‌‌‌‌　　英：development; 法：developpement

‌‌‌‌　　自我心理学 (EGO-PSYCHOLOGY)把精神分析呈现为发展心理学的一种形式，因为它强调儿童性欲的时间性发展。根据此种解释，弗洛伊德说明了孩子如何经由各个前生殖阶段（即口腔阶段与肛门阶段）而在生殖 (GENITAL)阶段中发展至成熟。

‌‌‌‌　　在拉康的早期著作中，至少是就三个“家庭情结”（Lacan, 1938)与种种自我防御 (E, 5)的发生学次序而言，他似乎接受了对于弗洛伊德的此种发展性阅读 (拉康为之贴上了“遗传论”的标签)。迟至1950年，他才开始严肃对待诸如“对象固着”(objectalfixation)与“发展停滞”(stagnation of development)这类的发生学概念 (Ec, 148)。然而，在1950年代初期，他出于各种原因而开始变得对遗传论持有极端批判的态度。首先，遗传论为性欲的发展预设了某种自然的次序，而没有考虑到人类性欲的象征性表达 (symbolic articulation), 从而忽视了冲动与本能之间的根本性差异。其次，遗传论的基础在于一种线性的时间概念，然而此种时间概念与精神分析的时间 (TME)理论是完全相抵触的。最后，遗传论假设性欲的最终综合既是可能的，也是正常的，但是对拉康而言根本不存在这样的综合。因而，尽管自我心理学与对象关系理论 (OBJECT-RELATIONS THEORY)都提出了心理性欲发展的一个最终阶段的概念，在此阶段上主体会与对象建立某种“成熟”关系，这种关系被描述为一种生殖关系 (genital relation), 然而此种观念却是拉康全然拒绝的。拉康认为，这样一种最终完整且成熟的状态是不可能的，因为主体的分裂是无法挽回的，而且欲望的欲望也是无法停止的。此外，拉康还指出：“那个对应于晚期本能成熟阶段的对象，是一个被重新发现的对象”(S4,15); 所谓的最终成熟阶段，只不过是同孩子的最初满足的对象的相遇。

‌‌‌‌　　拉康驳斥了对于弗洛伊德的此种遗传论阅读，并且将其描述为一种“本能成熟的神话”(E, 54)。他认为，弗洛伊德曾经加以分析过的各个“阶段”(即口腔阶段、肛门阶段与生殖阶段)，并非是可观察到自然发展的生物学现象，诸如感觉运动发展的各个阶段，而“显然是更加复杂的结构”(E, 242)。这些前生殖阶段并非是按时序排列的儿童发展的时刻，而是在本质上被回溯性地投射到过去的无时间结构“它们是依照俄狄浦斯情结的回溯作用来排序的”(E, 197)。因而，拉康便摒弃了所有那些旨在通过“所谓的对于儿童的直接观察”来为心理性欲阶段的顺序拿出经验证据的尝试，而强调在成人分析中对于这些阶段的重构：“正是经由从成人的经验来着手，我们必须回溯性地，在事后 (nachtraglich)来处理那些据称是原始的经验”(S1,217)。在1961年，这些前生殖阶段被拉康构想为要求 (DEMAND)的不同形式。

‌‌‌‌　　现象的时序发生与结构的逻辑顺序之间的这一复杂关系，也可以通过参照语言获得的问题来加以阐明。一方面，心理语言学已经发现了一种自然的发展次序，在此种顺序中，婴儿会依循一系列在生物学上被预先决定的阶段而前进 (首先是咿呀学语，跟着是音素的获得，继而是孤立的单词，再然后是愈来愈复杂的句子)。然而，拉康对于此种时序性的顺序并不感兴趣，因为它仅仅处理的“是一种现象的发生，严格地讲”(S1,179)。让拉康感兴趣的并非是语言的现象（外部显现），而是语言把主体定位在某种象征结构中的方式。就后者而言，拉康指出，早在孩子能够说话之前，即“早在语言的外化显现之前，孩子就已然对语言的象征作用产生了一种最初的领会”(S1,179: 见：S1,54)。然而，至于此种对象征界的“最初领会”是如何发生的，这个问题却是几乎不可能加以理论化的，因为它涉及的不是一个能指接着一个能指的逐渐获得，而是对于一个能指“宇宙”的“全或无”(all or nothing)的进入。一个能指只有凭借它与其他能指的关系才是一个能指，也因此无法被孤立地获得。因而，向象征界的过渡便始终是一个无中生有 (creationex nihilo)的问题，涉及一种秩序与另一秩序之间的某种根本断续性，而从来都不是一个逐渐进化的问题。后一术语 (即“进化”一词)对拉康而言是特别令人厌恶的，他告诫自己的学生们要“当心那种以进化论而著称的思想辖域”(S7,213), 而且更愿意根据“无中生有”的隐喻来描述精神变化。

‌‌‌‌　　拉康对于发展与进化等概念的反对，并非是基于他对精神变化概念本身的反对。相反，拉康坚持强调精神的历史性 (historicity)并且把恢复精神的流动与运动看作精神分析治疗的目标。他对发展概念的反对仅仅反映出了他对有关精神变化的一切常规模型的怀疑；主体被卷入在一种不断“成为”的过程之中，但是通过把一种固定“天赐”的遗传发展模型强加在它之上，这一过程却会受到威胁，而非是助益。因而，拉康指出：“在精神分析中，历史是不同于发展维度的一个维度，而试图把前者化约为后者便是偏离正轨了。历史仅仅在发展的节奏之外进行。”(E, 875)

‌‌‌‌　　那么，我们又当如何看待主导拉康教学的两个重要“阶段”，即镜子阶段与俄狄浦斯情结呢？虽然镜子阶段明显联系着一个可以在儿童的生活中被定位于某一特定时间 (6个月至18个月之间)的事件，但是这引起拉康的兴趣则只是因为它阐明了二元关系在本质上的无时间结构：而正是这一结构构成了镜子阶段的核心 (有趣的是，法文术语stade既可以在时间上被理解为一个“阶段”[stage], 又可以在空间上被理解为一个“竞技场”[stadium])。同样，虽然弗洛伊德把俄狄浦斯情结定位在一个特定的年龄上 (3岁至5岁)，但是拉康则把俄狄浦斯情结构想为有关主体性的一种无时间的三角结构。由此可知，自我在何时被确切地建立起来，或是孩子在何时进入俄狄浦斯情结的问题一这些问题在精神分析的其他学派之间曾导致过那么多的争论一便很少是拉康的兴趣所在。虽然拉康承认“自我是在主体历史中的某一特定时刻被建立起来的”(S1,115), 也承认存在着一个俄狄浦斯情结形成的时刻，但是他对其确切的时间不感兴趣。孩子在何时进入象征秩序的问题是无关于精神分析的。问题的关键在于，在孩子登陆象征秩序之前，他是无法言说的，也因此是精神分析所无法触及的，而在孩子登陆象征秩序之后，先于那一时刻的所有事情都会回溯性地受到象征系统的转化。

‌‌‌‌　　Developpement) Psychoanalysis is presented by EGO-PSYCHOLOGY as a form ofdevelopmental psychology, with the emphasis placed on the temporal development of thechild's sexuality. According to this interpretation, Freud shows how the child progressesthrough the various pregenital stages (the oral and anal stages) to maturity in theGENITAL stage.

‌‌‌‌　　In his early work Lacan seems to accept this developmental reading of Freud (whichhe labels 'geneticism'), at least in the matter of a genetic order for the three 'familycomplexes' (Lacan, 1938) and for ego defences (E, 5). As late as 1950 he takes seriouslysuch genetic concepts as 'objectal fixation'and 'stagnation of development' (Ec, 148) However, in the early 1950s he begins to become extremely critical of geneticism forvarious reasons. Firstly, it presupposes a natural order for sexual development and takesno account of the symbolic articulation of human sexuality, thus ignoring thefundamental differences between drives and instincts. Secondly, it is based on a linearconcept of time which is completely at odds with the psychoanalytic theory of TIME. Finally, it assumes that a final synthesis of sexuality is both possible and normal, whereasfor Lacan no such synthesis exists. Thus, while both ego-psychology and OBJECT-RELATIONS THEORY propose the concept of a final stage of psychosexualdevelopment, in which the subject attains a 'mature'relation with the object, described asa genital relation, this is totally rejected by Lacan. Lacan argues that such a state of finalwholeness and maturity is not possible because the subject is irremediably split, and themetonymy of desire is unstoppable. Furthermore, Lacan points out that 'the object whichcorresponds to an advanced stage of instinctual maturity is a rediscovered object' (S4,15); the so-called final stage of maturity is nothing more than the encounter with theobject of the first satisfactions of the child.

‌‌‌‌　　Lacan disputes the geneticist reading of Freud, describing it as a 'mythology ofinstinctual maturation' (E, 54). He argues that the various 'stages'analysed by Freud (oral, anal and genital) are not observable biological phenomena which develop naturally, such as the stages of sensoriomotor development, but 'obviously more complexstructures' (E, 242). The pregenital stages are not chronologically ordered moments of achild's development, but essentially timeless structures which are projected retroactivelyonto the past;'they are ordered in the retroaction of the Oedipus complex' (E, 197). Lacan thus dismisses all attempts to draw empirical evidence for the sequence ofpsychosexual stages by means of 'the so-called direct observation of the child' (E, 242), and places the emphasis on the reconstruction of such stages in the analysis of adults;'Itis by starting with the experience of the adult that we must grapple, retrospectively, nachtraglich, with the supposedly original experiences' (S1,217). In 1961, the pregenitalstages are conceived by Lacan as forms of DEMAND.

‌‌‌‌　　The complex relationship between the chronological emergence of phenomena and thelogical sequence of structures is also illustrated by reference to the question of languageacquisition. On the one hand, psycholinguistics has discovered a natural order ofdevelopment, in which the infant progresses through a sequence of biologicallypredetermined stages (babbling, followed by phoneme acquisition, then isolated words, and then sentences of increasing complexity). Lacan, however, is not interested in thischronological sequence, since it only deals with 'the emergence, properly speaking, of aphenomenon' (S1,179). What interests Lacan is not the phenomena (externalappearance) of language but the way language positions the subject in a symbolicstructure. In respect of the latter, Lacan points out that 'the child already has an initialappreciation of the symbolism of language'well before he can speak,'well before theexteriorised appearance of language' (S1,179; see S1,54). However, the question of how this 'initial appreciation'of the symbolic comes about is almost impossible to theorise, since it is not a question of a gradual acquisition of one signifier after another but the 'allor nothing'entry into a 'universe'of signifiers. A signifier is only a signifier by virtue ofits relation to other signifiers, and so cannot be acquired in isolation. Thus the transitionto the symbolic is always a question of creation ex nihilo, a radical discontinuity betweenone order and another, and never a question of a gradual evolution. The last term isparticularly distasteful for Lacan, who warns his students to 'beware of that register ofthought known as evolutionism' (S7,213), and prefers to describe psychic changeinterms of metaphors of creation ex nihilo.

‌‌‌‌　　Lacan's opposition to notions of development and evolution are not based onanopposition to the notion of psychic change in itself. On the contrary, Lacan insists on thehistoricity of the psyche, and sees the restoration of fluidity and movement to the psycheas the aim of psychoanalytic treatment. His opposition to the concept of developmentonly reflects his suspicion of all normative models of psychic change; the subject isinvolved in a continual process of becoming, but this process is threatened, not aided, byimposing a fixed providential'model of genetic development upon it. Lacan thus arguesthat 'in psychoanalysis, history is a dimension different to that of development, and that itis an aberration to try to reduce the former to the latter. History only proceeds out of beatwith development' (Ec, 875).

‌‌‌‌　　What, then, is to be made of the two great 'stages'which dominate Lacan's teaching, the mirror stage and the Oedipus complex? The mirror stage is clearly related to an eventwhich can be located in a specific time in the life of the child (between six to eighteenmonths), but this event is only of interest to Lacan because it illustrates the essentiallytimeless structure of the dual relationship; and it is this structure that constitutes the heartof the mirror stage. (It is interesting to note that the French term stade can be understoodin both temporal and spatial terms, as a'stage', or as a'stadium'). Likewise, while Freudlocates the Oedipus complex at a specific age (the third to the fifth year of life), Lacanconceives of the Oedipus complex as a timeless triangular structure of subjectivity. Itfollows that questions of exactly when the ego is constituted, or when the child enters the Oedipus complex, which have led to so much controversy between other schools ofpsychoanalysis, are of little interest to Lacan. While Lacan admits that the 'ego isconstituted at a specific moment in the history of the subject' (S1,115), and that there is amoment when the Oedipus complex is formed, he is not interested in the question ofexactly when those moments occur. The question of when the child makes his entry intothe symbolic order is irrelevant to psychoanalysis. All that matters is that before he doesso he is incapable of speech and so inaccesible to psychoanalysis, and that after he doesso everything prior to that moment is transformed retroactively by the symbolic system.