‌‌‌‌　　英：nature; 法：nature

‌‌‌‌　　贯穿在拉康著作中的一个恒定的主题，即他在人类与其他动物之间做出的区分，或者用拉康的话说，是在“人类社会”与“动物社会”之间做出的区分 (S1,223)。这一区分的基础便是语言 (LANGUAGE); 人类拥有语言，而动物则只有编码 (CODES)(但也有一处有趣的告诫，见：S1,240)。此种基本差异的结果便导致动物的心理是完全受到想象界所支配的，而人类的心理则由于额外的象征性维度而变得复杂了。

‌‌‌‌　　在人类存在与其他动物之间的此种二元对立的语境下，拉康便把“自然”一词用在了一种复杂的双重意义上。一方面，它用该词来指代这个对立中的一项，即动物世界。在此种意义上，拉康采纳了自然与文化 (用拉康的话说，“文化”即象征秩序)之间的传统人类学区分。如同克劳德·列维-斯特劳斯与其他人类学家那样，拉康指出乱伦禁忌是把文化区别于自然的法律结构的核心，“原始的法则 (Law)因此便是在规定婚姻制度的时候将文化领域叠加在服从交媾法则的自然领域之上的那个东西”(E, 66)(见：[[law法则]])

‌‌‌‌　　亲属关系受到乱伦禁忌的规定，便指明了这样一个事实，即父性功能是人类与动物之间裂隙的核心所在。正是父亲 (Father)通过铭写下一条男男相传的血脉并由此排列出一个世世代代的序列，从而标记了象征界与想象界之间的差异。换句话说，人类的独特之处并非在于他们缺乏动物心理的想象性维度，而是说在人类身上，这一想象秩序遭到了额外的象征界维度所扭曲。想象界是动物与人类所共有的，只可惜对人类而言，它不再是一种自然的想象界。因此，拉康便驳斥“在动物心理与人类心理之间存在着我们远远无法设想的某种断续性的学说”(Ec, 484).

‌‌‌‌　　另一方面，拉康也用“自然”一词来表示那些认为在人类存在 (human existence)中存有某种“自然秩序"”的观念，此种观念被拉康称为“有关‘自然母亲' (natura mater)的伟大幻想，即真正的自然概念”(S1,149)。这种关于自然的伟大幻想，作为在浪漫主义中如此持续的一个主题 (例如：卢梭的高贵的野蛮人的概念)，构成了现代心理学的基础，因为现代心理学试图通过参照诸如本能与适应之类的动物行为学范畴来说明人类行为。

‌‌‌‌　　拉康对于所有这些根据自然来说明人类现象的企图皆持有极为批判的态度。他指出，此类企图的基础皆在于它们未能认识到象征秩序的重要性，正是象征秩序使得人类存在 (human beings)从根本上异化于自然的给定。在人类世界中，即便是“那些最接近于需要的意指，那些关系到最纯粹的生物性附着于某种滋养性或捕获性环境的意指，这些最原始的意指，对它们的次序与它们的基础本身而言，也皆服从于能指的法则”(S3,198).

‌‌‌‌　　因此，拉康指出：“弗洛伊德的发现给予我们的教导便是，所有自然的和谐在人类身上皆遭到了深深的破坏。”(S3,83)甚至从一开始就没有让人类主体在被捕获于象征秩序之前便能够存在于其中的那种纯粹自然的状态，“法则 (Law)从原初时 (ab origine)即已存在”(S3,83)。对人类而言，需要从来都不会以某种纯粹前语言的状态而呈现：这样一种“神话性”的前语言的需要，只能在它被链接于要求之后来进行假设。

‌‌‌‌　　某种自然秩序在人类存在 (human existence)中的缺位，可以最清晰地见于人类的性欲。弗洛伊德与拉康均认为，即便是性欲，这一可能看似在人类身上最接近于自然的意指，也完全是被捕获在文化秩序之中的：对人类而言，根本没有一种自然的性关系这样的事情。如此的一个结果便是，性倒错不可能通过参照支配着性欲的某种假设的自然性或生物性规范来加以界定。动物的本能是相对不变的，而人类的性欲则是由冲动来支配的，这些冲动皆是极其多变的，而且其目标也非某种生物学的功能（见：[[biology 生物学]])。

‌‌‌‌　　(nature) A constant theme running throughout Lacan's work is the distinction he drawsbetween human beings and other animals, or, as Lacan puts it, between 'human society'and 'animal society' (S1,223). The basis of this distinction is LANGUAGE; humanshave language, whereas animals merely have CODES (but see S1,240 for an interestingcaveat). The consequence of this fundamental difference is that animal psychology isentirely dominated by the imaginary, whereas human psychology is complicated by theadditional dimension of the symbolic.

‌‌‌‌　　Within the context of this binary opposition between human beings and other animals, Lacan uses the term 'nature'in a complex double sense. On the one hand, he uses it todesignate one term in the opposition, namely the animal world. In this sense, Lacanadopts the traditional anthropological opposition between nature and culture (culturebeing, in Lacanian terms, the symbolic order). Like Claude Levi-Strauss and otheranthropologists, Lacan points to the prohibition of incest as thethe kernel of the legalstructure which differentiates culture from nature; The primordial Law is therefore thatwhich in regulating marriage superimposes the kingdom of culture on that of a natureabandoned to the law of mating' (E, 66)(see LAW).

‌‌‌‌　　The regulation of kinship relations by the incest taboo, points to the fact that thepaternal function is at the heart of the rift between humans and animals. By inscribing aline of descent from male to male and thus ordering a series of generations, the Fathermarks the difference between the symbolic and the imaginary. In other words, what isunique about human beings is not that they lack the imaginary dimension of animalpsychology, but that in human beings this imaginary order is distorted by the addeddimension of the symbolic. The imaginary is what animals and human beings have incommon, except that in human beings it is no longer a natural imaginary. Hence Lacan repudiates the doctrine of a discontinuity between animal psychologyand humanpsychology which is far away from our thought' (Ec, 484).

‌‌‌‌　　On the other hand, Lacan also uses the term'nature'to denote the idea that there is a'natural order'in human existence, an idea which Lacan calls 'the great fantasy of naturamater, the very idea of nature' (S1,149). This great fantasy of nature, which is such apersistent theme in Romanticism (e.g.Rousseau's idea of the noble savage), underliesmodern psychology, which attempts to explain human behaviour by reference toethological categories such as instinct and adaptation.

‌‌‌‌　　Lacan is highly critical of all such attempts to explain human phenomena in terms ofnature. He argues that they are based on a failure to recognise the importance of thesymbolic order, which radically alienates human beings from natural givens. In thehuman world, even 'those significations that are the closest to need, significations that arerelative to the most purely biological insertioninto a nutritiveandcaptivatingenvironment, primordial significations, are, in their sequence and intheir veryfoundation, subject to the laws of the signifier' (S3,198).

‌‌‌‌　　Lacan thus argues that 'the Freudian discovery teaches us that all natural harmony inman is profoundly disconcerted' (S3,83). There is not even a pure natural state at thebeginning in which the human subject might exist before being caught up in the symbolicorder: 'the Law is there ab origine' (S3,83). Need is never present in a purepre-linguistic state in the human being: such a 'mythical'pre-linguistic need can only behypothesised after it has been articulated in demand.

‌‌‌‌　　The absence of a natural order in human existence can be seen most clearly in humansexuality. Freud and Lacan both argue that even sexuality, which might seem to be thesignification closest to nature in the human being, is completely caught up in the culturalorder; there is no such thing, for the human being, as a natural sexual relationship. Oneconsequence of this is that perversion cannot be defined by reference to a supposednatural or biological norm governing sexuality. Whereas animal instincts are relativelyinvariable, human sexuality is governed by drives which are extremely variable and donot aim at a biological function (see BIOLOGY)