年度的研讨班上，拉康提出了一种“超越阳具”(beyond the phallus)的专指女性“享乐”(JOUISSANCE)的概念 (S20,69)。此种享乐“属于无限的秩序”，譬如神秘主义的出神 (S20,44)。女人们虽然可以体验到此种“享乐”，但是她们对此一无所知 (S20,71)。同样是在这期研讨班上，拉康又再度论及他在1970一1971年度的研讨班上首次提出的那句颇有争议的格言，即“女人并不存在”(la femme n'existe pas; 见：Lacan, 1973a:60), 而他在这里则将其重新表述为“没有大写的女人”(ln'y a pas Lafemme; 见：S20,68)。正如法语原文所清楚地显示的那样，拉康在质疑的并非是“女人”这个名词，而是它前面的那个定冠词。在法语中，这个定冠词表示普遍性，而这恰恰是女人们所缺乏的特征：女人们“并不屈从于普遍化，哪怕是阳具中心的普遍化”(Lacan, 1975b)。因此，每当这个定冠词出现在“女人”一词的前面，拉康都会将其画掉，正如他划掉A以产生被画杠的大他者的符号那样，因为像女人一样，大他者也是不存在的 (见：杠[BAR])。为了极力主张此种观点，拉康便把女人说成是“并非全部”（英：not-all; 法：pastoute)的 (S20,13), 男性特征是基于阳具的例外而建立的一种普遍的功能（阉割）。与此不同，女人则是不容许任何例外的一种并非普遍 (non-universal)。女人之所以被比作真理，是因为两者皆享有并非全部的逻辑 (根本没有全部女人这样的东西，也不可能道出“全部真理”①)(Lacan, 1973a:64).

‌‌‌‌　　在1975年，拉康又继续声称“女人是一个症状”(Lacan, 19745:1975年1月21日的研讨班)。更确切地说，一个女人即是一个男人的症状，因为在某种意义上说，一个女人永远都只能作为一个幻想的对象（），即作为男人们的欲望的原因，而进入他们的精神经济 (psychic economy).

‌‌‌‌　　拉康有关女人与女性性欲的这些评论，已然在女性主义理论中变成了争论与争议的焦点。女性主义者们在把拉康视作女性主义事业的盟友抑或敌人的问题上分成了两派。一些人把他的理论看作在给父权制提供一种尖刻的描述，是在挑战有关性别同一性的那些固定概念的一种方式 (例如：Mitchell and Rose, 1982)。其他人则认为他的象征秩序的概念是把父权制作为一种超历史性的给定 (transhistorical given)而重新安置了下来，而且他给阳具赋予的特权也只不过是在重复弗洛伊德自己的所谓厌女症（例如：Gop, 1982; Grosz, 1990)。至于这场争论中的代表性样本，见：Adams and Cowie (1990)与Brennan (1989)。至于拉康有关女性性欲的说明，见：Leader (1996)。

‌‌‌‌　　(femme) Freud's account of SEXUAL DIFFERENCE is based on the view that there arecertain psychical characteristics that can be called 'masculine'and others that can becalled feminine', and that these differ from each other significantly. However, Freudconstantly refuses to give any definition of the terms 'masculine'and feminine', arguingthat they are foundational concepts which can be used but not elucidated bypsychoanalytic theory (Freud, 1920a: SE XVIII, 171).

‌‌‌‌　　One feature of this opposition is that the two terms do not function in an exactlysymmetrical way. Masculinity is taken by Freud as the paradigm; he asserts that there isonly one libido, which is masculine, and that the psychical development of the girl is atfirst identical to that of the boy, only diverging at a later moment. Femininity is thus thatwhich diverges from the masculine paradigm, and Freud regards it as a mysterious, unexplored region, a 'dark continent' (Freud, 1926e: SE XX, 212). The riddle of thenature of femininity' (Freud, 1933a: SE XXII, 113) comes to preoccupy Freud in his laterwritings, and drives him to ask the famous question,'What does woman want?' (see Jones, 1953-7: vol. 2,468). Masculinity is a self-evident given, femininity is a zone ofmystery:

‌‌‌‌　　Psychoanalysis does not try to describe what a woman is-that would be atask it could scarcely perform-but sets about enquiring how she comesinto being, how a woman develops out of a child with a bisexualdisposition.

‌‌‌‌　　(Freud, 1933a: SE XXII, 116)

‌‌‌‌　　Apart from a few remarks on the function of the MOTHER in the family complexes (Lacan, 1938), Lacan's pre-war writings do not engage with the debate on femininity. The occasional statements on the subject which occur in Lacan's work in the early 1950sare couched in terms derived from Claude Levi-Strauss; women are seen as objects ofexchange which circulate like signs between kinship groups (see Levi-Strauss, 1949b). Women in the real order serve... As objects for the exchanges required by the elementarystructures of kinship' (E, 207). Lacan argues that it is precisely the fact that woman ispushed into the position of an exchange object that constitutes the difficulty of thefeminine position:

For her, there's something insurmountable, let us say unacceptable, in thefact of being placed in the position of an object in the symbolic order, towhich, on the other hand, she is entirely subjected no less than the man.

(S2,262)

‌‌‌‌　　Lacan's analysis of the Dora case makes the same point: what is unacceptable for Dora isher position as object of exchange between her father and Herr K (see Lacan, 1951a). Being in this position of exchange object means that woman 'has a relation of the seconddegree to this symbolic order' (S2,262; see S4,95-6).

‌‌‌‌　　In 1956, Lacan takes up the traditional association of HYSTERIA with femininity, arguing that hysteria is in fact nothing other than the question of femininity itself, thequestion which may be phrased 'What is a woman?'. This is true for both male andfemale hysterics (S3,178). The term 'woman'here refers not to some biological essencebut to a position in the symbolic order; it is synonymous with the term 'feminineposition'. Lacan also argues that 'there is no symbolisation of woman's sex as such', since there is no feminine equivalent to the 'highly prevalent symbol'provided by thephallus (S3,176). This symbolic dissymmetry forces the woman to take the same routethrough the Oedipus complex as the boy,i.e.to identify with the father. However, this ismore complex for the woman, since she is required to take the image of a member of theother sex as the basis for her identification (S3,176).

‌‌‌‌　　Lacan returns to the question of femininity in 1958, in a paper entitled 'Guidingremarks for a congress on feminine sexuality' (Lacan, 1958d). In this paper he notes theimpasses which have beset psychoanalytic discussions of feminine sexuality, and arguesthat woman is the Other for both men and women;'Man here acts as the relay wherebythe woman becomes this Other for herself as she is this Other for him' (Ec, 732).

‌‌‌‌　　Lacan's most important contributions to the debate on femininity come, like Freud's, late in his work. In the seminar of 1972-3, Lacan advances the concept of a specificallyfeminine JOUISSANCE which goes 'beyond the phallus' (S20,69); this jouissance is 'ofthe order of the infinite', like mystical ecstasy (S20,44). Women may experience thisjouissance, but they know nothing about it (S20,71). It is also in this seminar that Lacantakes up his controversial formula, first advanced in the seminar of 1970-1,'Womandoes not exist' (la femme n'existe pas-Lacan, 1973a:60), which he here rephrases asthere is no such thing as Woman' (il n'y a pas La femme-S20,68). As is clear in theoriginal French, what Lacan puts into question is not the noun 'woman', but the definitearticle which precedes it. In French the definite article indicates universality, and this isprecisely the characteristic that women lack; women 'do not lend themselves togeneralisation, even to phallocentric generalisation' (Lacan, 1975b). Hence Lacan strikesthrough the definite article whenever it precedes the term femme in much the same wayas he strikes through the A to produce the symbol for the barred Other, for like woman, the Other does not exist (see BAR). To press home the point, Lacan speaks of woman asnot-all' (pas-toute; S20,13); unlike masculinity, which is a universal function foundedupon the phallic exception (castration), woman is a non-universal which admits of noexception. Woman is compared to truth, since both partake of the logic of the not-all (there is no such thing as all women; it is impossible to say 'the whole truth')(Lacan, 1973a:64).

‌‌‌‌　　Lacan goes on in 1975 to state that 'a woman is a symptom' (Lacan, 1974-5: seminarof 21 January 1975). More precisely, a woman is a symptom ofa man, in the sense that awoman can only ever enter the psychic economy of men as a fantasy object (a), the causeof their desire.

‌‌‌‌　　Lacan's remarks on woman and on feminine sexuality have become the focus ofcontroversy and debate in feminist theory. Feminists have divided over whether to see Lacan as an ally or an enemy of the feminist cause. Some have seen his theories asproviding an incisive description of patriarchy and as a way of challenging fixed conceptsof sexual identity (e.g.Mitchell and Rose, 1982). Others have argued that his concept ofthe symbolic order reinstates patriarchy as a transhistorical given, and that his privilegingof the phallus simply repeats the alleged misogynies of Freud himself (e.g.Gallop, 1982; Grosz, 1990). For representative samples of the debate, see Adams and Cowie (1990) and Brennan (1989). For a Lacanian account of feminine sexuality, see Leader (1996).