‌‌‌‌　　英：consciousness;法：conscience

‌‌‌‌　　在所谓的“地形学模型”(topographical model)中，弗洛伊德把意识作为精神中的一个部分离析出来，同无意识 (UNCONSCIOUS)与前意识 (preconscious)并存。拉康发觉弗洛伊德有关意识的评论远远不及他有关无意识的阐述：“虽然他【弗洛伊德】可以就精神装置 (psychic apparatus)中的大多数其他部分给出某种一致的、均衡的说明，但是当涉及意识问题的时候，他总是会遇到一些相互矛盾的情况”(S2,117)。根据拉康的观点，弗洛伊德在探讨意识方面的难题反复地纠缠他的理论：“这个意识系统所引发的困难反复出现在弗洛伊德的理论化的每个层面上”(S2,117)。特别是，拉康拒绝明显存在于弗洛伊德著作中的那些旨在把知觉意识系统联系于自我 (EGO)的企图，除非此种联系是经过细致的理论化的。如果在自我与意识之间存在某种联系，那么这也是在引诱的方面而言的：这种完全自明的意识的幻象是由整个精神分析的经验所颠覆的 (见：我思[COGITO])。“人类的意识在本质上是一种两极的张力，一极是从主体中异化出来的自我 (g0), 另一极则是从根本上逃离自我的知觉，即一种纯粹的感知 (percipi)" (S2,177).

‌‌‌‌　　在1954年，拉康给出了“一则有关意识现象的唯物主义定义”(S2,4052)。然而，物质不应当同自然相混淆：拉康认为，意识并非是从自然秩序中进化出来的：它在根本上是不连续的，而且它的起源也更加类似于创造，而非进化 (S7,213-14:223).

‌‌‌‌　　在1960年代，拉康又根据他的假设知道的主体（SUBJECT SUPPOSED TO KNOW)的概念，重新思考了向其自身充分呈现的自我意识 (德：SelbstbewuBstsein)的幻象。

‌‌‌‌　　(conscience) In the so-called 'topographical model', Freud isolates consciousness as oneof the parts of the psyche, along with the UNCONSCIOUS and the preconscious. Lacanfinds Freud's remarks on consciousness far weaker than his formulations on theunconscious;'while he [Freud]can give a coherent, balanced account of the majority ofother parts of the psychic apparatus, when it's a question of consciousness, he alwaysencounters mutually contradictory conditions' (S2,117). According to Lacan, Freud'sproblems with discussing consciousness return again and again to haunt his theory: 'Thedifficulties which this system of consciousness raises reappear at each level of Freud'stheorising' (S2,117). In particular, Lacan rejects the apparent attempts in Freud's work tolink the consciousness-perception system to the EGO, unless this link is carefullytheorised. Ifthere is a link between the ego and consciousness, it is in terms of a lure; theillusion of a fully self-transparent consciousness is subverted by the wholepsychoanalytic experience (see COGITO).'Consciousness in man is by essence a polartension between an ego alienated from the subject and a perception which fundamentallyescapes it, a pure percipi' (S2,177).

‌‌‌‌　　In 1954 Lacan gives 'a materialist definition of the phenomenon of consciousness' (S2,40-52). However, matter is not to be confused with nature; Lacan argues thatconsciousness does not evolve from the natural order; it is radically discontinuous, and itsorigin is more akin to creation than to evolution (S7,213-14; 223).

‌‌‌‌　　In the 1960s Lacan rethinks the illusion of a self-consciousness (SelbstbewuBtsein) fully present to itself in terms of his concept of the SUBJECT SUPPOSED TO KNOW.