‌‌‌‌　　英：real; 法：reel

‌‌‌‌　　拉康把“实在界”这一术语作为一个名词来使用，可以追溯至他早期在1936年所发表的一篇论文。该术语在当时的某些哲学家中间颇为流行，并且是埃米尔·梅耶松①的一部著作的焦点 (拉康在1936年的文章中提到了梅耶松的这部著作：见：Ec, 86)。梅耶松把“实在”定义为“一种本体论上的绝对，一种真正的自在存在 (being-in-itself)”(Meyerson, 1925:79;引自：Roustang, 1986:61)。因而，在讲到“实在”的时候，拉康便遵循的是20世纪早期哲学的某一思脉中的共同实践。然而，虽然这可能是拉康的出发点，但是纵观拉康的著作，该术语也经历了很多意义与用法上的转变。

‌‌‌‌　　起初，实在界仅仅是与形象的领域相对立而言的，而这就似乎是把它定位在了超越那些显象 (appearances)之外的存在 (being)的领域 (Ec, 85)。然而，即便在此早期时刻上，拉康也在“实在”与“真实”(the true)之间做出了区分，这一事实即表明实在界已然遭到了某种歧义性的侵蚀 (Ec, 75).

‌‌‌‌　　在出现于1936年之后，这一术语便从拉康的著作中消失了，直至1950年代早期才再度出现，当时拉康援引了黑格尔的观点：“凡是实在的事物皆是合乎理性的（反之亦然）。”(Ec, 226)直至1953年，拉康才把实在界抬升至精神分析理论的一个基本范畴的地位；自此以后，实在界便是所有精神分析现象皆可据此而得到描述的三大秩序 (ORDERS)之一，另外两个秩序是象征秩序与想象秩序。因而，实在界便不再只是与想象界相对立，而且还被定位在超越象征界之外。象征界是根据诸如在场与缺位之间的此类对立而建立的，与此不同的是，“实在界中没有任何缺位”(S2,313)。在场与缺位之间的象征性对立即隐含了某种事物可能从象征秩序中丢失的永久可能性，而实在界则“总是在其位置上：它将其粘在自己的脚后跟上而携带着，无视可能将其放逐出那里的东西”（Ec, 25; 见：S11,49).

‌‌‌‌　　尽管象征界是一系列被称为能指的业已分化的离散元素的集合，然而实在界，就其本身而言，是未经分化的，“实在界是绝对没有裂隙的”(S2,97)。正是象征界在意指过程中引入了“实在界中的一道切口”：“正是词语的世界创造了事物的世界一这些事物在形成 (coming-into-being)过程中的此时此地 (hic et nunc)原本全是混乱不堪的。”(E, 65)

‌‌‌‌　　在1953一1955年的这些阐述中，实在界皆是作为外在于语言且无法同化于象征化的事物而出现的。它是“绝对抵制象征化的东西”(S1,66), 又或者说，实在界是“存留于象征化之外的事物的领域”(Ec, 388)。这一主题在拉康的其余著作中始终保持恒定，并且导致拉康把实在界联系于不可能性的概念。实在界是“不可能的”(S11,167), 因为它既不可能想象，也不可能整合进象征秩序，且不可能以任何方式而抵达。正是此种不可能性与抵制象征化的特性，给实在界赋予了其在本质上的创伤性特质。因而，在1956一1957年度的研讨班上对于小汉斯个案 (Freud, 1909b)的解读中，拉康便发现有两个实在的元素闯入并扰乱了孩子想象性的前俄狄浦斯式和谐，即在幼儿手淫中开始被孩子感受到的实在的阴茎，以及新生的妹妹 (S4,308-9)

‌‌‌‌　　此外，实在界同样具有一些物质的意涵，它隐含着潜藏在想象界与象征界之下的一种物质性基底（见：唯物主义[MATERIALISM])。这些物质的意涵也把实在界的概念同生物学 (BIOLOGY)的领域与身体的非人肉体性（与身体的想象功能与象征功能相对立）联系了起来。例如，实在的父亲即生物学上的父亲，而实在的阳具也是与这一器官的象征功能和想象功能相对立而言的身体上的阴茎。

‌‌‌‌　　纵观拉康的著作，他使用实在界的概念阐明了诸多临床现象：

‌‌‌‌　　・焦虑 (ANXIETY)与创伤实在界是焦虑的对象，它缺乏任何可能的中介，因而是“一种不再是对象的本质性对象，但是这一对象面临着一切话语的终止与一切范畴的失败，它是绝佳的焦虑的对象”(S2,164)。以创伤的形式而呈现出来的，正是与这一实在的对象的错失的相遇 (S11,55)。它是处在“【象征性的】自发 (automaton)之外"的机遇 (yche)(Sl1,53)(见：偶然[CHANCE]).

‌‌‌‌　　·幻觉 (HALLUCINATIONS)当某种事物无法被整合进象征秩序，如同在精神病中那样，它便可能会以某种幻觉的形式而重新返回实在界之中 (S3,321).

‌‌‌‌　　上述的这些评论只是描绘出了拉康应用实在界范畴的一些主要的用法，但远远没有覆盖这一术语的所有复杂性。相比于其他两种秩序，拉康较少谈论实在界，而且他还把实在界变成了一种根本不确定性的位点，事实上，通过这些做法，他都是在煞费苦心地确保让实在界在三大秩序中始终是最难以捉摸且最神秘莫测的。因而，至于实在界到底是外在的还是内在的，抑或它究竟是不可知的还是经得起理性检验的，便从来都不是完全清晰的。

‌‌‌‌　　·外在/内在一方面，“实在界”这一术语似乎隐含着一种有关客观外部现实的过分简单化观念，即独立于任何观察者而自在存在的一种物质性基底。另一方面，有关实在界的这样一种“天真”的看法却又遭到了以下事实所颠覆，即实在界同样囊括了诸如幻觉与创伤性的梦境之类的事物。因而，实在界既是内在的又是外在的 (S7,118; 见：外心性[EXTIMACY])(extimie)。此种歧义性亦反映了弗洛伊德自己使用两个德文术语（Virklichkeit与Realitat)来表示现实 (reality)的做法中所固有的那种歧义性，以及弗洛伊德在物质现实 (material reality)与精神现实 (psychicalreality)之间所做出的区分。

‌‌‌‌　　·不可知性/合乎理性一方面，实在界是无法知道的，因为它既超越了想象界又超越了象征界，如同康德的自在之物 (thigin-itself)那样，它是一个不可知的x。另一方面，拉康又引用了黑格尔的说法，凡是实在的皆是合乎理性的，凡是合乎理性的皆是实在的，从而暗示它也是经得起运算与逻辑检验的。

‌‌‌‌　　从1970年代初期开始，通过参照实在界与“现实”之间的区分 (譬如，拉康当时把现实定义为“实在界的鬼脸”[the grimace of thereal], 见：Lacan, 1973a: 17; 亦见：S17,148), 我们便可以在拉康的著作中识别出一种旨在解决此一不确定性的企图。在这组对立中，实在界被坚定地置于不可知与不可同化的一边，而“现实”则表示象征界与想象界相链接而产生出来的那些主观性表象 (即弗洛伊德的“精神现实”)。然而，在引入此种对立之后，拉康并未以带有一致性与系统化的方式来维持这一对立，而是在两种时刻之间摇摆不定，他时而会明确维持这一对立，时而又会重返自己先前可交替使用“实在”与“现实”这些术语的习惯上去。

‌‌‌‌　　(reel) Lacan's use of the term 'real'as a substantive dates back to an early paper, published in 1936. The term was popular among certain philosophers at the time, and isthe focus of a work by Emile Meyerson (which Lacan refers to in the 1936 paper; Ec, 86). Meyerson defines the real as 'an ontological absolute, a true being-in-itself (Meyerson, 1925:79;quoted in Roustang, 1986:61). In speaking of 'the real', then, Lacanis following a common practice in one strand of early twentieth-century philosophy. However, while this may be Lacan's starting point, the term undergoes many shifts inmeaning and usage throughout his work.

‌‌‌‌　　At first the real is simply opposed to the realm of the image, which seems to locate itin the realm of being, beyond appearances (Ec, 85). However, the fact that even at thisearly point Lacan distinguishes between the real and 'the true'indicates that the real isalready prey to a certain ambiguity (Ec, 75).

‌‌‌‌　　After appearing in 1936, the term disappears from Lacan's work until the early 1950s, when Lacan invokes Hegel's view that 'everything which is real is rational (and viceversa)' (Ec, 226). It is not until 1953 that Lacan elevates the real to the status of afundamental category of psychoanalytic theory; the real is henceforth one of the threeORDERS according to which all psychoanalytic phenomena may be described, the othertwo being the symbolic order andand the imaginary order. The real is thus no longersimply opposed to the imaginary, but is also located beyond the symbolic. Unlike thesymbolic, which is constituted in terms of oppositions such as that between presence andabsence, there is no absence in the real' (S2,313). Whereas the symbolic oppositionbetween presence and absence implies the permanent possibility that something may bemissing from the symbolic order, the real 'is always in its place: it carries it glued to itsheel, ignorant of what might exile it from there' (Ec, 25; see S11,49).

‌‌‌‌　　Whereas the symbolic is a set of differentiated, discrete elements called signifiers, thereal is, in itself, undifferentiated;'the real is absolutely without fissure' (S2,97). It is thesymbolic which introduces 'a cut in the real'in the process of signification: 'it is theworld of words that creates the world of things-things originally confused in the hic etnunc of the all in the process of coming-into-being' (E, 65).

‌‌‌‌　　In these formulations of the period 1953-5, the real emerges as that which is outsidelanguage and inassimilable to symbolisation. It is 'that which resists symbolizationabsolutely' (S1,66); or, again, the real is 'the domain of whatever subsists outsidesymbolisation' (Ec, 388). This theme remains a constant throughout the rest of Lacan's work, and leads Lacan to link the real with the concept of impossibility. The real is 'theimpossible' (S11,167) because it is impossible to imagine, impossible to integrate intothe symbolic order, and impossible to attain in any way. It is this character ofimpossibility and of resistance to symbolisation which lends the real its essentiallytraumatic quality. Thus in his reading of the case of Little Hans (Freud, 1909b) in theseminar of 1956-7, Lacan distinguishes two real elements which intrude and disrupt thechild's imaginary preoedipal harmony: the real penis which begins to make itself felt ininfantile masturbation, and the newly born sister (S4,308-9).

‌‌‌‌　　The real also has connotations of matter, implying a material substrate underlying theimaginary and the symbolic (see MATERIALISM). The connotations of matter also linkthe concept of the real to the realm of BIOLOGY and to the body in its brute physicality (as opposed to the imaginary and symbolic functions of the body). For example the realfather is the biological father, and the real phallus is the physical penis as opposed to thesymbolic and imaginary functions of this organ.

‌‌‌‌　　Throughout his work, Lacan uses the concept of the real to elucidate a number ofclinical phenomena:

‌‌‌‌　　.ANXIETY and trauma The real is the object of anxiety; it lacks any possiblemediation, and is thus 'the essential object which isn't an object any longer, but thissomething faced with which all words cease and all categories fail, the object of anxietypar excellence' (S2,164). It is the missed encounter with this real object which presentsitself in the form of trauma (S11,55). It is the tyche which lies 'beyond the [symbolic]automaton' (S11,53)(see CHANCE).

‌‌‌‌　　.HALLUCINATIONS When something cannot be integrated in the symbolic order, as in psychosis, it may return in the real in the form of a hallucination (S3,321).

‌‌‌‌　　The preceding comments trace out some of the main uses to which Lacan puts thecategory of the real, but are far from covering all the complexities of this term. In fact, Lacan takes pains to ensure that the real remains the most elusive and mysterious of thethree orders, by speaking of it less than of the other orders, and by making it the site of aradical indeterminacy. Thus it is never completely clear whether the real is external orinteral, or whether it is unknowable or amenable to reason.

‌‌‌‌　　External/internal On the one hand, the term 'the real'seems to imply a simplisticnotion of an objective, external reality, a material substrate which exists in itself, independently of any observer. On the other hand, such a 'naive'view of the real issubverted by the fact that the real also includes such things as hallucinations andtraumatic dreams. The real is thus both inside and outside (S7,118; see EXTIMACY)(extimite). This ambiguity reflects the ambiguity inherent in Freud's own use of the twoGerman terms for reality (Wirklichkeit and Realitat) and the distinction Freud drawsbetween material reality and psychical reality (Freud, 1900a: SE V, 620).

‌‌‌‌　　.Unknowable/rational On the one hand, the real cannot be known, since it goesbeyond both the imaginary and the symbolic; it is, like the Kantian thing-in-itself, anunknowable x.On the other hand, Lacan quotes Hegel to the effect that the real is rationaland the rational is real, thus implying that it is amenable to calculation and logic.

‌‌‌‌　　It is possible to discem in Lacan's work, from the early 1970s on, an attempt toresolve this indeterminacy, by reference to a distinction between the real and 'reality (such as when Lacan defines reality as 'the grimace of the real'in Lacan, 1973a: 17; seealso S17,148). In this opposition, the real is placed firmly on the side of the unknowable and unassimilable,while 'reality'denotes subjective representations which are a productof symbolic and imaginary articulations(Freud's psychical reality').However,after thisopposition is introduced,Lacan does not maintain it in a consistent or systematic way,butoscillates between moments when the opposition is clearly maintained and momentswhen he reverts to his previous custom of using the terms 'real'and 'realityinterchangeably.