英：end of analysis; 法：find'analyse
在《可终止与不可终止的分析》(Analysis Terminable and Interminable)一文中，弗洛伊德讨论了到底是否有可能结束一个分析，或者是否所有的分析都必然是未完成的问题 (Freud, 1937c)。拉康给予这一问题的回答是，去谈论一个分析的结束固然是可能的。尽管并非所有的分析都坚持到了它们的完结，然而分析治疗却是一种有其结束的逻辑过程，而拉康则以“分析的结束”这一术语来命名这个终点。
鉴于很多分析在结束分析之前便中断了，因而便出现了此类分析能否被视作成功的问题。如果要回答这个问题，那么就有必要在分析的结束与精神分析治疗的目标之间做出区分。精神分析治疗的目标在于引导分析者道出有关其语言的真理。任何的分析，无论有多么不完整，当它达到这一目标的时候，都可以被看作成功的。因此，分析的结束的问题，便远不止是一段分析治疗的过程是否抵达其目标的问题；而是这段治疗是否抵达其逻辑终点的问题。
拉康是以各种不同的方式来构想这一终点的。
(1)在1950年代初，分析的目标被描述为“某种真言的到来以及主体对其历史的领悟”(E, 88)(见：言语[SPEECH])。“主体…在开始分析的时候只讲到他自己而没有对着你讲，或是只对着你讲而没有讲到他自己。当他能够对着你去讲到他自己的时候，分析便会结束”(Ec, 373,n.1)。分析的结束也同样被描述为甘心接受其自身的必死性 (E, 104-5).
(2)在1960年，拉康则把分析的结束描述为一种焦虑与抛弃的状态，并且将其比喻为人类婴儿的无助 (HELPLESSNESS)。
(3)在1964年，他又将其描述为当分析者“穿越根本幻想”(traversed the radical fantasy)的时刻（Sl1,273; 见：幻想[FANTASY]).
(4)在其教学的最后十年，他则把分析的结束描述为“认同于圣状”，以及“知道用圣状来做些什么”(见：圣状[SINTHOME]).
所有这些阐述的共同思想皆在于，分析的结束会涉及分析者主体位置上的某种改变 (分析者的“主体性罢免”[subjective desti-uon])以及分析家位置上的某种相应的改变 (分析家的“存在的丧失”[法：desetre; 英：loss of being], 即分析家从假设知道的主体的位置上的跌落)。在分析的结束之时，分析家会被化约为一种纯粹的剩余，一个纯粹的对象小a (objet petit a), 即分析者欲望的原因
因为拉康认为所有精神分析家都应当从头到尾地经历分析治疗的过程，所以分析的结束也同样是从分析者到分析家的过渡。因此，“一个分析的真正结束”便恰恰是“让你准备去成为一个分析家”的东西 (S7,303).
在1967年，拉康引入了通过 (PASS)程序，作为证明某人分析结束的手段。凭借此种程序，拉康希望避免把分析的结束看作某种类似神秘的、无法言喻的经验的危险。这样一种见解是与精神分析相对立的，因为精神分析的全部关切皆在于把事物诉诸言语的表达
拉康批评那些根据对分析家的认同来看待分析的结束的精神分析家们。与此种精神分析的观点相对立，拉康宣称“跨越认同的层面是可能的”(S11,273)。超越认同不仅是可能的，而且还是必要的，因为否则的话它便不是精神分析，而是暗示，后者是精神分析的对立面：“分析运作的根本原动力便是维持I一认同一与之间的距离”(S11,273).
拉康同样拒绝分析的结束涉及转移的“肃清”这样一种思想 (见：S11,267)。这种认为转移可以被“肃清”的思想，其基础乃在于一种对于转移之本质的误解，根据此种误解，转移被看作某种能够被超越的幻象。这样一种见解之所以是错误的，是因为它全然忽视了转移的象征性本质；转移是言语的基本结构的一部分。尽管分析治疗会涉及同分析家之间建立起来的特殊“转移关系”(transference relationship)的解除，然而转移本身在分析的结束之后却仍旧会存在下去。
拉康所拒绝的有关分析结束的其他错误观念包括：“强化自我”“适应现实”与“幸福”。分析的结束既非是症状的消失，亦非是某种潜在疾病 (例如：神经症)的治愈，因为分析在本质上并非是一种治疗的过程，而是一种对于真理的探寻，而真理却并非总是有益的（S17,122）。
(fin d'analyse) In 'Analysis Terminable and Interminable', Freud discusses the questionof whether it is ever possible to conclude an analysis, or whether all analyses arenecessarily incomplete (Freud, 1937c). Lacan's answer to this question is that it is indeedpossible to speak of concluding an analysis. Although not all analyses are carried throughto their conclusion, analytic treatment is a logical process which has an end, and Lacandesignates this end-point by the term 'end of analysis'.
Given that many analyses are broken off before the end of analysis is reached, thequestion arises as to whether such analyses can be considered succesful or not. To answerthis question it is necessary to distinguish between the end of analysis and the aim ofpsychoanalytic treatment. The aim of psychoanalytic treatment is to lead the analysand toarticulate the truth about his desire. Any analysis, however incomplete, may be regardedas successful when it achieves this aim. The question of the end of analysis is thereforesomething more than whether a course of analytic treatment has or has not achieved itsaim; it is a question of whether or not the treatment has reached its logical end-point.
Lacan conceives of this end-point in various ways.
- In the early 1950s, the end of analysis is described as 'the advent of a true speechand the realisation by the subject of his history' (E, 88)(see SPEECH). Thesubject... Begins the analysis by speaking about himself without speaking to you, or byspeaking to you without speaking about himself. When he can speak to you abouthimself, the analysis will be over' (Ec, 373,n.1). The end of analysis is also described ascoming to terms with one's own mortality (E, 104-5).
- In 1960, Lacan describes the end of analysis as a state of anxiety and abandonment, and compares it to the HELPLESSNESS of the human infant.
- In 1964 he describes it as the point when the analysand has 'traversed the radicalfantasy' (S11,273)(see FANTASY).
- In the last decade of his teaching, he describes the end of analysis as 'identificationwith the sinthome', and as 'knowing what to do with the sinthome' (see SINTHOME)
Common to all these formulations is the idea that the end of analysis involves achange in the subjective position of the analysand (the analysand's 'subjectivedestitution'), and a corresponding change in the position of the analyst (the loss of being[Fr. Desetre]of the analyst, the fall of the analyst from the position of the subject-supposed-to-know). At the end of the analysis, the analyst is reduced to a mere surplus, apure objet petit a, the cause of the analysand's desire.
Since Lacan argues that all psychoanalysts should have experienced the process ofanalytic treatment from beginning to end, the end of analysis is also the passage fromanalysand to analyst.'The true termination of an analysis'is therefore no more and noless than that which 'prepares you to become an analyst' (S7,303)
In 1967, Lacan introduced the procedure of the PASS as a means of testifying to theend of one's analysis. By means of this procedure, Lacan hoped to avoid the dangers ofregarding the end of analysis as a quasi-mystical, ineffable experience. Such a view isantithetical to psychoanalysis, which is all about putting things into words.
Lacan criticises those psychoanalysts who have seen the end of analysis in terms ofidentification with the analyst. In opposition to this view of psychoanalysis, Lacan statesthat the 'crossing of the plane of identification is possible' (S11,273). Not only is itpossible to go beyond identification, but it is necessary, for otherwise it is notpsychoanalysis but suggestion, which is the antithesis of psychoanalysis;'thefundamental mainspring of the analytic operation is the maintenance of the distancebetween the I-identification-and the a' (S11,273).
Lacan also rejects the idea that the end of analysis involves the 'liquidation'of thetransference (see S11,267). The idea that the transference can be 'liquidated'is based ona misunderstanding of the nature of the transference, according to which the transferenceis viewed as a kind of illusion which can be transcended. Such a view is erroneousbecause it entirely overlooks the symbolic nature of the transference; transference is partof the essential structure of speech. Although analytic treatment involves the resolution ofthe particular transference relationship established with the analyst, transference itselfstill subsists after the end of analysis.
Other misconceptions of the end of analysis which Lacan rejects are: 'strengtheningthe ego','adaptation to reality'and 'happiness'. The end of analysis is not thedisappearance of the symptom, nor the cure of an underlying disease (e.g.neurosis), sinceanalysis is not essentially a therapeutic process but a search for truth, and the truth is notalways beneficial (S17,122).