英:contertransference:. 法:contre-transfert
弗洛伊德创造了“反转移”这个术语来指称分析家朝向病人的“无意识情感”。虽然弗洛伊德只是非常罕见地使用到这一术语,但是在他死后,该术语在精神分析理论中得到了更加广泛的使用。特别是,关于指派给反转移的角色,分析家们很快便在技术的讨论中划分成了两大阵营。一方面,很多分析家认为,反转移的表现是在分析家身上未经彻底分析的那些元素的结果,这些表现因此应当通过更加彻底的训练性分析而被缩减至最小。另一方面,自保拉·海曼开始,一些克莱因学派的分析家便认为,分析家应当在自己的解释上由其自身的反转移反应来引导,将其自身的感受当作病人心理状态的指示器 (Heimann, 1950)。前一群体把反转移视作对于分析的障碍,后一群体则将其看作一项有用的工具。
在1950年代,拉康把反转移呈现为某种阻抗 (RESISTANCE), 即某种阻碍精神分析治疗进展的障碍。如同所有针对治疗的阻抗那样,反转移归根结底是一种分析家的阻抗。因而,拉康便把反转移定义为在治疗的“辩证过程的某一时刻上,分析家的偏见、激情、困惑乃至不充分资料的总和”(Ec, 225).
拉康提到了弗洛伊德的两例个案研究来阐明他的意思。在1951年,他提到了杜拉个案 (Freud, 1905e), 并且指出弗洛伊德的反转移的根源不仅在于他相信异性恋是自然的而非规范的看法,而且还在于他对K先生的认同。拉康认为,正是这两个因素致使弗洛伊德槽糕地处理了治疗并且激起了“负性转移”,从而导致杜拉突然中断了治疗 (Lacan, I951a).
在1957年,拉康又就弗洛伊德对于同性恋少女的治疗 (Freud, 1920a)提出了一则类似的分析。他指出,当弗洛伊德把这个女人的梦解释为一种想要欺骗他的愿望的时候,他便是聚焦在了这个女人的转移的想象性维度,而非象征性维度 (S4,135)。也就是说,弗洛伊德把这个梦解释为某种针对他本人的东西,而非某种指向大他者的东西。拉康认为,弗洛伊德之所以这样做,既是因为他发觉这个女人很有吸引力,也是因为他认同了这个女人的父亲 (S4,1069)。再一次地,弗洛伊德的反转移使治疗过早地结束,尽管这一次是弗洛伊德决定要终止治疗的。
上述的两个例子似乎可能暗示着,拉康同那些认为训练性分析应当让分析家有能力超越对于病人的所有情感反应的分析家站在同一阵线上。然而,拉康断然拒绝了此种观点,他将其看作一种“斯多葛派的理想”(stoical ideal)而不予理会 (S8,219)。训练性分析并不会使分析家置身于激情之外,倘若如此认为,则是相信所有的激情皆滋生自无意识,而这是为拉康所拒绝的一种思想。甚至可能正好相反,分析家越是经历过更好的分析,他就越是可能会坦诚地爱上分析者,或是对分析者感到相当厌恶 (S8,220)。因而,如果说分析家没有基于这些情感来行动,那也不是因为他的训练性分析耗尽了他的激情,而是因为它给他赋予了比那些激情更加强大的一种欲望,这种欲望被拉康称作分析家的欲望(DESIRE OF THE ANALYST)(S8,220-1)
从来没有人说过分析家绝不应当对分析者产生情感。但是他不仅必须知道不要投身其中,而是要把这些情感保持在它们的位置上,而且还必须知道如何把这些情感恰当地运用在自己的技术中。
(S1,32)
如果说反转移是为拉康所谴责的,那么,这也是因为他不是根据分析家所感受到的各种情感来定义它的,而是把它定义为分析家未能恰当地使用那些情感的失败。
在1960年代,拉康对“反转移”这一术语开始持极具批判性的态度。他认为该术语意味着分析家与分析者之间存在着一种对称性的关系,而转移则根本不是一种对称性的关系。当谈到分析家的位置的时候,使用“反转移”这个术语便既是误导性的又是不必要的:仅仅是讲分析家与分析者被卷入在转移中的不同方式就足够了 (S8,233)。“转移是主体与精神分析家被共同纳入其中的一种现象。根据转移与反转移来对其进行划分…永远都只不过是一种规避问题本质的方式”(S11,231)。
(contre-transfert) Freud coined the term'countertransference'to designate the analyst's'unconscious feelings'towards the patient. Although Freud only used the term veryrarely, it became much more widely used in psychoanalytic theory after his death. Inparticular, analysts soon divided over the role allotted to countertransference indiscussions of technique. On the one hand, many analysts argued that countertransferencemanifestations were the result of incompletely analysed elements in the analyst, and thatsuch manifestations should therefore be reduced to a minimum by a more completetraining analysis. On the other hand, some analysts from the Kleinian school, beginningwith Paula Heimann, argued that the analyst should be guided in his interpretations by hisown countertransference reactions, taking his own feelings as an indicator of the patient'sstate of mind (Heimann, 1950). Whereas the former group regarded countertransferenceas an obstacle to analysis, the latter group regarded it as a useful tool.
In the 1950s, Lacan presents countertransference as a RESISTANCE, an obstaclewhich hinders the progress of psychoanalytic treatment. Like all resistances to treatment, countertransference is ultimately a resistance of the analyst. Thus Lacan definescountertransference as 'the sum of the prejudices, passions, perplexities, and even theinsufficient information of the analyst at a certain moment of the dialectical process'ofthe treatment (Ec, 225).
Lacan refers to two of Freud's case studies to illustrate what he means. In 1951, herefers to the Dora case (Freud, 1905e), and argues that Freud's countertransference wasrooted in his belief that heterosexuality is natural rather than normative, and in hisidentification with Herr K.Lacan argues that it was these two factors which caused Freudto handle the treatment badly and provoke the 'negative transference'which led to Dorabreaking offthe treatment (Lacan, 195la).
In 1957 Lacan presents a similar analysis of Freud's treatment of the younghomosexual woman (Freud, 1920a). He argues that when Freud interpreted the woman'sdream as expressing a wish to deceive him, he was focusing on the imaginary dimensionof the woman's transference rather than on the symbolic dimension (S4,135). That is, Freud interpreted the dream as something directed at him personally, rather than assomething directed at the Other. Lacan argues that Freud did this because he found thewoman attractive and because he identified with the woman's father (S4,106-9). Once again, Freud's countertransference brought the treatment to a premature end, though thistime it was Freud who decided to terminate it.
The preceding examples might seem to suggest that Lacan aligns himself with thoseanalysts who argue that the training analysis should give the analyst the capacity totranscend all affective reactions to the patient. However, Lacan absolutely rejects thispoint of view, which he dismisses as a'stoical ideal' (S8,219). The training analysis doesnot put the analyst beyond passion, and to believe that it does would be to believe that allthe passions stem from the unconscious, an idea which Lacan rejects. If anything, thebetter analysed the analyst is, the more likely he is to be frankly in love with, or be quiterepulsed by, the analysand (S8,220). If, then, the analyst does not act on the basis ofthese feelings, it is not because his training analysis has drained away his passions, butbecause it has given him a desire which is even stronger than those passions, a desirewhich Lacan calls the DESIRE OF THE ANALYST (S8,220-1).
Hence Lacan does not entirely reject Paula Heimann's position. He accepts thatanalysts have feelings towards their patients, and that sometimes the analyst can directthe treatment better by reflecting on these feelings. For example, if Freud had reflected abit more on his feelings towards the young homosexual woman, he might have avoidedinterpreting her dream as a message addressed directly to him (S4,108).
No one has ever said that the analyst should never have feelings towardshis patient. But he must know not only not to give into them, to keep themin their place, but also how to make adequate use of them in his technique.
(S1,32)
If countertransference is condemned by Lacan, then, it is because he defines it not interms of affects felt by the analyst, but as the analyst's failure to use those affectsappropriately.
In the 1960s Lacan becomes very critical of the term countertransference. He arguesthat it connotes a symmetrical relationship between the analyst and the analysand, whereas the transference is anything but a symmetrical relationship. When speaking ofthe analyst's position it is both misleading and unnecessary to use thetermcountertransference; it is sufficient to speak of the different ways in which the analyst andanalysand are implicated in the transference (S8,233).'The transference is aphenomenon in which subject and psycho-analyst are both included. To divide it in termsof transference and counter-transference... Is never more than a way of avoiding theessence of the matter' (S11,231)