‌‌‌‌　　英：metonymy; 法：metonymie

‌‌‌‌　　换喻的通常定义是一种比喻，其中的一个词项被用来表示它实际上并不指涉却与之紧密联系的一个对象。此种联系可以是物理临近性的联系 (诸如“三十张帆”意味着“三十艘船”)，但也未必 (诸如“我没有读过莎士比亚”意味着“我没有读过莎士比亚的任何作品”)。

‌‌‌‌　　然而，除了临近性的概念以外，拉康对于该术语的使用很少归功于这项定义，因为拉康的用法是受罗曼·雅各布森的著作启发而来的，雅各布森在换喻与隐喻 (METAPHOR)之间建立了一则对立 (Jakobson, 1956)。遵循雅各布森的观点，拉康把换喻联系于语言的组合轴 (combinatorial axis),与替代轴 (substitutive axis)相对立。例如，在“我是快乐的”这句话中，“我”和“是”这两个词之间的关系便是一种换喻关系，而以“悲伤”来替代“快乐”的可能性则取决于这两个词项之间的隐喻关系。

‌‌‌‌　　在拉康有关此一主题的最为详尽的著作中 (Lacan, 1957b),他把换喻定义为能指链条 (SIGNIFYING CHAIN)中的一个能指与另一能指之间的历时性关系。换喻因而便涉及单一能指链条上的众多能指如何可以被组合或联系起来 (“水平”关系)，而隐喻则涉及一个能指链条上的能指如何可以被另一能指链条中的能指所替代 (“垂直”关系)。隐喻与换喻合在一起，便共同构成了意指得以被产生的方式。

‌‌‌‌　　拉康给换喻提供了一则公式 (E, 164: 图8)。

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‌‌‌‌　　这一公式当做如下解读。在等式的左边，拉康在括号外面写下了fS, 表意功能（函数），也就是意指效果。在括号里面，他则写下了S.S’, 即一个能指与另一能指在一个能指链条上的联系。在等式的右边，S即能指，5即所指，（一）则是索绪尔式算法中的那道杠 (BAR)。符号“≌”要读作“全等于”。因而，整个公式读作：“能指与能指相联系的表意功能全等于对杠的维持”。这则公式意在阐明拉康的以下论题，即在换喻中，意指的阻抗被维持，杠没有被穿越，也没有任何新的所指被产生。

‌‌‌‌　　拉康把他的换喻概念放置在各种不同的语境下来使用。

‌‌‌‌　　·欲望 (DESIRE)拉康提出换喻是沿着能指链条从一个能指到另一能指的历时性运动，即一个能指在意义的永久延迟中不断地指涉于另一能指。欲望恰好也是以同样永无止境的不断延迟过程为特征的，因为欲望总是“对于某种其他事物的欲望”（E, 167), 一旦欲望的对象被获得，它就不再是可欲望的，而主体的欲望便固着于另一对象。因而，拉康写道：“欲望即一则换喻。”（E, 175, 强调为原文所加）

‌‌‌‌　　·移置拉康同样遵循雅各布森的观点，把隐喻一换喻的区分联系于弗洛伊德所描述的梦的工作机制。然而，在此种联系的确切本质上，他又不同于雅各布森 (见：隐喻[METAPHOR])。正如移置在逻辑上优先于凝缩，所以换喻是隐喻的条件，因为“在所指的转移能够发生之前，能指的协调必须首先是可能的”(S3,229)。

‌‌‌‌　　(metonymie) Metonymy is usually defined as a trope in which a term is used to denote anobject which it does not literally refer to, but with which it is closely linked. This linkmay be one of physical contiguity (such as when 'thirty sails'means 'thirty boats'), butnot necessarily (such as when 'I haven't read Shakespeare'means 'I haven't readanything written by Shakespeare').

‌‌‌‌　　However, Lacan's use of the term owes little to this definition apart from the notion ofcontiguity, since it is inspired by the work of Roman Jakobson, who established anopposition between metonymy and METAPHOR (Jakobson, 1956). Following Jakobson, Lacan links metonymy to the combinatorial axis of language, as opposed to thesubstitutive axis. For example, in the sentence 'I am happy', the relation between thewords 'I'and am'is a metonymic relation, whereas the possibility of substituting'sad'for 'happy'depends on the metaphoric relation between these two terms.

‌‌‌‌　　In his most detailed work on the subject (Lacan, 1957b), Lacan defines metonymy asthe diachronic relation between one signifier and another in the SIGNIFYING CHAIN. Metonymy thus concerns the ways in which signifiers can be combined/linked in a singlesignifying chain ('horizontal'relations), whereas metaphor concerns the ways in which asignifier in one signifying chain may be substituted for a signifier in another chain ('vertical'relations). Together, metaphor and metonymy constitute the way in whichsignification is produced.

‌‌‌‌　　Lacan provides a formula for metonymy (E, 164; Figure 10).

‌‌‌‌　　This formula is to be read as follows. On the lefthand side of the equation, outside thebrackets, Lacan writes f S, the signifying function, which is to say the effect ofsignification. Inside the brackets he writes S... S', the link between one signifier andanother in a signifying chain. On the righthand side of the equation there is S, thesignifier, s, the signified, and (-) the BAR of the Saussurean algorithm. The sign =is tobe read 'is congruent with'. Thus the whole formula reads: 'the signifying function of theconnection of the signifier with the signifier is congruent with maintenance of the bar'. The formula is meant to illustrate Lacan's thesis that in metonymy the resistance ofsignification is maintained, the bar is not crossed, no new signified is produced.

‌‌‌‌　　Lacan puts his concept of metonymy to use in a variety of contexts.

‌‌‌‌　　DESIRE Lacan presents metonymy as a diachronic movement from one signifier toanother along the signifying chain, as one signifier constantly refers to another in aperpetual deferral of meaning. Desire is also characterised by exactly the same never-ending process of continual deferral; since desire is always 'desire for something else' (E, 167), as soon as the object of desire is attained, it is no longer desirable, and the subject'sdesire fixes on another object. Thus Lacan writes that 'desire is a metonymy' (E, 175, emphasis in original).

‌‌‌‌　　Displacement Lacan also follows Jakobson in linking the metaphor-metonymydistinction to the mechanisms of the dream work described by Freud. However, he differsfrom Jakobson over the precise nature of this link (see METAPHOR). Just asdisplacement is logically prior to condensation, so metonymy is the condition formetaphor, because 'the coordination of signifiers has to be possible before transferencesof the signified are able to take place' (S3,229).