‌‌‌‌　　英：affect;法：affect;德：Affekt

‌‌‌‌　　在弗洛伊德的著作当中，“情感”(AFkt)一词是与“表象”(Vorstellung)截然对立的术语。情感 (affective)与理智 (intellectual)之间的对立是哲学中最古老的主题之一，并经由德国心理学而传人了弗洛伊德的词汇。

‌‌‌‌　　然而，对拉康而言，情感与理智之间的这种对立在精神分析的领域中是无效的。“此一对立是同分析经验最为相反的，而且就理解分析经验而论也是最无启发的”(S 1,274).

‌‌‌‌　　因而，为了回应那些指责拉康是过度理智而忽略情感角色的人，我们可以指出，此种批评乃立基于拉康眼中的一对虚假对立

‌‌‌‌　　(拉康同样认为，关于过度理智的这些批评往往都只是对于思维混乱的借口一见：E, 171)。精神分析治疗乃是建立在象征秩序的基础之上，而象征秩序则超越了情感与理智之间的对立。一方面，精神分析的经验“并非是一种情感的热吻”(S 1,55)。另一方面，精神分析的治疗也非是一种理智的事务：“我们并不是在此处理一个理智的维度”(S 1,274)。故而，拉康派的精神分析家必须意识到，“情感的热吻”与理智化皆可能是针对分析的阻抗，是自我的想象性引诱。焦虑是唯一并非欺骗性的情感

‌‌‌‌　　拉康反对那些把情感领域视作第一位的分析家，因为情感并非是同理智相对立的一个孤立的领域：“情感并不像是会逃离理智性考量 (intellectual accounting)的一种特殊的愚钝。它并不存在于超越象征符生产且先于话语性建构的某种神话性彼岸”(S 1,57). 然而，他也拒绝人们指责他忽视了情感的角色，并且指出他恰好将整整一年的研讨班专门用来讨论焦虑 (Lacan, 1973 a:38).

‌‌‌‌　　拉康并未提出某种有关情感的一般性理论①，而仅仅是就这些情感冲击到精神分析治疗而言才会触及它们。他坚持强调情感与象征秩序的关系：情感即意味着主体受到了自己与大他者的关系所影响 (affected) 2。他指出情感不是能指而是信号 (S 7,102-3), 并且强调弗洛伊德的如下立场，即压抑并不针对情感（情感只能遭受转化或者移置），而是针对表象代表 3 (用拉康的话说，即能指)(Ec, 714)。

‌‌‌‌　　拉康有关情感概念的这些评论，在临床实践中皆有重要的蕴涵。首先，如果分析家要正确地指导治疗的话，那么先前在传统上根据情感来构想的所有那些精神分析学的概念，诸如转移等，就统统必须根据它们的象征结构而加以重新思考。

‌‌‌‌　　其次，这些情感皆是可能欺骗分析家的引诱，因此分析家必须警惕被其自身的情感所蒙骗。这并非意味着分析家应当无视其自身对于病人的感受，而仅仅意味着他必须知道如何恰当地使用自身的情感 (见：[[countertransference 反转移]]).

‌‌‌‌　　最后，我们由此得出结论，精神分析治疗的目标并非对于过去经验的重新体验，也非对于情感的发泄，而是在言语中链接/道出 (articulate)有关欲望的真理。

‌‌‌‌　　在拉康的话语中，与“情感”有关但又不同的另一项术语，便是“激情”(passion)。拉康谈到有“三种根本激情”，即爱、恨与无知 (S 1,271):这是一种对于佛教思想的指涉 (E, 94)。这些激情并非想象的现象，而是被定位在三大秩序之间的交界处 2。

‌‌‌‌　　(affect) In Freud's work, the term 'affect'stands in opposition to the term 'idea'. Theopposition between the affective and the intellectual is one of the oldestthemes inphilosophy, and made its way into Freud's vocabulary via German psychology.

‌‌‌‌　　For Lacan, however, the opposition between the affective and the intellectual is notvalid in the psychoanalytic field.'This opposition is one of the most contrary to analyticexperience and most unenlightening when it comes to understanding it' (S 1,274).

‌‌‌‌　　Thus, in response to those who accuse Lacan of being over-intellectual and ofneglecting the role of affect, it can be pointed out that this criticism is based on what Lacan saw as a false opposition (Lacan also argued that criticisms of being over-intellectual were often merely excuses for sloppy thinking-see E, 171). Psychoanalytictreatment is based on the symbolic order, which transcends the opposition between affectand intellect. On the one hand, psychoanalytic experience 'is not that of an affectivesmoochy-woochy' (S 1,55). On the other hand, nor is psychoanalytic treatment anintellectual affair;'we are not dealing here with an intellectual dimension' (S 1,274). The Lacanian psychoanalyst must thus be aware of the ways in which both 'affectivesmoochy-woochy'and intellectualisation can be resistances to analysis, imaginary luresof the ego. Anxiety is the only affect that is not deceptive.

‌‌‌‌　　Lacan is opposed to those analysts who have taken the affective realm as primary, forthe affective, is not a separate realm opposed to the intellectual;'The affective is not likea special density which would escape an intellectual accounting. It is not to be found in amythical beyond of the production of the symbol which would precede the discursiveformulation' (S 1,57). However, he rejects accusations of neglecting the role of affect, pointing to the fact that a whole year of the seminar is dedicated precisely to discussinganxiety (Lacan, 1973 a:38).

‌‌‌‌　　Lacan does not propose a general theory of affects, but only touches on them insofaras they impinge on psychoanalytic treatment. He insists on the relationship of affect tothe symbolic order; affect means that the subject is affected by his relation with the Other. He argues that affects are not signifiers but signals (S 7,102-3), and emphasises Freud's position that repression does not bear upon the affect (which can only betransformed or displaced) but upon the ideational representative (which is, in Lacan'sterms, the signifier)(Ec, 714).

‌‌‌‌　　Lacan's comments on the concept of affect have important implications in clinicalpractice. Firstly, all the concepts in psychoanalysis which have traditionallybeenconceived in terms of affects, such as the transference, must be rethought in terms of theirsymbolic structure, if the analyst is to direct the treatment comrectly.

‌‌‌‌　　Secondly, the affects are lures which can deceive the analyst, and hence the analystmust be wary of being tricked by his own affects. This does not mean that the analystmust disregard his own feelings for the patient, but simply that he must know how tomake adequate use of them (see COUNTERTRANSFERENCE).

‌‌‌‌　　Finally, it follows that the aim of psychoanalytic treatment is not the reliving of pastexperiences, nor the abreaction of affect, but the articulation in speech of the truth aboutdesire.

‌‌‌‌　　Another term in Lacan's discourse, related to but distinct from 'affect', is the termpassion'. Lacan speaks of the 'three fundamental passions': love, hate and ignorance (S 1,271); this is a reference to Buddhist thought (E, 94). These passionsarenotimaginary phenomena, but located at the junctions between the three orders.