‌‌‌‌　　英：truth; 法：verite

‌‌‌‌　　在拉康的话语中，真理是最为核心却也最为复杂的术语之一。在拉康的真理概念中，有着几个清晰且恒定的基本观点：真理总是指涉有关欲望的真理，而精神分析治疗的目标便是引导分析者去道出这一真理。真理并不等待以某种预先形成的充分状态而由分析家向分析者揭示出来，相反，它是在治疗本身的辩证运动中被逐渐建构出来的 (Ec, 144)。拉康指出，与古典哲学的传统相反，真理并非是美的 (S7,217),而且了解真理也并非必然是有益的 (S17,122)。虽然拉康在谈到“真理”的时候总是会使用该词的单数形式，但是这并非是一种单一的、普遍的真理，而是一种绝对的、特殊的真理，即对每个主体而言都是独一无二的真理（见：S7,24)。然而，除了这几个简单的观点之外，我们不可能对拉康使用该术语的方式给出一种意义明确的定义，因为它同时运作于多重语境，对立于各种术语。因此，我们在这里所能做出的一切尝试，便是对它运作于其中的某些语境给出一种一般性的标示。

‌‌‌‌　　·真理相对于正确正确 (exactitude)涉及的是“把尺度引入实在”(E, 74), 并且构成了精确科学的目标。然而，真理则关涉欲望，欲望不是关乎精确科学而是关于主体性科学的问题。因此，唯有在语言的脉络下，真理才是一个有意义的概念：“正是由于语言的出现，真理的维度才得以显现。”(E, 172)精神分析治疗便被建立在这样一个根本前提的基础之上，即言语是揭示出有关欲望的真理的唯一手段。“多亏有言语的维度，真理才得以挖通了其通往实在的道路。在言语之前是没有任何真假而言的。”(S1,228)

‌‌‌‌　　·真理与科学 (SCIENCE)从拉康最早期的作品开始，“真理”这一术语便具有了一些形而上学甚至是神秘主义的细微差别，从而问题化了任何旨在链接真理与科学的企图。这并非是说拉康否认科学的目标是认识真理，而仅仅是说科学不能宣称将真理垄断为自己的独有财产 (Ec, 79)。拉康后来又指出，科学的基础其实恰恰在于它排除了作为原因的真理概念 (Ec, 874)。真理的概念对于理解疯癫而言是必不可少的，现代科学却因为无视真理的概念而把疯癫变得毫无意义可言 (Ec, 153-4).

‌‌‌‌　　·真理、谎言与欺骗真理与欺骗密切相关，因为相比于实话，谎言往往能够更加富于表现力地揭示出有关欲望的真理。欺骗与谎言并非真理的对立面：恰恰相反，它们皆被铭刻在真理的文本当中。分析家的角色便在于揭示出铭刻在分析者言语的欺骗中的真理。尽管分析者实际上可能对分析家说的是“我在欺骗你”，然而分析家会对分析者说：“在这句‘我在欺骗你’当中，你将其作为信息发送过来的就是我要向你表达的，而在这么做的时候，你是在讲述真理。”(S11,139-40: 见：S4,107-8)

‌‌‌‌　　·真理相对于假象分析者所呈现出的那些假象 (false appearances)并不仅仅是分析家为了发现真理而必须揭露且摒弃的障碍：恰恰相反，分析家必须把这些假象纳入考量（见：假相[SEMBLANCE]).

‌‌‌‌　　·真理、谬误与过失精神分析业已表明，有关欲望的真理往往都是经由那些过失 (即过失行为：见：行动[ACT])而被揭示出来的。拉康曾经说过一句典型的难以捉摸的话，从而引起了真理、过失、谬误与欺骗之间的复杂关系，当时他把“言语在寻求真理时的结构化作用”描述为“谬误在欺骗中逃之天天，却被过失重新捕获" (S1,273).

‌‌‌‌　　·真理与虚构拉康并未把“虚构”(fiction)这一术语使用在某种“虚假性”(falsehood)的意义上，而是将其使用在某种科学性建构 (scientific construct)的意义上（拉康在此是从边沁那里得到的提示，见：S7,12)。因而，拉康的“虚构”一词便对应着弗洛伊德所谓的“约定俗成”(英：convention; 德：Konvention)(见：Sl1, I63), 相较于虚假性而言，它与真理有着更多的共同之处。实际上，拉康声称：“真理是像虚构那样被结构的。”(E, 306; Ec, 808)

‌‌‌‌　　·真理与实在 (REAL)拉康在真理与实在之间做出的区分，可以追溯至他在“二战”前的那些作品 (例如：Ec, 75), 而且他在不同的地方也都对此有所论及，“我们习惯于实在，我们压抑了真理”(E, 169)。然而，拉康也同样指出，真理是与实在相类似的：我们不可能道出全部的真理，而且“正是因为此种不可能性，真理才渴求着实在”(Lacan, 1973a:83)。

‌‌‌‌　　(verite) Truth is one of the most central, and yet most complex terms in Lacan'sdiscourse. A few basic points are clear and constant in Lacan's concept of truth; truthalways refers to truth about desire, and the aim of psychoanalytic treatment is to lead theanalysand to articulate this truth. Truth does not await, in some preformed state offullness, to be revealed to the analysand by the analyst; on the contrary, it is graduallyconstructed in the dialectical movement of the treatment itself (Ec, 144). Lacan argues, inopposition to the traditions of classical philosophy, that truth is not beautiful (S7,217) and that it is not necessarily beneficial to leam the truth (S17,122). While Lacan alwaysspeaks about'truth'in the singular, this is not a single universal truth, but an absolutelyparticular truth, unique to each subject (see S7,24). However, beyond these few simplepoints, it is impossible to give a univocal definition of the way Lacan uses the term, sinceit functions in multiple contexts simultaneously, in opposition to a wide variety of terms. All that will be attempted here, therefore, is a general indication of some of the contextsin which it functions.

‌‌‌‌　　Truth versus exactitude Exactitude is a question of 'introducing measurement intothe real' (E, 74), and constitutes the aim of the exact sciences. Truth, however, concernsdesire, which is not a matter for the exact sciences but for the sciences of subjectivity. Therefore truth is only a meaningful concept in the context of language: 'It is with theappearance of language that the dimension of truth emerges' (E, 172). Psychoanalytic treatment is based on the fundamental premise that speech is the only means of revealingthe truth about desire.'Truth hollows its way into the real thanks to the dimension ofspeech. There is neither true nor false prior to speech' (S1,228).

‌‌‌‌　　Truth and SCIENCE From Lacan's earliest writings, the term 'truth'hasmetaphysical, even mystical, nuances which problematise any attempt to articulate truthand science. It is not that Lacan denies that science aims to know the truth, but simplythat science cannot claim to monopolise truth as its exclusive property (Ec, 79). Lacanlater argues that science is in fact based on a foreclosure of the concept of truth as cause (Ec, 874). The concept of truth is essential for understanding madness, and modemscience renders madness meaningless by ignoring the concept of truth (Ec, 153-4).

‌‌‌‌　　Truth, lies and deception Truth is intimately connected with deception, since liescan often reveal the truth about desire more eloquently than honest statements. Deceptionand lies are not the opposite of truth: on the contrary, they are inscribed in the text oftruth. The analyst's role is to reveal the truth inscribed in the deception of the analysand'sspeech. Although the analysand may in effect be saying to the analyst 'I am deceivingyou', the analyst says to the analysand 'In this I am deceiving to you, what you aresending as message is what I express to you, and in doing so you are telling the truth' (S11,139-40; seeS4,107-8).

‌‌‌‌　　Truth versus false appearances The false appearances presented by the analysandare not merely obstacles that the analyst must expose and discard in order to discover thetruth; on the contrary, the analyst must take them into account (see SEMBLANCE).

‌‌‌‌　　Truth, error and mistakes Psychoanalysis has shown that the truth about desire isoften revealed by mistakes (parapraxes; see ACT). The complex relations between truth, mistakes, error and deception are evoked by Lacan in a typically elusive phrase when hedescribes the structuration of speech in search of truth'as 'error takingflight indeception and recaptured by mistake' (S1,273).

‌‌‌‌　　Truth and fiction Lacan does not use the term 'fiction'in the sense of 'afalsehood', but in the sense of a scientific construct (Lacan takes his cue here from Bentham-see S7,12). Thus Lacan's term 'fiction'corresponds to Freud'sterm Konvention, convention (see S11,163), and has more in common with truth thanfalsehood. Indeed, Lacan states that truth is structured like a fiction (E, 306; Ec, 808)

‌‌‌‌　　Truth and the REAL The opposition which Lacan draws between truth and thereal dates back to his pre-war writings (e.g.Ec, 75), and is taken up at various points; We are used to the real. The truth we repress' (E, 169). However, Lacan also points outthat truth is similar to the real; it is impossible to articulate the whole truth, and'[precisely because of this impossibility, truth aspires to the real' (Lacan, 1973a:83)