英:pleasure principle; 法:principe de plaisir; 德:Lustprinzip
即便当拉康单独使用“快乐”一词的时候,他也都总是在指涉快乐“原则”,而从来不是在指涉快乐的感觉。
快乐原则是弗洛伊德在其元心理学著作中提出的“心理运作的两大原则”之一(另一项原则即现实原则[REALITY PRINCIPLE])。快乐原则的唯一目的便是获得快乐并避免不快乐。
拉康有关快乐原则的首度延伸讨论出现在1954一1955年度的研讨班上。在此期研讨班上,拉康把快乐原则比作一种内稳装置 (homeostatic device),其目的在于把兴奋维持在最低的功能水平上 (S2,79-80)。这符合弗洛伊德“把不快乐联系于兴奋量的增加,而把快乐联系于兴奋量的减少”的论点。拉康把快乐原则 (他将其称作“复原倾向”[restitutive tendency])对立于死亡冲动 (即“重复倾向”[repetitive tendency]), 而这也与弗洛伊德有关死亡冲动是“超越快乐原则”的观点相一致 (S2,79-80).
在1960年,拉康发展出了在快乐与享乐 (JOUISSANCE)之间存在某种对立的思想,而这一思想很快便在他的著作中变成了一个重要的概念。“享乐”现在被定义为快乐原则所试图阻止的一种过剩的兴奋量。快乐原则因而被看作一种象征性的法则,这一律令可以被表述为“尽可能少地享乐”(这就是为什么弗洛伊德最初将其称作不快乐原则[unpleasure principle]的原因所在;见:Freud, 1900a: SEV, 574)。快乐是对一种内稳 (homeostasis)且恒定 (constancy)状态的保护,而“享乐”则不断威胁要对其进行破坏并使其受到创伤。
实际上,快乐原则的功能便在于引导主体在能指间切换,通过尽可能多生成所需要的能指而把调节精神装置整个运作的那一张力维持在一个尽可能低的水平上。
(S7,119)
换句话说,快乐原则即对乱伦的禁止,“它调节着主体与原物(das Ding)之间的距离”(S7,69; 见:原物[THNG])。倘若主体违反了这一禁令,跟原物离得太近,那么他便会感到痛苦。因为允许主体违反快乐原则的是那些冲动,因此每一个冲动都是一个死亡冲动 (DEATH DRIVE).
因为快乐原则联系着禁止、法则与规制,所以它明显处在象征界的一边,而享乐则处在实在界的一边。因而,快乐原则“无非是能指的支配性”(S7,134)。这便使拉康陷入了一则悖论,因为象征界也是强制性重复 (REPETTTION)的领域,而用弗洛伊德的话说,强制性重复恰恰就是“超越”快乐原则的东西。实际上,拉康有关快乐原则的有些描述,使它听起来就几乎等同于强制性重复:“快乐原则的功能即在于让人始终去寻找那个他必须再度找到,却永远无法得到的东西。”(S7,68)
(principe de plaisir) Even when Lacan uses the word 'pleasure'on its own, he is alwaysreferring to the pleasure principle, and never to a sensation.
The pleasure principle is one of the 'two principles of mental functioning'posited by Freud in his metapsychological writings (the other being the REALITY PRINCIPLE). The pleasure principle aims exclusively at avoiding unpleasure and obtaining pleasure.
Lacan's first extended discussion of the pleasure principle appears in the seminar of1954-5. Here Lacan compares the pleasure principle to a homeostatic device that aims atmaintaining excitation at the lowest functional level (S2,79-80). This accords with Freud's thesis that unpleasure is related to the increase of quantities of excitation, andpleasure to their reduction. Lacan opposes the pleasure principle, which he dubs therestitutive tendency', to the death drive (the 'repetitive tendency'), in accordance with Freud's view that the death drive is 'beyond the pleasure principle' (S2,79-80).
In 1960, Lacan develops what soon comes to be an important concept in his work; theidea of an opposition between pleasure and JOUISSANCE. Jouissance is now defined asan excessive quantity of excitation which the pleasure principle attempts to prevent. Thepleasure principle is thus seen as a symbolic law, a commandment which can be phrased Enjoy as little as possible' (which is why Freud originally called it the unpleasureprinciple; see Freud, 1900a: SE V, 574). Pleasure is the safeguard of a state ofhomeostasis and constancy which jouissance constantly threatens to disruptandtraumatise.
The function of the pleasure principle is, in effect, to lead the subject fromsignifier to signifier, by generating as many signifiers as are required tomaintain at as low a level as possible the tension that regulates the wholefunctioning of the psychic apparatus.
(S7,119)
Put another way, the pleasure principle is the prohibition of incest,'that which regulatesthe distance between the subject and das Ding' (S7,69; see THING). When the subjecttransgresses this prohibition, gets too near to the Thing, then he suffers. Since it is thedrives which permit the subject to transgress the pleasure principle, it follows that everydrive is a DEATH DRIVE.
Since the pleasure principle is related to prohibition, to the law, and to regulation, it isclearly on the side of the symbolic, whereas jouissance is on the side of the real. Thepleasure principle is thus 'nothing else than the dominance of the signifier' (S7,134). This involves Lacan in a paradox, since the symbolic is also the realm of theREPETITION compulsion, which is, in Freud's terms, precisely that which goes beyond the pleasure principle.Indeed,some of Lacan's descriptions of the pleasure principlemake it sound almost identical to the repetition compulsion: 'The function of the pleasureprinciple is to make man always search for what he has to find again,but which he willnever attain'(S7,68).