‌‌‌‌　　英：materialism; 法：materialisme

‌‌‌‌　　由于要着手处理心理发生学与心/身关系等议题，精神分析必然会引发一些本体论的问题。至于弗洛伊德的那些见解能否被看作唯物主义，这一问题很难回答。一方面，他坚持强调物质性基底 (physical substratum)在所有心理性事件 (mental events)中的重要性，同时在他的研究中与自己最尊敬的那些科学家（主要是赫尔曼·赫尔姆霍兹①与恩斯特·布吕克2)的唯物主义公理保持一致。另一方面，他又反对沙柯试图参照大脑损伤来说明所有癔症性症状的企图，因此他把精神现实 (psychical reality)与物质现实 (material reality)区分开来，而且也不断地强调经验而非遗传在神经疾病的病因学中的作用。这两种倾向通常都会在他的作品中以一种不稳定的联合而汇聚起来，譬如在下面的这句话里：“分析家实际上皆是无可救药的机械论者与唯物论者，即便他们试图避免使心灵和精神丧失其仍旧未加认识的那些特征。”（Freud, 1941d[1921]:SEXVⅢ，179)

‌‌‌‌　　拉康也同样将他自己呈现为一位唯物主义者；早在1936年，他就批判联想主义心理学 (associationist psychology)未能践行其所声称的唯物主义，而在1964年，他又宣称精神分析对立于任何形式的哲学唯心主义 (S11,221).

‌‌‌‌　　然而，与弗洛伊德一样，拉康的这些唯物主义宣言也是极其复杂的。因而，即便在拉康有关这一主题最早的那些声明中，他也明显是以一种非常特殊的方式来构想唯物主义的。例如，在1936年，他便指出唯物主义并非意味着对于意向性与意义等范畴的拒绝 (Ec, 76-8), 并且他也拒绝把“物质”看作“真正的唯物主义将其抛诸脑后的一种天真形式”的过分简单化概念 (Ec, 90)。在1946年，他又反复批评把思维视作某种纯粹“附带现象”(epiphenomenon)的那种粗糙形式的唯物主义 (Ec, 159)。而在1956年，他又在“自然主义式的唯物主义”(naturalist materialism)与“弗洛伊德式的唯物主义”(Freudian materialism)之间做出了区分 (Ec, 465-6)。因此，拉康显然并不赞同把所有因果关系皆还原为一种粗糙的经济决定论，并且把所有文化现象 (包括语言[LANGUAGE]在内)皆看作一种纯粹由经济基础来决定的上层建筑的那种唯物主义。与此相反，拉康引用了斯大林的著名宣言“语言并非上层建筑”(E, 125), 并且指出语言是“某种物质性的东西”(S2,82)。在这些基础之上，他便宣称自己给语言所赋予的重要性是完全相容于历史唯物主义的 (Ec, 875-6).

‌‌‌‌　　拉康的唯物主义，因而是一种能指 (SIGNIFIER)的唯物主义：“我在你们面前正试图主张的这一观点便涉及上述那些元素的某种唯物主义，因为从某种意义上说，能指完完全全就是具身化的、物质化的。”(S3,289)然而，能指的物质性并非指涉于某种有形的铭写，而是指涉于它的不可分割性；“但是如果我们首先坚持能指的物质性，那么这一物质性在很多方面皆是独一无二的，其中的第一条便是能指经不起分割”(Ec, 24)。能指在其物质性的维度上，能指的实在性面向，即字符 (LETTE)。正是拉康的“能指唯物主义”致使他给出了“一则有关意识现象的唯物主义定义”（S2,40-52).

‌‌‌‌　　拉康宣称他的能指理论是一种唯物主义理论，但是此一主张遭到了德里达的驳斥，德里达指出拉康的字符概念透露出了某种隐含的唯心主义的迹象 (Derrida, 1975)。

‌‌‌‌　　(materialisme) By addressing the issues of psychogenesis, the mind/body problem, etc., psychoanalysis necessarily raises ontological questions. The question of whether Freud'sviews can be considered materialistic or not is difficult to answer. On the one hand, heinsisted on the importance of the physical substratum of all mental events, in keepingwith the materialist axioms of the scientists whom he had most respected during hisstudies (principally Hermann Helmholtz and Ernst Brucke). On the other hand, heopposed Charcot's attempts to explain all hysterical symptoms by reference to lesions inthe brain, distinguished psychical reality from material reality, and constantly emphasisedthe role of experience rather than heredity in the aetiology of nervous illness. These two trends often converge in his writings in an uneasy alliance, as in the following sentence: 'Analysts are at bottom incorrigible mechanists and materialists, even though they seek toavoid robbing the mind and spirit of their still unrecognized characteristics' (Freud, 1941d[1921]: SE XVIII, 179).

‌‌‌‌　　Lacan too presents himself as a materialist; in 1936 he criticisesassociationistpsychology for not living up to its purported materialism, and in 1964 he argues thatpsychoanalysis is opposed to any form of philosophical idealism (S11,221).

‌‌‌‌　　However, as with Freud, Lacan's declarations of materialism are highly complex. Thus it is clear even in Lacan's earliest statements on the subject that he conceives ofmaterialism in a very particular way. In 1936, for example, he argues that materialismdoes not imply a rejection of the categories of intentionality and meaning (Ec, 76-8), andrejects the simplistic idea of 'matter'as 'a naive form which has been left behind byauthentic materialism' (Ec, 90). In 1946 he repeatedly criticises the crude form ofmaterialism which regards thought as a mere 'epiphenomenon' (Ec, 159). And in 1956 hedistinguishes between a 'naturalist materialism'and a 'Freudian materialism' (Ec, 465-6). It is clear, then, that Lacan does not subscribe to that kind of materialism whichreduces all causation to a crude economic determinism, and which regards all culturalphenomena (including LANGUAGE) as a mere superstructure determined by theeconomicinfrastructure. In opposition to this, Lacan cites Stalin's famouspronouncement that 'language is not a superstructure' (E, 125), and argues that language'is something material' (S2,82). On these grounds he declares that the importanceheattributes to language is perfectly compatible with historical materialism (Ec, 875-6).

‌‌‌‌　　Lacan's materialism is thus a materialism of the SIGNIFIER: 'the point of view I amtrying to maintain before you involves a certain materialism of the elements in question, in the sense that the signifiers are well and truly embodied,materialized' (S3,289). However, the materiality of the signifier does not refer to a tangible inscription but to itsindivisibility; But if we have insisted firstly on the materiality of the signifier, thismateriality is singular in many ways, the first of which is that the signifier does notwithstand partition' (Ec, 24). The signifier in its material dimension, the real aspect of thesignifier, is the LETTER. It is Lacan's 'materialism of the signifier'which leads him togive 'a materialist definition of the phenomenon of consciousness' (S2,40-52).

‌‌‌‌　　Lacan's claims that his theory of the signifier is a materialist theory are disputed by Derrida, who argues that Lacan's concept of thee letter betrays an implicit idealism (Derrida, 1975)