英：desire; 法：desir; 德：Vunsch/Begierde
拉康的“désir”（欲望）一词，是在弗洛伊德的法文译本中被用来翻译弗洛伊德的“Wunsch”的术语，该词在《标准版》中被斯特雷奇翻译成“wish”（愿望）。因此，拉康著作的英文译者们便面对着一个两难困境：他们是应该用“wish”来翻译“désir”，这样更接近于弗洛伊德的“Wunsch”，还是应该将其译作“desire”，这样更接近于法文术语，但缺乏对于弗洛伊德的影射？拉康著作的所有英文译者都选择了后者，因为英文术语“desire'”就像法文术语一样传达着某种持续力量的意涵，此即拉康概念的本质。这个英文术语也像法文术语那样带有对于黑格尔的“Begierde”的影射，并因而保持了哲学上的细微差别，这对拉康的“欲望”概念而言是如此的本质，而且使它成为“一个比弗洛伊德自己所使用的任何概念都要更加宽泛且更加抽象的范畴”(Macey,1995:80)。
如果说有任何一个概念能够宣称是拉康思想的真正核心的话，那么这便是欲望的概念。拉康遵循斯宾诺莎的观点声称“欲望是人的本质”(S11,275; 见：Spinoza, 1677:128); 欲望是人类存在 (human existence)的中心，同时也是精神分析的核心关切。然而，当拉康谈论欲望的时候，他指涉的并不是任何类型的欲望，而始终都是无意识的欲望。这并非是因为拉康把有意识的欲望看作不重要的，而仅仅是因为正是无意识的欲望构成了精神分析的核心关切。无意识的欲望完全是性欲化的，“无意识的动机仅限于…性的欲望…另一种主要的一般性欲望，即饥饿的欲望，是不被表征的”(E, 142).
精神分析治疗的目标，即在于引导分析者承认有关其欲望的真理。然而，只有当某人的欲望在言语中被道出的时候，承认这个欲望才是可能的：“只有当它在他者的面前被表述、被命名的时候，那个欲望，无论它是什么，才会在该词的充分意义上得到承认。”(S1,183)
因此，在精神分析当中，“重要的就是要教会主体去命名、去道出、去生成这个欲望”(S2,228)。然而，它涉及的不是给某种特定的欲望寻找一种全新的表达方式，因为这可能隐含着一种表现主义的语言理论 (expressionist theory of language)。相反，通过在言语中道出欲望，分析者生成了它：
主体应当抵达对其欲望的承认与命名，这便是分析的有效性行动。但是，这涉及的不是去承认某种可能完全是给定的东西…通过给它命名，主体便在世界上创造了、生成了一个全新的在场。
(S2,228-9)
然而，至于欲望能够在多大程度上以言语来道出，却存在着一个限制，因为“在欲望与言语之间存在着某种根本的不可相容性”（E, 275):正是此种不可相容性说明了无意识的不可化约性 (即事实上，无意识并非是不被知道的东西，而是无法被知道的东西)。尽管就某种程度而言，有关欲望的真理在所有的言语中皆会存在，然而言语却永远无法道出有关欲望的全部真理：只要言语试图去道出欲望，就总是会产生某种残留，某种超出言语的剩余。拉康对于其同时代的精神分析理论的最重要的批评之一，便是它们倾向把欲望的概念混淆于要求 (DEMAND)与需要 (NEED)的相关概念。与此种倾向相反，拉康坚持强调在这三个概念之间进行区分。这一区分在1957年便开始出现在他的著作当中（见：S4,100-1,125),但是直至1958年才具体成形 (Lacan, 1958c).
需要是一种纯粹的生物性本能 (NSTINCT), 是一种根据有机体的需求而出现并在得到满足时完全（即便只是暂时性地）缓和的胃口。人类主体由于诞生于一种无助的状态，无法满足其自身的种种需要，因此便依赖于大他者帮助其来满足这些需要。为了得到大他者的帮助，婴儿便必须用声音来表达自己的需要：需要必须在要求中得到链接/获得表达。婴儿的那些原始要求可能只是一些表达不清的哭闹，但是这些哭闹足以将大他者招来以满足婴儿的需要。然而，大他者的在场就其本身而言很快获得了某种重要性，此种重要性超越了需要的满足，因为这一在场象征化了大他者的爱。因此，要求很快便具有了某种双重功能，既充当着需要的表达，又充当着对爱的要求。然而，虽然大他者能够提供主体所要求的那些满足其需要的对象，但是大他者无法提供主体所渴望的那种无条件的爱。因此，即使在那些用要求来表达的需要得到满足之后，要求的另一面向，即对爱的渴望，却始终得不到满足，而这个剩余物便是欲望。“欲望既非对满足的胃口，亦非对爱的要求，而是从后者中减去前者所得的差值”(E, 287).
欲望因而是由于需要在要求的链接中被表达出来而产生的剩余，“在要求变得同需要分离开来的空白边际，欲望开始形成”（E, 311)。需要可以得到满足，继而停止刺激主体，直至另一需要产生为止，与此不同的是，欲望却永远无法得到满足；在其压力上它是恒定的，而且是永恒的。就其本身而言，欲望的实现并非在于得到“满足”，而是在于欲望的再生。
拉康对于需要与欲望的区分，把欲望的概念完全抬升到了生物学的领域之外，从而令人强烈地联想到科耶夫对于动物欲望与人类欲望的区分：当欲望要么被导向另一个欲望，要么被导向一个“从生物学观，点来看是完全没有用的”对象的时候，它就显得是人类独有的欲望 (Kojeve, 1947:6).
重要的是在欲望与冲动之间做出区分。尽管它们两者皆属于大他者的领域（与爱相反），然而欲望是单一的，而冲动则是繁多的。换句话说，冲动是被称作欲望的某种单一力量的一些特殊（部分）表现（尽管也可能有一些欲望没有被表现在冲动之中：见：S11,243)。欲望只有一个对象，即对象小a (OBJET PETIT A), 而且这一对象是由不同部分冲动中的各种部分对象所代表的。对象小并非欲望所趋向的对象，而是欲望的原因。欲望不是一种与对象的关系，而是一种与缺失 (LACK)的关系。
拉康最经常重复的一则公式即：“人的欲望是大他者的欲望。”(S11,235)这句话能够以很多互补的方式来理解，下面便是其中最重要的几种理解：
(1)欲望在本质上是“对于大他者的欲望的欲望”，这既意味着欲望成为一个他者欲望的对象，也意味着欲望得到一个他者的承认。拉康经由科耶夫从黑格尔那里接受了此种思想，科耶夫宣称：
只有当一个人欲望的不是身体，而是他者的欲望 (Desire)的时候…也就是说，当他想要“被欲望”或是“被爱”的时候，或者更确切地讲，想要让其个人价值“被承认”的时候，欲望才是人类的欲望…换句话说，所有人类的、人类发生学上的欲望 (Desire)…最终，都会起到一种对于“承认”的欲望的功能。
(Kojeve, 1947:6)
科耶夫继续指出（仍然是遵循黑格尔），为了获得所欲望的承认，主体就必须在一场为了纯粹声望的斗争 (struggle for pure prestige)中冒上牺牲自己生命的危险 (见：主人[MASTER])。欲望在本质上是欲望成为一个他者欲望的对象，这一点在俄狄浦斯情结的第一“时间”上得到了清楚的阐明，主体在此时间上欲望着成为母亲的阳具。
(2)主体正是作为大他者来进行欲望的 (E, 312): 也就是说，主体是从一个他者的立场来进行欲望的。如此的结果便是“人类欲望的对象…在本质上是一个为别人所欲望的对象”(Lacan, 1951b:12)。把一个对象变得可欲望的东西，并非是事物本身的任何内在品质，而仅仅是它被另一个人所欲望的这一事实。大他者的欲望因而便是把对象变得等价且可交换的东西；这虽然“往往会减少任何一个特殊对象的特别重要性，但它同时又会把无数对象的存在带入视野”(Lacan, 1951b:12).
这种思想同样得自科耶夫对于黑格尔的解读，科耶夫指出：“指向一个自然对象的欲望，只有就它被另一个人指向同一对象的欲望 (Desire)所‘中介'而言，才是人类的欲望：只有人类会因为其他人对某种东西的欲望而去欲求其他人所欲求的这个东西。”(Koj心ve, 1947:6)对此的原因可以追溯至前面有关人类的欲望即对于承认的欲望的观点；通过欲求一个他者所欲求的东西，我便可以让这个他者承认我占有那一对象的权力，从而让这个他者承认我凌驾在他之上的优越性 (Kojève, 1947:40)。
欲望的这一普遍特征在意症中尤其明显：癔症患者即这样的种人，她支撑着另一个人的欲望，同时又将另一个人的欲望转变成她自己的欲望（例如，杜拉欲望K夫人，就是因为她认同了K先生，因而把他被感知到的欲望据为己有；S4,138; 见：Freud, 1905e).
因此，在对一个意症患者的分析当中，重要的就不是要找出她所欲望的对象，而是要发现她从中欲望的位置（即她所认同的主体）。
(3)欲望是对于大他者的欲望 (玩味法语介词“de”的多义性)。根本性的欲望即对于母亲这个原始大他者的乱伦性欲望(S7,67).
(4)欲望永远是“对于别的东西的欲望”(E, 167), 因为我们不可能对自己已经拥有的东西产生欲望。产生欲望的对象是在不断延宕的，这就是为什么欲望是一则换喻 (METONYMY)(E, 175).
(5)就起源而言，欲望出现在大他者的领域之中，即出现在无意识之中。
从拉康的这句话中显示出来的最重要的一点，即在于欲望是种社会性的产物。欲望并非是它看上去所是的私人事务，而是始终在与其他主体被感知到的欲望的辩证关系中被构成的。
第一个占据大他者位置的人便是母亲，而且孩子也首先会受到她的欲望所支配。只有当父亲 (Father)通过阉割母亲而将欲望链接于法则的时候，主体才会从对反复无常的母亲欲望的屈从 (subjection)之中被解救出来（见：阉割情结[CASTRATION COMPLEX])。
(desir) Lacan's term, desir, is the term used in the French translations of Freud totranslate Freud's term Wunsch, which is translated as 'wish'by Strachey in the Standard Edition. Hence English translators of Lacan are faced with a dilemma; should theytranslate desir by 'wish', which is closer to Freud's Wunsch, or should they translate it as 'desire', which is closer to the French term, but which lacks the allusion to Freud? All of Lacan's English translators have opted for the latter, since the English term 'desire'conveys, like the French term, the implication of a continuous force, which is essential to Lacan's concept. The English term also carries with it the same allusions to Hegel's Begierde as are carried by the French term, and thus retains the philosophical nuanceswhich are so essential to Lacan's concept of desir and which make it 'a category farwider and more abstract than any employed by Freud himself (Macey, 1995:80).
If there is any one concept which can claim to be the very centre of Lacan's thought, itis the concept of desire. Lacan follows Spinoza in arguing that 'desire is the essence ofman' (S11,275; see Spinoza, 1677:128); desire is simultaneously the heart of humanexistence, and the central concern of psychoanalysis. However, when Lacan talks aboutdesire, it is not any kind of desire he is referring to, but always unconscious desire. Thisis not because Lacan sees conscious desire as unimportant, but simply because it isunconscious desire that forms the central concemn of psychoanalysis. Unconscious desireis entirely sexual;'the motives of the unconscious are limited... To sexual desire... Theother great generic desire, that of hunger, is not represented' (E, 142).
The aim of psychoanalytic treatment is to lead the analysand to recognise the truthabout his desire. However, it is only possible to recognise one's desire when it isarticulated in speech: 'It is only once it is formulated, named in the presence of the other, that desire, whatever it is, is recognised in the full sense of the term' (S1,183).
Hence in psychoanalysis 'what's important is to teach the subject to name, toarticulate, to bring this desire into existence' (S2,228). However, it is not a question ofseeking a new means of expression for a given desire, for this would imply aexpressionist theory of language. On the contrary, by articulating desire in speech, theanalysand brings it into existence:
That the subject should come to recognise and to name his desire; that isthe efficacious action of analysis. But it isn't a question of recognisingsomething which would be entirely given.... In naming it, the subjectcreates, brings forth, a new presence in the world.
(S2,228-9)
However, there is a limit to how far desire can be articulated in speech because of afundamental incompatibility between desire and speech' (E, 275); it is thisincompatibility which explains the irreducibility of the unconscious (i.e.the fact that theunconscious is not that which is not known, but that which cannot be known). Althoughthe truth about desire is present to some degree in all speech, speech can never articulatethe whole truth about desire; whenever speech attempts to articulate desire, there isalways a leftover, a surplus, which exceeds speech.
One of Lacan's most important criticisms of the psychoanalytic theories of his daywas that they tended to confuse the concept of desire with the related concepts ofDEMAND and NEED. In opposition to this tendency, Lacan insists on distinguishingbetween these three concepts. This distinction begins to emerge in his work in 1957 (see S4,100-1,125), but only crystallises in 1958 (Lacan, 1958c).
Need is a purely biological INSTINCT, an appetite which emerges according to therequirements of the organism and which abates completely (even if only temporarily)
When satisfied. The human subject, being born in a state of helplessness, is unable tosatisfy its own needs, and hence depends on the Other to help it satisfy them. In order toget the Other's help, the infant must express its needs vocally; need must be articulated indemand. The primitive demands of the infant may only be inarticulate screams, but theyserve to bring the Other to minister to the infant's needs. However, the presence of the Other soon acquires an importance in itself, an importance that goes beyond thesatisfaction of need, since this presence symbolises the Other's love. Hence demand soontakes on a double function, serving both as an articulation of need and as a demand forlove. However, whereas the Other can provide the objects which the subject requires tosatisfy his needs, the Other cannot provide that unconditional love which the subjectcraves. Hence even after the needs which were articulated in demand have been satisfied, the other aspect of demand, the craving for love, remains unsatisfied, and this leftover isdesire. Desire is neither the appetite for satisfaction, nor the demand for love, but thedifference that results from the subtraction of the first from the second' (E, 287).
Desire is thus the surplus produced by the articulation of need in demand; Desirebegins to take shape in the margin in which demand becomes separated from need' (E, 311). Unlike a need, which can be satisfied and which then ceases to motivate the subjectuntil another need arises, desire can never be satisfied; it is constant in its pressure, andeternal. The realisation of desire does not consist in being 'fulfilled', but in thereproduction of desire as such.
Lacan's distinction between need and desire, which lifts the concept of desirecompletely out of the realm of biology, is strongly reminiscent of Kojeve's distinctionbetween animal and human desire; desire is shown to be distinctively human when it isdirected either toward another desire, or to an object which is 'perfectly useless from thebiological point of view' (Kojeve, 1947:6).
It is important to distinguish between desire and the drives. Although they both belongto the field of the Other (as opposed to love), desire is one whereas the drives are many. In other words, the drives are the particular (partial) manifestations of a single forcecalled desire (although there may also be desires which are not manifested in the drives: see S11,243). There is only one object of desire, OBJET PETIT4, and this is representedby a variety of partial objects in different partial drives. The OB. JET PETIT A is not theobject towards which desire tends, but the cause of desire. Desire is not a relation to anobject, but a relation to a LACK.
One of Lacan's most oft-repeated formulas is: 'man's desire is the desire of the Other' (S11,235). This can be understood in many complementary ways, of which the followingare the most important.
Desire is essentially 'desire of the Other's desire', which means both desire to bethe object of another's desire, and desire for recognition by another. Lacan takes this ideafrom Hegel, via Kojeve, who states:
Desire is human only if the one desires, not the body, but the Desire of theother... That is to say, if he wants to be 'desired'or 'loved', or, rather, recognised'in his human value.... In other words, all human, anthropogeneticIDesire... Is, finally, a function of the desire forrecognition'.
(Kojeve, 1947:6)
Kojeve goes on to argue (still following Hegel) that in order to achieve the desiredrecognition, the subject must risk his own life in a struggle for pure prestige (seeMASTER). That desire is essentially desire to be the object of another's desire is clearlyillustrated in the first 'time'of the Oedipus complex, when the subject desires to be thephallus for the mother. 2. It is qua Other that the subject desires (E, 312): that is, the subject desires from thepoint of view of another. The effect of this is that 'the object of man's desire... Isessentially an object desired by someone else' (Lacan, 1951b:12). What makes an objectdesirable is not any intrinsic quality of the thing in itself but simply the fact that it isdesired by another. The desire of the Other is thus what makes objects equivalent andexchangeable; this 'tends to diminish the special significance of any one particular object, but at the same time it brings into view the existence of objects without number' (Lacan, 1951b:12)
This idea too is taken from Kojeve's reading of Hegel; Kojeve argues that 'Desiredirected toward a natural object is human only to the extent that it is "mediated"by the Desire of another directed towards the same object: it is human to desire what othersdesire, because they desire it' (Kojeve, 1947:6). The reason for this goes back to theformer point about human desire being desire for recognition; by desiring that whichanother desires, I can make the other recognise my right to possess that object, and thusmake the other recognise my superiority over him (Kojeve, 1947:40).
This universal feature of desire is especially evident in hysteria; the hysteric is onewho sustains another person's desire, converts another's desire into her own (e.g.Doradesires Frau K because she identifies with Herr K, thus appropriating his perceiveddesire; S4,138; see Freud, 1905e). Hence what is important in the analysis of a hystericis not to find out the object of her desire but to discover the place from which she desires (the subject with whom she identifies). 3. Desire is desire for the Other (playing on the ambiguity of the French prepositionde). The fundamental desire is the incestuous desire for the mother, the primordial Other (S7,67). 4. Desire is always 'the desire for something else' (E, 167), since it is impossible todesire what one already has. The object of desire is continually deferred, which is whydesire is a METONYMY (E, 175). 5. Desire emerges originally in the field ofthe Other;i.e.in the unconscious
The most important point to emerge from Lacan's phrase is that desire is a socialproduct. Desire is not the private affair it appears to be but is always constituted in adialectical relationship with the perceived desires of other subjects
The first person to occupy the place of the Other is the mother, and at first the child isat the mercy of her desire. It is only when the Father articulates desire with the law bycastrating the mother that the subject is freed from subjection to the whims of themother's desire (see CASTRATION COMPLEX).