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‌‌‌‌  英:master; 法:maitre

‌‌‌‌  在其1950年代的著作中,拉康经常会提到黑格尔在《精神现象学》(1807)一书中引入的“主奴辩证法”(dialectic of the masterand the slave)。正如他所有其他对黑格尔的提及那样,拉康乃受益于亚历山大·科耶夫对于黑格尔的解读,因为他是在1930年代参加科耶夫有关黑格尔的讲座 (见:Kojeve, 1947)的时候才遇到了黑格尔。

‌‌‌‌  根据科耶夫的说法,人的欲望 (DESIRE)是对于承认 (recogni-ion)的欲望,而主奴辩证法 (DIALECTIC)便是这一事实的不可避免的结果。为了获得承认,主体必须将其自身所持有的观念强加给一个他者。然而,因为这个他者也同样欲望着承认,所以他也必须做出同样的事情,因此主体便被迫卷入了与他者的斗争。这场争夺承认、争夺“纯粹声望”(pure prestige)的斗争 (Kojeve, I947:7;见:S1,223)必定是一场“殊死搏斗”(fight to the death), 因为只有为了承认而冒上自己生命的危险,一个人才能够证明他真的是人。然而,这场战役事实上又必须在任何一方战斗者死亡之前停止下来,因为只有活着的人才能授予承认。因而,当其中一方放弃自己对于承认的欲望并且向另一方投降的时候,这场斗争便结束了;战败的一方承认胜利者是自己的“主人”并且变成他的“奴隶”。事实上,人类社会之所以可能,仅仅是因为一些人甘愿当奴隶,而不是殊死搏斗;一个完全由主人们构成的社会共同体是不可能的。

‌‌‌‌  在取得胜利之后,主人便使唤奴隶为他劳动。奴隶的劳动在于将自然之物转化为可供主人消费并享用的成果。然而,这场胜利并非像它在表面上看来的那样绝对:主人与奴隶之间的关系之所以是辩证性的,是因为它会导致对于他们各自位置的否定。一方面,主人所取得的承认是不能令他满足的,因为给他授予这一承认的不是别人,而仅仅是一个奴隶,他在主人看来只不过是一头牲畜或是一件物品;因而“当主人的那位便永远都不会得到满足”(Kojève, 1947:20)。另一方面,奴隶却因为这样一个事实而部分地补偿了他的战败,即通过劳动,通过对自然加以改造,他便让自己凌驾在自然之上。在改变世界的过程中,奴隶也改变了他自己,变成了其自身命运的主宰者,而非像主人那样,只能经由奴隶劳动的中介而做出改变。至此,历史的进展便是“劳动的奴隶而非好战的主人的产物”(Kojève, 1947:52)。这一辩证法的结果因此是悖论性的:主人终将陷入一种令人不满的“存在性僵局”(existentialimpasse), 而奴隶则通过“辩证地克服”(dialectically overcoming)自己的奴性而保有获得真正满足的可能性。

‌‌‌‌  拉康借用主奴辩证法而阐明了涵盖范围甚广的很多观点。例如,争夺纯粹声望的斗争即阐明了欲望的主体间性本质,其中重要的事情便是让欲望得到一个他者的承认。殊死搏斗也阐明了自我与相似者之间的二元关系中所固有的那种侵凌性(AGGRESSIVITY)(E, 142)。此外,听天由命地“等待主人死亡”(E, 99)的奴隶,也给以犹豫和拖延为特征的强迫型神经症患者提供了一个很好的类比 (见:S1,286).

‌‌‌‌  拉康还将主奴辩证法纳入了他对主人话语 (DISCOURSE)的理论化。在这一话语的公式化表述中,主人即主人能指 (S,),他迫使奴隶 (S,)进行劳动,以便产生他能够将其据为己有的某种剩余 (α)。主人能指是为所有其他能指表征主体的能指,主人话语因而是一种旨在整体化的意图 (这就是拉康为什么会把主人话语与哲学和本体论联系起来,同时玩味“主人”[maitre]与“是我”[m'ere]之间同音异义的原因所在;S20,33)。然而,这一意图却始终都会失败,因为主人能指永远都不可能完整地表征主体,总是存在着某种逃脱表征的剩余。

‌‌‌‌  (maitre) In his work during the 1950s Lacan often refers to 'the dialectic of the masterand the slave', which Hegel introduces in Phenomenology of Spirit (1807). As in all hisother Hegelian references, Lacan is indebted to Alexandre Kojeve's reading of Hegel, which Lacan encountered when attending Kojeve's lectures on Hegel in the 1930s (see Kojeve, 1947).

‌‌‌‌  According to Kojeve, the DIALECTIC of the master and the slave is the inevitableresult of the fact that human DESIRE is the desire for recognition. In order to achieverecognition, the subject must impose the idea that he has of himself on an other. However, since this other also desires recognition, he also must do the same, and hencethe subject is forced to engage in combat with the other. This fight for recognition, forpure prestige' (Kojeve, 1947:7;see S1,223) must be a 'fight to the death', since it isonly by risking his life for the sake of recognition that one can prove that he is trulyhuman. However, the combat must in fact stop short of the death of either combatant, since recognition can only be granted by a living being. Thus the struggle ends when oneof the two gives up his desire for recognition and surrenders to the other; the vanquishedone recognises the victor as his'master'and becomes his'slave'. In fact, human societyis only possible because some human beings accept being slaves instead of fighting to thedeath; a community of masters would be impossible

‌‌‌‌  After achieving victory, the master sets the slave to work for him. The slave works bytransforming nature in order that the master may consume it and enjoy it. However, thevictory is not as absolute as it seems; the relation between the master and the slave isdialectical because it leads to the negation of their respective positions. On the one hand, the recognition achieved by the master is unsatisfactory because it is not another manwho grants him this recognition but only a slave, who is for the master a mere animal orthing; thus 'the man who behaves as a Master will never be satisfied' (Kojeve, 1947:20). On the other hand, the slave is partly compensated for his defeat by the fact that, byworking, he raises himself above nature by making it other than it was. In the process ofchanging the world the slave changes himself and becomes the author of his own destiny, unlike the master who changes only through the mediation of the slave's work. Historicalprogress is now 'the product of the working slave and not of the warlike Master' (Kojeve, 1947:52). The outcome of the dialectic is therefore paradoxical: the master ends up in adissatisfying 'existential impasse', while the slave retains the possibility of achieving truesatisfaction by means of'dialectically overcoming'his slavery.

‌‌‌‌  Lacan draws on the dialectic of the master and the slave to illustrate a wide range ofpoints. For example the struggle for pure prestige illustrates the intersubjective nature ofdesire, in which the important thing is for desire to be recognised by an other. The fightto the death also illustrates the AGGRESSIVITY inherent in the dual relationshipbetween the ego and the counterpart (E, 142). Furthermore, the slave who resignedlywaits for the master's death' (E, 99) offers a good analogy of the obsessional neurotic, who is characterised by hesitation and procrastination (see S1,286).

‌‌‌‌  Lacan also takes up the dialectic of the master and the slave in his theorisation of theDISCOURSE of the master. In the formulation of this discourse, the master is the mastersignifier (S1) who puts the slave (S2) to work to produce a surplus (a) which he canappropriate for himself. The master signifier is that which represents a subject for allother signifiers; the discourse of the master is thus an attempt at totalisation (which iswhy Lacan links the discourse of the master with philosophy and ontology, playing onthe homophony between maitre and m 'etre; S20,33). However, this attempt always failsbecause the master signifier can never represent the subject completely; there is alwayssome surplus which escapes representation.