英:subject; 法:sujet
“主体”这一术语在拉康非常早期的精神分析作品中就已出现 (见:Lacan, 1932), 而且从1945年开始,它便在拉康的著作当中占据了一个核心的地位。这个术语是拉康著作的一项区分性特征,因为该词并未构成弗洛伊德的理论词汇的一部分,而是更多地联系于哲学、法律与语言学的话语。
在拉康“二战”前的文章中,“主体”这一术语似乎仅仅意味着“人类的存在”(human being)(见:Ec, 75), 此外,这一术语也同样被用来指涉分析者 (Ec, 83).
在1945年,拉康在三种类型的主体之间做出了区分。首先,是非个人性的主体 (impersonal subject), 即独立于(小)他者的纯粹语法上的主体(主语),能思的主体 (noetic subject),“众所周知”(itisknown that)中的“众”(即作为形式主语的it)。其次,是匿名的互易性的主体 (reciprocal subject), 完全等同于并可替换以任何的(小)他者,此种主体是在与(小)他者的等值中认出其自身的。最后,是个人性的主体 (personal subject),其独一性 (uniqueness)是由一种自我肯定的行动所构成的 (Ec, 207-8)。始终都是这第三种意义上的主体,即有其独一性的主体,构成了拉康著作的焦点。
在1953年,拉康在主体与自我 (EG0)之间做了一则区分,这一区分将始终是贯穿在他其余著作中的最基本的区分之一。自我隶属于想象秩序,而主体则隶属于象征界。因而,主体并不完全等同于一种有意识的能动感受 (sense of agency), 此种能动感受仅仅是由自我所产生的一种幻象,而是等同于无意识,拉康的“主体”即无意识的主体。拉康宣称,这一区分可以追溯至弗洛伊德:“【弗洛伊德】写下《自我与它我》(Das Ich und das E), 是为了维持真正的无意识主体与自我之间的这一根本性区分,自我是经由一系列的异化性认同而在无意识主体的核心中构成的。”(E, 128)尽管精神分析治疗会在自我上产生一些强大的效果,然而精神分析首先对之起作用的是主体,而非自我。
拉康玩味了“subject”这一术语的多重意义。在语言学和逻辑学上,一个命题的主词 (subject)是谓词 (predicated)所表述的东西 (见:Lacan, 1967:19), 同时也是与“宾词”(object)对立的词项。拉康还玩味了“object”这一术语的哲学意涵,以强调他所提出的主体概念涉及的是人类存在 (human being)的那些无法将其加以对象化 (objectified: 即具体化、还原到事物),或是无法以某种“客观性”(objective)的方式来加以研究的面向。“我们把什么称作一个主体呢?恰恰就是在对象化(客观化)的发展中,处于对象(客体)外部的东西。”(S1,194)
从1950年代中期开始,对于语言的参照便渐渐支配了拉康的主体概念。他区分了所述的主体 (subject of the statement)与能述的主体 (subject of the ENUNCIATION)来说明,因为主体在本质上是一个言说的存在 (英:speaking being; 法:parletre, 即“言在”),所以他便不可避免地会遭到割裂、阉割与分裂 (SPLT)。在1960年代早期,拉康把主体定义为一个能指为另一能指所代表的东西,换句话说,主体是一种语言的效果 (Ec, 835).
除了该术语在语言学与逻辑学上的地位之外,“主体”一词也同样具有一些哲学上和法律上的意涵。在哲学话语中,它意指个体的自我意识;而在法律话语中,它则表示一个处在他人权力之下的人 (例如:一个臣服于[subject to]君主统治的人)。这个术语同时拥有这些意义的事实也就意味着,它完美地阐明了拉康有关意识是由象征秩序所决定的论题,“主体只有凭借其对于大他者领域的臣服 (subjection), 才是一个主体”(S2,188, 翻译有所修改)。这一术语在法律话语中也具有指代行动支持的功能,主体是能够对自己的行动 (ACTS)承担责任的人。
拉康特别强调该术语的那些哲学意涵,他将其联系于笛卡尔的我思 (COGITO)哲学:
以“主体”这一术语…我所指涉的并非此种主体的现象所需要的生命基质,也非任何类型的实体,亦非任何在其情感诉求 (pathos)上拥有知识的存在…甚至更不是某种具象化的理性诉求 (logos),而是笛卡尔式的主体,它出现在当怀疑被认作确信的时候。
(S11,126)
主体的符号S与弗洛伊德的术语E (见:它我[D])发音相同,这一事实也表明,对于拉康而言,真正的主体即无意识的主体。在1957年,拉康又划掉了这个符号,从而产生了符号8,即“被画杠的主体”,以此来表明主体在本质上是被割裂的事实。
(sujet) The term 'subject'is present from the very earliest of Lacan's psychoanalyticwritings (see Lacan, 1932), and from 1945 on it occupies a central part in Lacan's work. This is a distinctive feature of Lacan's work, since the term does not constitute part of Freud's theoretical vocabulary, but is more associated with philosophical, legal andlinguistic discourses.
In Lacan's pre-war papers, the term 'subject'seems to mean no more than 'humanbeing' (see Ec, 75); the term is also used to refer to the analysand (Ec, 83).
In 1945, Lacan distinguishes between three kinds of subject. Firstly, there is theimpersonal subject, independent of the other, the pure grammatical subject, the noeticsubject, the 'it'of 'it is known that.'Secondly, there is the anonymous reciprocal subjectwho is completely equal to and substitutable for any other, and who recognises himself inequivalence with the other. Thirdly, there is the personal subject, whose uniqueness isconstituted by an act of self-affirmation (Ec, 207-8). It is always this third sense of thesubject, the subject in his uniqueness, that constitutes the focus of Lacan's work.
In 1953, Lacan establishes a distinction between the subject and the EGO which willremain one of the most fundamental distinctions throughout the rest of his work. Whereas the ego is part of the imaginary order, the subject is part of the symbolic. Thus the subjectis not simply equivalent to a conscious sense of agency, which is a mere illusionproduced by the ego, but to the unconscious; Lacan's 'subject'is the subject of theunconscious. Lacan argues that this distinction can be traced back to Freud: '[Freud]wrote Das Ich und das Es in order to maintain this fundamental distinction between thetrue subject of the unconscious and the ego as constituted in its nucleus by a series ofalienating identifications' (E, 128). Although psychoanalytic treatment has powerfuleffects on the ego, it is the subject, and not the ego, on which psychoanalysis primarilyoperates.
Lacan plays on the various meanings of the term 'subject'. In linguistics and logic, thesubject of a proposition is that about which something is predicated (see Lacan, 1967:19), and is also opposed to the 'object'. Lacan plays on the philosophical nuances of the latterterm to emphasise that his concept of the subject concerns those aspects of the humanbeing that cannot (or must not) be objectified (reified, reduced to a thing), nor be studiedin an 'objective'way.'What do we call a subject? Quite precisely, what in thedevelopment of objectivation, is outside of the object' (S1,194).
References to language come to dominate Lacan's concept of the subject from themid-1950s on. He distinguishes the subject of the statement from the subject of theENUNCIATION to show that because the subject is essentially a speaking being (parletre), he is inescapably divided, castrated, SPLIT. In the early 1960s Lacan definesthe subject as that which is represented by a signifier for another signifier; in other words, the subject is an effect of language (Ec, 835).
Besides its place in linguistics and logic, the term 'subject'also has philosophical andlegal connotations. In philosophical discourse, it denotes an individual self-consciousness, whereas in legal discourse, it denotes a person who is under the power ofanother (e.g.a person who is subject to the sovereign). The fact that the term possessesboth these meanings means that it perfectly illustrates Lacan's thesis about thedetermination of consciousness by the symbolic order;'the subject is a subject only byvirtue of his subjection to the field of the Other' (S2,188, translation modified). The termalso functions in legal discourse to designate the support of action; the subject is one whocan be held responsible for his ACTS.
The philosophical connotations of the term are particularly emphasised by Lacan, wholinks it with Descartes's philosophy of the COGITO:
In the term subject... I am not designating the living substratum neededby this phenomenon of the subject, nor any sort of substance, nor anybeing possessing knowledge in his pathos... Nor even some incarnatedlogos, but the Cartesian subject, who appears at the moment when doubtis recognised as certainty.
(S11,126)
The fact that the symbol of the subject, S, is a homophone of the Freud's term Es (see ID) illustrates that for Lacan, the true subject is the subject of the unconscious. In 1957 Lacanstrikes through this symbol to produce the symbol thebarred subject', thus illustratingthe fact that the subject is essentially divided.