英：death;法：mort
“死亡”这一术语在不同的语境下出现于拉康的著作。
(1)死亡是象征秩序的构成性要素，因为象征符 (symbol)代替了它所象征的事物，从而便等同于那一事物的死亡：“象征符是对于事物的谋杀”(E, 104)。同样，人类历史上的“第一个象征符”便是坟墓 (E, 104)。唯有凭借能指，人类才得以触及并能够设想其自身的死亡；“正是在能指之中，并且就主体链接着一个能指链条而言，他才能够去面对自己可能会从他之所是的这一链条中消失的事实”(S 7,295)。能指同样也使主体超越了死亡，因为“能指早已将他视作死者，它在本质上使他不朽”(S 3,180)。象征秩序中的死亡也联系着父亲 (Father)的死亡（即在《图腾与禁忌》中对于部落父亲的谋杀；Freud, 1912-13）；象征的父亲始终是一个死亡的父亲。
(2)在 1959 一 1960 年度的研讨班《精神分析的伦理学》当中，拉康谈到了“二度死亡”（seconddeath：这是他参照萨德侯爵的小说《茱莉埃特》［Juliette］中的一段话而创造出来的措辞，其中的一个角色谈到了“二度生命”［second life］，见：Sade, 1797:772，被引用于 S 7,211）。首度死亡 (firstdeath)是身体的物理性死亡，此种死亡虽然终结了一个人的生命，但并未终止腐烂与再生的循环。二度死亡则阻止了死者身体的再生，它是“自然转化的循环真正覆灭的时刻”(S 7,248)。二度死亡的概念被拉康用来阐明了他在很多主题上的思想：美 (S 7,260: 美的功能即在于揭示出人类与其自身死亡的关系一 S 7,295); 与存在 (being)的直接关系 (S 7,285):以及施加永恒痛苦的施虐性幻想 (S 7,295)。“介于两次死亡之间的空域”(I'espace de I'entre-deux-morts)这一措辞，原本是由拉康的一位学生所创造（见：S 7,320), 则被拉康拿来命名“悲剧在其中上演的地带”(S 8,120)。
(3)死亡在黑格尔与海德格尔的哲学体系中皆扮演着一个重要的角色，而拉康则同时借鉴了他们俩的哲学来理论化死亡在精神分析中的角色。从黑格尔那里（经由科耶夫），拉康接受了这样一种思想，即死亡既构成了人类的自由，同时又构成了“绝对的主人”(Kojeve, 1947:21)。死亡在黑格尔式的主人 (MASTER)与奴隶的辩证法中扮演着一个至关重要的角色，它在那里同欲望有着密切的关联，因为唯有凭借一种对于死亡的欲望，主人才能相对于一些他者来确认其自身 (E, 105)。从海德格尔那里，拉康接受了这样一种思想，即唯有凭借死亡所设下的最终界限，人类的存在 (existence)才会呈现出意义，因此人类主体严格地讲是一种“向死而在”(being-for-death); 这对应着拉康的如下观点，即经由分析的过程，分析者应当最终承担起其自身必死的命运 (E, 104-5)。
(4)在拉康把精神分析治疗比喻为桥牌游戏的时候，他把分析家描述为在扮演着“明手”（法语中的“le mort”, 在字面上即“死人”的意思)的位置。“分析家通过假装他是个死人而具体地介入分析的辩证法…他让死亡呈现”(E, 140)。分析家会“尸化”(secorpsifiat)其自身。
(5)那个构成了强迫型神经症 (OBSESSIONAL NEUROSIS)的结构的问题也涉及死亡：这个问题便是“我是活着还是死了？”(S 3,179-80)。
(mort) The term death occurs in various contexts in Lacan's work.
- Death is constitutive of the symbolic order, because the symbol, by standing inplace of the thing which it symbolises, is equivalent to the death of the thing: 'the symbolis the murder of the thing' (E, 104). Also, the first symbol'in human history is the tomb (E, 104). It is only by virtue of the signifier that man has access to and can conceive ofhis own death;'It is in the signifier and insofar as the subject articulates a signifyingchain that he comes up against the fact that he may disappear from the chain of what heis' (S 7,295). The signifier also puts the subject beyond death, because the signifieralready considers him dead, by nature it immortalises him' (S 3,180). Death in thesymbolic order is related to the death of the Father (i.e.the murder of the father of thehorde in Totem and Taboo; Freud, 1912-13); the symbolic father is always a dead father.
- In the seminar of 1959-60,'The Ethics of Psychoanalysis', Lacan talks about the'second death' (a phrase which he coins in reference to a passage from the Marquis de Sade's novel Juliette, in which one of the characters speaks of a 'second life', see Sade, 1797:772, quoted in S 7,211). The first death is the physical death of the body, a deathwhich ends one human life but which does not put an end to the cycles of corruption andregeneration. The second death is that which prevents the regeneration of the dead body, the point at which the very cycles of the transformations of nature are annihilated' (S 7,248). The concept of the second death is used by Lacan to formulate ideas on variousthemes: beauty (S 7,260; it is the function of beauty to reveal man's relationship to hisown death-S 7,295); the direct relationship to being (S 7,285); and the sadistic fantasyof inflicting perpetual pain (S 7,295). The phrase 'zone between-two-deaths' (l'espace de I'entre-deux-morts), which was originally coined by one of Lacan's students (see S 7,320), is taken up by Lacan to designate 'the zone in which tragedy is played out' (S 8,120)
- Death plays an important role in the philosophical systems of Hegel and Heidegger, andLacan draws on both of these in his theorisation of the role of death inpsychoanalysis. From Hegel (via Kojeve), Lacan takes the idea that death is bothconstitutive of man's freedom and 'the absolute Master' (Kojeve, 1947:21). Death plays acrucial part in the Hegelian dialectic of the MASTER and the slave where it is intimatelylinked with desire, since the master only affirms himself for others by means of a desirefor death (E, 105). From Heidegger, Lacan takes the idea that human existence only takeson meaning by virtue of the finite limit set by death, so that the human subject is properlya 'being-for-death'; this corresponds to Lacan's view that the analysand should come, viathe analytic process, to assume his own mortality (E, 104-5).
- In his comparison between psychoanalytic treatment and the game of bridge, Lacandescribes the analyst as playing the position of the 'dummy' (in French, le mort; literally, the dead person').'The analyst intervenes concretely in the dialectic of analysis bypretending that he is dead... He makes death present' (E, 140). The analyst 'cadaveriseshimself (se corpsifiat).
- The question which constitutes the structure of OBSESSIONAL NEUROSISconcerns death; it is the question 'Am I dead or alive?' (S 3,179-80).