‌‌‌‌　　英：existence; 法：existence; 德：Existenz

‌‌‌‌　　拉康以各种不同的方式来使用“存在”这个术语 (见：Zik, 1991:136-7):

‌‌‌‌　　象征界中的存在存在的这层意义要在弗洛伊德讨论“存在判断”(judgement of existence)的语境下来理解，即在把任何属性归于一个实体之前，这个实体的存在即已借由此一判断而得到了确认 (见：Freud, 1925h; 见：肯定[BEJAHUNG])。在此意义上，只有被整合进象征秩序的事物才会充分地“存在”，因为“根本没有前话语的现实 (prediscursive reality)这样一种事物”(S20,33)。正是在此种意义上，拉康声称“女人不存在”(Lacan, 1973a:60); 象征秩序中不包含任何表示女性特质的能指，女性的位置也因此无法被充分地加以象征化。

‌‌‌‌　　需要注意的是，在象征秩序中，“除非是在一种假定缺位的基础之上，否则任何事物都不存在。除非是就它并不存在而言，任何事物才是存在的”(Ec, 392)。换句话说，存在于象征秩序中的所有事物，都只有凭借它与所有其他事物的差异才得以存在。这一点是由索绪尔率先指出的，他当时声称在语言中没有任何肯定的词项，有的只是差异 (Saussure, 1916).

‌‌‌‌　　实在界中的实存在此种意义上，只有不可能象征化的事物才是实存的，即处在主体中心的不可能的原物（the impossible Thing)。“实际上，存在着某种从根本上无法为能指所同化的事物。这恰恰就是主体的独特的实存”(S3,179)。此即无意识主体 (S)的实存，拉康将其描述为一种“不可言喻的、愚蠢的实存”（E, 194)

‌‌‌‌　　“实存”一词的第二种意义，恰好是第一种意义上的“存在”的对立面。第一种意义上的“存在”同义于拉康对“存在”(BENG)一词的使用，而第二种意义上的“实存”则是对立于“存在”的。

‌‌‌‌　　拉康创造了“ex-sistence”（外在）这个新词来表达这样一种思想，即我们存在的核心 (Kern unseres Wesen)从根本上也是相异的、外部的大他者 (Ec, I1); 主体是去中心的 (decentred), 他的中心是外在于他自身的，他是离心的 (ex-centric)。拉康同样讲到了“梦中欲望的‘外在’(德：Entstellung, 即‘扭曲')”(E, 263), 因为梦境只能通过扭曲欲望来对其进行表征。

‌‌‌‌　　(existence) The term 'existence'is employed by Lacan in various ways (see Zizek, 1991:136-7)

‌‌‌‌　　Existence in the symbolic This sense of existence is to be understood in the contextof Freud's discussion of the 'judgement of existence', by which the existence of an entityis affirmed prior to attributing any quality to it (see Freud, 1925h; see BEJAHUNG). Onlywhat is integrated in the symbolic order fully 'exists'in this sense, since 'there is no suchthing as a prediscursive reality' (S20,33). It is in this sense that Lacan argues that'woman does not exist' (Lacan, 1973a:60); the symbolic order contains no signifier forfemininity, and hence the feminine position cannot be fully symbolised.

‌‌‌‌　　It is important to note that, in the symbolic order,'nothing exists except onanassumed foundation of absence. Nothing exists except insofar as it does not exist' (Ec, 392). In other words, everything that exists in the symbolic order only exists by virtue ofits difference to everything else. It was Saussure who first pointed this out when heargued that in language there are no positive terms, only differences (Saussure, 1916).

‌‌‌‌　　Existence in the real In this sense, it is only that which is impossible to symbolisethat exists: the impossible Thing at the heart of the subject.'There is in effect somethingradically unassimilable to the signifier. It's quite simply the subject's singular existence (S3,179). This is the existence of the subject of the unconscious, S, which Lacandescribes as an 'ineffable, stupid existence' (E, 194).

‌‌‌‌　　This second sense of the term existence is exactly the opposite of existence in the firstsense. Whereas existence in the first sense is synonymous with Lacan's use of the termBEING, existence in the second sense is opposed to being.

‌‌‌‌　　Lacan coins the neologism ex-sistence to express the idea that the heart of our being (Kern unseres Wesen) is also radically Other, strange, outside (Ec, 11); the subject isdecentred, his centre is outside of himself, he is ex-centric. Lacan also speaks of the 'ex-sistence (Entstellung) of desire in the dream' (E, 264), since the dream cannot representdesire except by distorting it.