‌‌‌‌　　英：cgo;法：moi;德：Ich

‌‌‌‌　　在拉康非常早期的著作当中，他便开始玩味这样一个事实，即弗洛伊德所使用的德文术语 (Ich)有着两种可能的法文翻译：宾格的“moi”(法国精神分析家们用来翻译弗洛伊德的Ich的习惯术语)以及主格的“j”。这一事实首先是由法国文法学家爱德华·皮琼所指出的 (见：Roudinesco, 1986:301)。因而，譬如在拉康有关镜子阶段的论文中，他就曾在这两项术语之间摇摆不定 (Lacan, 1949)。尽管我们很难在这篇论文中看出这两项术语之间有任何系统化的区分，然而清楚的是，它们并不完全是可交替使用的，而到1956年，拉康仍然在摸索一种方法来对它们加以清楚地区分 (S3,261)。正是雅各布森有关转换词的论文在1957年的发表，才使得拉康得以更清楚地理论化这一区分；因而，在1960年，拉康便把“je”指称为一个转换词 (SHIFTER),它指示但不代表能述的主体 (E, 298)。大多数英文译本都把“moi”译作“ego”而把“je”译作“I”，以此来明确拉康的用法。

‌‌‌‌　　当拉康使用拉丁文术语“©go”(该术语在《标准版》中被用来翻译弗洛伊德的“Ich”)的时候，他虽然会将该词用作术语“moi”的同义词，但也会用该词来暗指对于众多英美精神分析学派的一个更加直接的参照，尤其是自我心理学 (EGO-PSYCHOLOGY).

‌‌‌‌　　弗洛伊德对“自我”(Ich)这一术语的使用是极其复杂的，而且该词在他的著述过程中也是经历了很多发展之后，才渐渐开始表示所谓的“结构模型”中的三个机构之一（其他两个机构即是它我与超我）。尽管弗洛伊德有关自我的阐述相当复杂，然而拉康却在弗洛伊德的著作中辨别出了两条研究自我的主要取径，并且指出了它们是明显相互矛盾的。一方面，在自恋理论的语境下，“自我站在与对象相对立的另一边”，而另一方面，在所谓的“结构模型”的语境下，“自我则站在与对象相一致的同一边”(Lacan, 1951b:11)。前一种取径将自我牢固安置于力比多经济，并使之联系于快乐原则，而后一种取径则将自我联系于知觉一意识系统，并使之对立于快乐原则。拉康还声称说，这两种说法之间的明显矛盾“会消失在当我们摆脱了一种有关现实原则的天真观念的时候”(Lacan, 1951b:11: 见：现实原则[REALITY PRINCIPLE])。因而，在后一种说法中以自我为中介的现实，其实就产生自在前一种说法中由自我所代表的快乐原则。然而，此种论点是否真的解决了这一矛盾，抑或它实际上是否不仅仅是给前一种说法赋予了特权而牺牲了后一种说法（见：S20,53; 自我在那里被说成是生长在“快乐原则的花盆之中”），则仍然是有待商榷的。

‌‌‌‌　　拉康认为，弗洛伊德有关无意识的发现，使自我摆脱了至少是自笛卡尔以来的西方哲学在传统上指派给它的那一核心位置。拉康同样指出，自我心理学的支持者们把自我重新定位为主体的中心 (见：自主的自我[AUTONOMOUS EGO]), 从而背离了弗洛伊德的这一根本发现。同这一学派的思想相对立，拉康主张自我并不处在中心，自我其实是一个对象。

‌‌‌‌　　自我是在镜子阶段 (MIRROR STAGE)中经由镜像认同而形成的一种构造。因而，它是主体变得异化于其自身，并将其自身转变成相似者的位置。自我所基于的此种异化，在结构上同偏执狂相类似，这就是为什么拉康写道，自我具有一种偏执狂的结构（E, 20)。自我因而是一种想象的构形，与主体 (SUBJECT)相对立，后者是一种象征界的产物 (见：E, 128)。实际上，自我恰好就是对于象征秩序的“误认”(meconnaissance), 是阻抗的所在地。自我是像一个症状那样被结构的：“自我恰恰是像一个症状那样被结构的。在主体的中心，它仅仅是一个享有特权的症状，是典型的人类症状，是人类的心理疾病。”(S1,16)

‌‌‌‌　　因此，拉康完全反对流行于自我心理学的这样一种思想，即精神分析治疗的目标是旨在强化自我。因为自我是“幻象的所在”(S1,62), 所以增强它的力量只会在增加主体的异化上取得成功。自我同样是对于精神分析治疗的阻抗的来源，因而强化自我的力量也只会增加那些阻抗。因为其想象的固定性，自我会抵制所有主体性的成长与改变，并且会抵制欲望的辩证运动。通过削弱自我的这种固定性，精神分析治疗旨在重新建立欲望的辩证并重新发动主体的生成。

‌‌‌‌　　拉康反对自我心理学把分析者的自我当作分析家在治疗中的同盟的观点。他同样拒绝自我心理学把精神分析治疗的目标看作促进自我对于现实的适应 (ADAPTATION)的观点。

‌‌‌‌　　(moi) From very early on in his work, Lacan plays on the fact that the German termwhich Freud uses (Ich) can be translated into French by two words: moi (the usual termwhich French psychoanalysts use for Freud's Ich) and je. This had first been pointed outby the French grammarian, Edouard Pichon (see Roudinesco, 1986:301). Thus, forexample, in his paper on the mirror stage, Lacan oscillates between the two terms (Lacan, 1949). While it is difficult to discem any systematic distinction between the two terms inthis paper, it is clear that they are not simply used interchangeably, and in 1956 he is stillgroping for a way to distinguish clearly between them (S3,261). It was the publication of Jakobson's paper on shifters in 1957 that allowed Lacan to theorise the distinction moreclearly; thus, in 1960, Lacan refers to the je as a SHIFTER, which designates but does notsignify the subject of the enunciation (E, 298). Most English translations make Lacan'susage clear by rendering moi as 'ego'and je as 'I'.

‌‌‌‌　　When Lacan uses the Latin term ego (the term used to translate Freud's Ich in the Standard Edition), he uses it in the same sense as the term moi, but also means it to implya more direct reference to Anglo-American schools of psychoanalysis, especially EGO-PSYCHOLOGY.

‌‌‌‌　　Freud's use of the term Ich (ego) is extremely complex and went through manydevelopments throughout the course of his work before coming to denote one of the threeagencies of the so-called 'structural model' (the others being the id and the superego). Despite the complexity of Freud's formulations on the ego, Lacan discerns two mainapproaches to the ego in Freud's work, and points out that they are apparentlycontradictory. On the one hand, in the context of the theory of narcissism,'the ego takessides against the object', whereas on the other hand, in the context of the so-calledstructural model', the ego takes sides with the object' (Lacan, 1951b:11). The formerapproach places the ego firmly in the libidinal economy and links it with the pleasureprinciple, whereas the latter approach links the ego to the perception-consciousnesssystem and opposes it to the pleasure principle. Lacan claims too that the apparentcontradiction between these two accounts 'disappears when we free ourselves from anaive conception of the reality-principle' (Lacan, 1951b: 11; see REALITY PRINCIPLE). Thus the reality that the ego mediates with, in the latter account, is in fact made out of thepleasure principle which the ego represents in the former account. However, it is arguablewhether this argument really resolves the contradiction or whether it does not, in effect, simply privilege the former account at the expense of the latter (see S20,53, where theego is said to grow 'in the flowerpot of the pleasure principle').

‌‌‌‌　　Lacan argues that Freud's discovery of the unconscious removed the ego from thecentral position to which westem philosophy, at least since Descartes, had traditionallyassigned it. Lacan also argues that the proponents of ego-psychology betrayed Freud'sradical discovery by relocating the ego as the centre of the subject (see AUTONOMOUSEGO). In opposition to this school of thought, Lacan maintains that the ego is not at thecentre, that the ego is in fact an object.

‌‌‌‌　　The ego is a construction which is formed by identification with the specular image inthe MIRROR STAGE. It is thus the place where the subject becomes alienated fromhimself, transforming himself into the counterpart. This alienation on which the ego isbased is structurally similar to paranoia, which is why Lacan writes that the ego has aparanoiac structure (E, 20). The ego is thus an imaginary formation, as opposed to theSUBJECT, which is a product of the symbolic (see E, 128). Indeed, the ego is precisely ameconnaissance of the symbolic order, the seat of resistance. The ego is structured like asymptom: 'The ego is structured exactly like a symptom. At the heart of the subject, it isonly a privileged symptom, the human symptom par excellence, the mental illness ofman' (S1,16).

‌‌‌‌　　Lacan is therefore totally opposed to the idea, current in ego-psychology, that the aimof psychoanalytic treatment is to strengthen the ego. Since the ego is 'the seat ofillusions' (S1,62), to increase its strength would only succeed in increasing the subject'salienation. The ego is also the source of resistance to psychoanalytic treatment, and thusto strengthen it would only increase those resistances. Because of its imaginary fixity, theego is resistant to all subjective growth and change, and to the dialectical movement ofdesire. By undermining the fixity of the ego, psychoanalytic treatment aims to restore thedialectic of desire and reinitiate the coming-into-being of the subject.

‌‌‌‌　　Lacan is opposed to the ego-psychology view which takes the ego of the analysand tobe the ally of the analyst in the treatment. He also rejects the view that the aim ofpsychoanalytic treatment is to promote the ADAPTATION of the ego to reality.