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‌‌‌‌  英:symbolic; 法:symbolique

‌‌‌‌  “象征性”这一术语以形容词的形式出现在拉康最早期的精神分析作品当中 (例如:Lacan, 1936)。在这些早期著作中,该术语隐含了对于数学物理学中所使用的象征逻辑和象征等式的参照(Ec, 79)。在1948年,症状被说成具有某种“象征性的意义”(E, 10). 到1950年,由于拉康在当时称赞马塞尔·莫斯说明了“社会结构是象征性的”(Ec, 132), 该术语也获得了一些人类学的寓意。

‌‌‌‌  在1953年,拉康开始把“象征界”这一术语作为一个名词使用,此时这些不同的细微差别便被结合进了一个单一的范畴。它现在变成了贯穿在拉康其后著作中始终居于核心的三种秩序 (ORDERS)之一。在此三种秩序中,象征界对于精神分析而言是最关键的一环,精神分析家们在本质上即“象征功能的实践者”(E, 72)。在谈到“象征功能”(symbolic function)的时候,拉康明确表示他的象征秩序的概念在很大程度上是归功于克劳德·列维-斯特劳斯的人类学著作 (“象征功能”这一措辞即取自列维-斯特劳斯:见:Lvi-Strauss, 1949a:203)。特别是,拉康从列维-斯特劳斯那里接受了这样一种思想,即社会世界是由调节亲属关系与礼物交换的某些法则所结构的 (亦见:Mauss, 1923)①。礼物的概念,以及交换环路的概念,因而便构成了拉康的象征界概念的基础 (S4,153-4,182).

‌‌‌‌  因为交换的最基本形式是交流本身(言词的交换、言语的礼物;S4,189),且因为法则 (LAW)与结构 (STRUCTURE)的概念倘若离开语言 (LANGUAGE)便是无法设想的,所以象征界在本质上是一个语言的维度。因而凡是具有一种语言结构的精神分析经验的面向,皆属于象征秩序。

‌‌‌‌  然而,拉康并未简单地把象征秩序等同于语言。恰恰相反,除了其象征的维度之外,语言还涉及想象的维度与实在的维度。语言的象征性维度即能指 (SIGNIFIER)的维度,在此维度中的元素没有任何肯定的存在 (positive existence), 而纯粹是凭借它们相互之间的差异而构成的。

‌‌‌‌  象征界同样是拉康将其指称为大他者 (OTHER)的那一根本相异性的领域。无意识 (UNCONSCIOUS)即这个大他者的话语,且因而完全属于象征秩序。象征界是在俄狄浦斯情结中对欲望进行调节的法则 (Law)的领域。它是文化的领域,与自然的想象秩序相对立。想象界是以二元关系为特征的,而象征界则是以三元结构为特征的,因为主体间的关系总是以一个第三项(即大他者)为“中介”的。此外,象征秩序也是死亡 (DEATH)、缺位(ABSENCE)与缺失 (LACK)的领域。象征界既是调节着与原物之间距离的快乐原则 (PLEASURE PRINCIPLE), 同时又是借由重复而“超越快乐原则”的死亡冲动 (DEATH DRIVE)(S2,210), 事实上,“死亡冲动只是象征秩序的面具”(S2,326).

‌‌‌‌  象征秩序是完全自主性的,它并非由生物学或遗传学所决定的一种上层建筑。相对于实在界而言,它完全是偶然的:“没有任何生物学的原因,而且特别是没有任何遗传学的原因,能够解释异族通婚。在人类的秩序中,我们处理的是将整个秩序囊括在其整体之中一种崭新功能的全然呈现。”(S2,29)因而,尽管象征界可能看似是作为某种预先给定而“源出于实在界”的,然而这是一种幻象,而且“我们也不应该认为那些象征符实际上都是来自实在界的”(S2,238).

‌‌‌‌  象征秩序的此种整体化的、包罗万象的效果,导致拉康把象征界说成是一种宇宙:“象征秩序中的整体性即被称作一种宇宙。象征秩序打从一开始便呈现出了其宇宙性的特征。它不是一点一点地构成的。那些象征符一旦到来,便会产生一个象征符的宇宙。”(S2,29)因此,便根本不存在从想象界逐渐连续地过渡至象征界的问题,它们是两种全然异质性的界域。象征秩序一旦出现,它便会创造出它始终都存在于那里的感觉,因为“我们发觉除了经由象征符,我们是绝对不可能推测出先于象征界的事物的”(S2,5). 严格地讲,正是出于这个原因,我们便不可能去设想语言的起源,更不用说是那些先于语言而存在的事物,这就是为什么发展的问题是处在精神分析领域之外的原因所在。

‌‌‌‌  拉康批评他那个时代的精神分析遗忘了象征秩序并且把所有事物统统化约到想象界的做法。对拉康而言,这无异于是背叛了弗洛伊德的那些最基本的洞见,“弗洛伊德的发现即在于他发现了在人类的本性中存在着一个由他跟象征秩序的关系所产生的效应场域。无视于这个象征秩序,便等于湮没了这项发现”(E, 64)。

‌‌‌‌  拉康认为,只有通过在象征秩序中进行工作,分析家才能够在分析者的主体位置上产生改变,这些改变也会产生一些想象的效果,因为想象界是由象征界所结构的。象征秩序才是主体性的决定因素,而形象与外观的想象性领域则只不过是象征界的效果而已。因此,精神分析便必须穿透到想象界之外而在象征秩序之内进行工作。

‌‌‌‌  拉康的象征界概念与弗洛伊德的“象征意义”(symbolism)是截然对立的。对弗洛伊德而言,象征符是意义与形式之间相对固定的一一对应关系,而这却更多地对应于拉康的指示符 (NDEX)概念 (见:Freud, 1900a: SEV, 第六章第五节《论梦中的象征意义》)。然而,对拉康而言,象征界的特征则恰好在于能指与所指之间缺乏任何固定的关系。

‌‌‌‌  (symbolique) The term 'symbolic'appears in adjectival form in Lacan's earliestpsychoanalytic writings (e.g.Lacan, 1936). In these early works the term impliesreferences to symbolic logic and to the equations used in mathematical physics (Ec, 79). In 1948 symptoms are said to have a 'symbolic meaning' (E, 10). By 1950, the term hasacquired anthropological overtones, as when Lacan praises Marcel Mauss for havingshown that 'the structures of society are symbolic' (Ec, 132).

‌‌‌‌  These different nuances are combined into a single category in 1953 when Lacanbegins to use the term 'symbolic'as a noun. It now becomes one of the three ORDERSthat remain central throughout the rest of Lacan's work. Of these three orders, thesymbolic is the most crucial one for psychoanalysis; psychoanalysts are essentiallypractitioners of the symbolic function' (E, 72). In speaking of 'the symbolic function', Lacan makes it clear that his concept of the symbolic order owes much to theanthropological work of Claude Levi-Strauss (from whom the phrase 'symbolic functionis taken; see Levi-Strauss, 1949a:203). In particular, Lacan takes from Levi-Strauss theidea that the social world is structured by certain laws which regulate kinship relationsand the exchange of gifts (see also Mauss, 1923). The concept of the gift, and that of acircuit of exchange, are thus fundamental to Lacan's concept of the symbolic (S4,153-4,182)

‌‌‌‌  Since the most basic form of exchange is communication itself (the exchange ofwords, the gift of speech; S4,189), and since the concepts of LAW and of STRUCTUREare unthinkable without LANGUAGE, the symbolic is essentially a linguistic dimension. Any aspect of the psychoanalytic experience which has a linguistic structure thus pertainsto the symbolic order.

‌‌‌‌  However, Lacan does not simply equate the symbolic order with language. On thecontrary, language involves imaginary and real dimensions in addition to its symbolicdimension. The symbolic dimension of language is that of the SIGNIFIER; a dimensionin which elements have no positive existence but which are constituted purely by virtueof their mutual differences.

‌‌‌‌  The symbolic is also the realm of radical alterity which Lacan refers to as the OTHER. The UNCONSCIOUS is the discourse of this Other, and thus belongs wholly to the symbolic order. The symbolic is the realm of the Law which regulates desire in the Oedipus complex. It is the realm of culture as opposed to the imaginary order of nature. Whereas the imaginary is characterised by dual relations, the symbolic is characterised bytriadic structures, because the intersubjective relationship is always 'mediated'by a thirdterm, the big Other. The symbolic order is also the realm of DEATH, of ABSENCE andof LACK. The symbolic is both the PLEASURE PRINCIPLE which regulates thedistance from the Thing, and the DEATH DRIVE which goes 'beyond the pleasureprinciple'by means of repetition (S2,210); in fact,'the death drive is only the mask ofthe symbolic order' (S2,326).

‌‌‌‌  The symbolic order is completely autonomous: it is not a superstructure determined bybiology or genetics. It is completely contingent with respect to the real: 'There is nobiological reason, and in particular no genetic one, to account for exogamy. In the humanorder we are dealing with the complete emergence of a new function, encompassing thewhole order in its entirety' (S2,29). Thus while the symbolic may seem to 'spring fromthe real'as pre-given, this is an illusion, and 'one shouldn't think that symbols actuallyhave come from the real' (S2,238).

‌‌‌‌  The totalising, all-encompassing effect of the symbolic order leads Lacan to speak ofthe symbolic as a universe: 'In the symbolic order the totality is called a universe. Thesymbolic order from the first takes on its universal character. It isn't constituted bit bybit. As soon as the symbol arrives, there is a universe of symbols' (S2,29). There istherefore no question of a gradual continuous transition from the imaginary to thesymbolic; they are completely heterogeneous domains. Once the symbolic order hasarisen, it creates the sense that it has always been there, since 'we find it absolutelyimpossible to speculate on what preceded it other than by symbols' (S2,5). For thisreason it is strictly speaking impossible to conceive the origin of language, let alone whatcame before, which is why questions of development lie outside the field ofpsychoanalysis.

‌‌‌‌  Lacan criticises the psychoanalysis of his day for forgetting the symbolic order andreducing everything to the imaginary. This is, for Lacan, nothing less than a betrayal of Freud's most basic insights; Freud's discovery is that of the field of the effects, in thenature of man, produced by his relation to the symbolic order. To ignore this symbolicorder is condemn the discovery to oblivion' (E, 64).

‌‌‌‌  Lacan argues that it is only by working in the symbolic order that the analyst canproduce changes in the subjective position of the analysand; these changes will alsoproduce imaginary effects, since the imaginary is structured by the symbolic. It is thesymbolic order which is determinant of subjectivity, and the imaginary realm of imagesand appearances are merely effects of the symbolic. Psychoanalysis must thereforepenetrate beyond the imaginary and work in the symbolic order.

‌‌‌‌  Lacan's concept of the symbolic is diametrically opposed to Freud's 'symbolism'. For Freud, the symbol was a relatively fixed bi-univocal relation between meaning and formwhich corresponds more to the Lacanian concept of the INDEX (see Freud 1900a: SE V, ch. 6, sect. E, on symbolism in dreams). For Lacan, however, the symbolic ischaracterised precisely by the absence of any fixed relations between signifier andsignified.