英：sublimation; 法：sublimation; 德：Sublimierung
在弗洛伊德的著作中，升华是力比多借以被导向那些明显是非性欲活动的一种过程，诸如艺术创作与智识工作等。因而，对于那些必须要另外以社会不可接受的形式（性倒错行为）或神经症性症状来释放的过剩的性欲能量，升华便起着一种社会可接受的安全阀的作用。这样一种见解的逻辑结论即在于，全然的升华可能就意味着一切性倒错与一切神经症的终结。然而，在弗洛伊德有关升华的说明中仍然有很多不清楚的地方。
拉康在其1959一1960年度的研讨班上吸收了升华的概念。他遵循弗洛伊德的观点，强调了这样一个事实，即社会承认的元素是此一概念的核心，因为只有就各种冲动转向了那些具有社会价值的对象而言，这些冲动才可以说是得到了升华 (S7,107)。正是这一共有的社会价值的维度，使拉康得以把升华的概念联系于他有关伦理学的讨论 (见：S7,144)。然而，拉康有关升华的说明也同样在一些观点上有别于弗洛伊德
(1)弗洛伊德的说明意味着性倒错的性欲作为冲动的一种直接满足的形式是可能的，而升华变得必要则只是因为这种直接的形式是遭到社会禁止的。然而，拉康拒绝此种零度满足 (zCrodegree of satisfaction)的概念 (见：Ziek, 1991:83-4), 他宣称性倒错并不仅仅是释放力比多的一种兽性的自然手段，而是相对于冲动的一种高度结构化关系，就其本身而言，这些冲动皆已然是语言性的而非生物性的力量。
(2)弗洛伊德认为全然的升华对于某些特别有教养或者有文化的人来说或许是可能的，而拉康则指出“全然的升华对个体而言是不可能的”(S7,91)。
(3)在弗洛伊德的说明中，升华涉及的是把冲动重新导向一种不同的（非性欲的）对象。然而，在拉康的说明中，改变的不是对象，而是对象在幻想结构中的位置。换句话说，升华涉及的不是把冲动导向一种不同的对象，而是改变冲动已然被导向它的那一对象的本质，这是“对象在其本质上的改变”，此种改变之所以成为可能，是因为冲动“已然被能指的链接深深地标记了”(S7,293)。因而，一个对象的崇高品质 (sublime quality)便并非是由于这一对象本身的任何固有属性，而仅仅是由于这一对象在象征性的幻想结构中的位置的一种效果。更确切地说，升华把一个对象重新定位在了原物 (THNG)的位置上。拉康有关升华的公式因而是“它把一个对象抬升至…原物的高位”(S7,112).
(4)虽然拉康遵循弗洛伊德的观点把升华联系于艺术 (ART),但是他也同样将其联系于死亡冲动 (DEATH DRIVE),从而复杂化了此种联系 (S4,431)。我们可以举出几点理由来对此进行说明。首先，死亡冲动的概念本身便被看作弗洛伊德自身升华的某种产物 (S7,212)。其次，死亡冲动不仅是一种“毁灭性的冲动”，而且也是“一种从零创造的意志”(S7,21213)。最后，由于被抬升至原物的高位，升华的对象发挥着一种最终会导致死亡与毁灭的魅惑性力量。
(sublimation) In Freud's work, sublimation is a process in which the libido is channelledinto apparently non-sexual activities such as artistic creation and intellectual work. Sublimation thus functions as a socially acceptable escape valve for excess sexual energywhich would otherwise have to be discharged in socially unacceptable forms (perversebehaviour) or in neurotic symptoms. The logical conclusion of such a view is thatcomplete sublimation would mean the end of all perversion and all neurosis. However, many points remain unclear in Freud's account of sublimation.
Lacan takes up the concept of sublimation in his seminar of 1959-60. He follows Freud in emphasising the fact that the element of social recognition is central to theconcept, since it is only insofar as the drives are diverted towards socially valued objectsthat they can be said to be sublimated (S7,107). It is this dimension of shared socialvalues which allows Lacan to tie in the concept of sublimation with his discussion ofethics (see S7,144). However, Lacan's account of sublimation also differs from Freud'son a number of points.
- Freud's account implies that perverse sexuality as a form of direct satisfaction of thedrive is possible, and that sublimation is only necessary because this direct form isprohibited by society. Lacan however rejects the concept of a zero degree of satisfaction (see Zizek, 1991:83-4), arguing that perversion not simply a brute natural means ofdischarging the libido, but a highly structured relation to the drives which are already, inthemselves, linguistic rather than biological forces.
- Whereas Freud believed that complete sublimation might be possible for someparticularly refined or cultured people, Lacan argues that 'complete sublimation is notpossible for the individual' (S7,91).
- In Freud's account, sublimation involves the redirection of the drive to a different (non-sexual) object. In Lacan's account, however, what changes is not the object but itsposition in the structure of fantasy. In other words, sublimation does not involve directingthe drive to a different object, but rather changing the nature of the object to which the drive was already directed, a 'change of object in itself, something which is madepossible because the drive is 'already deeply marked by the articulation of the signifier' (S7,293). The sublime quality of an object is thus not due to any intrinsic property of theobject itself, but simply an effect of the object's position in the symbolic structure offantasy. To be more specific, sublimation relocates an object in the position of theTHING. The Lacanian formula for sublimation is thus that 'it raises an object... To thedignity of the Thing' (S7,112).
- While Lacan follows Freud in linking sublimation with creativity and ART, hecomplicates this by also linking it with the DEATH DRIVE (S4,431). Several reasonscan be adduced to explain this. Firstly, the concept of the death drive is itself seen as aproduct of Freud's own sublimation (S7,212). Secondly, the death drive is not only a'destruction drive', but also a will to create from zero' (S7,212-13). Thirdly, thesublime object, through being elevated to the dignity of the Thing, exerts a power offascination which leads ultimately to death and destruction.