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‌‌‌‌  英:resistance; 法:resistance; 德:Widerstand

‌‌‌‌  弗洛伊德最初使用“阻抗”这一术语,以指代不情愿把那些被压抑的记忆恢复到意识状态。由于精神分析治疗恰好便涉及此种回忆,该术语很快就开始表示在治疗期间出现并打断治疗进展的所有那些障碍:“凡是干扰到工作进展的东西皆是某种阻抗。”(Freud, 1900a: SEV, 517)阻抗表现在主体打破了“说出一切他想到的”这项“基本规则”的所有方式之中。

‌‌‌‌  虽然阻抗的概念从一开始便出现在弗洛伊德的著作当中,但是由于分析治疗在1910一1920年这十年间的效力日益减少,它开始在精神分析理论中扮演着一个日渐重要的角色(见:解释[NTERPRETATION])。如此导致的一个结果,便是自我心理学越来越重视克服病人的阻抗。拉康对于此种强调上的转变持极具批判性的态度,并声称这会轻易地导致把阻抗看作基于病人的“基本敌意”(S1,30)的一种“审问式”风格的精神分析。拉康认为这忽视了阻抗的结构性本质,并且把分析化约为一种想象的二元关系 (见:E, 78; Ec, 333f)。虽然拉康确实同意精神分析的治疗会涉及“阻抗的分析”,但是这也只是在该措辞在“知道回答应该被定位在什么层面”的意义上得到正确理解的情况下而言的。换句话说,关键的事情在于,分析家应当能够在那些主要朝向想象界来定位的干预与那些朝向象征界来定位的干预之间做出区分,并且知道在治疗的每一时刻上何种干预是恰当的。

‌‌‌‌  在拉康看来,阻抗的问题并不在于分析者的敌意,阻抗是结构性的,而且是分析的过程所固有的。归根结底,这是由于一种在结构上的“欲望与言语之间的不相容”(E, 275)。因此,阻抗便存在着永远无法被“克服”的某种不可缩减的水平,“在种种阻抗得到缩减之后,仍然存在着某种可能是本质性的剩余”(S2,321)。阻抗的这一不可缩减的“剩余”之所以是“本质性”的,因为正是对于此种剩余的重视,把精神分析与暗示 (SUGGESTION)区分了开来。精神分析尊重病人抵制暗示的权利,而实际上也重视那样的阻抗,“当主体的阻抗是反对暗示的时候,它仅仅是一种想要维持主体欲望的欲望。就此而言,它便必须被放置在正性转移的等级上”(E, 271).

‌‌‌‌  然而,拉康指出,虽然分析家无法,也不应当试图去克服所有的阻抗 (S2,228), 但是可以把它缩减至最小,或至少避免使它加剧。他可以通过在分析者的阻抗中认出他自己的部分来做到这一点,因为“对于分析的阻抗无非是分析家自己的阻抗”(E, 225). 这要从两个方面来理解:

‌‌‌‌  (1)只有当分析者的阻抗响应并/或激起分析家一方的某种阻抗的时候,即当分析家陷入阻抗的引诱的时候 (例如:弗洛伊德就曾经陷入了杜拉阻抗的引诱),它才会在阻碍治疗的方面取得成功。“病人的阻抗永远都是你自己的,而当一个阻抗取得成功的时候,恰恰是因为你【分析家】深陷其中,因为你理解。”(S3,48)因而,分析家必须遵循中立的规则,而不被卷入病人为他所设下的那些引诱之中。

‌‌‌‌  (2)正是分析家通过推动分析者而激起了阻抗,“在主体一方是没有任何阻抗的”(S2,228)。“阻抗是一种主体解释的现在状态。它是主体解释自己此时已谈到重点的方式…这仅仅意味着他【病人】无法再走得更快。”(S2,228)精神分析治疗工作的原则即在于通过不去逼迫病人而把阻抗缩减至其不可缩减的最小值。因而,分析家必须避免所有形式的暗示。

‌‌‌‌  阻抗的来源存在于自我之中:“在严格的意义上,主体的阻抗联系着自我的辖域,它是自我的一个效果。”(S2,127)因而,阻抗便属于想象秩序,而不属于主体的层面,“在被压抑的东西的那一面,在事物的无意识的那一面,是不存在任何阻抗的,有的只是一种重复的倾向”(S2,321)。这一点在L图式 (SCHEMA L)中得到了阐明,阻抗即阻断了大他者坚持的言说 (即A一S轴)的想象轴一α'。自我的阻抗皆是想象的引诱,分析家必须警惕被其所蒙骗 (E, 168)。因而,分析的目标永远都不能旨在“强化自我”,如同自我心理学所主张的,因为这样只会服务于增加阻抗。

‌‌‌‌  拉康同样批评自我心理学混淆了阻抗的概念与防御(DEFENCE)的概念。然而,拉康在这两个概念之间做出的区分,截然不同于它们在英美精神分析中被加以区分的方式。拉康指出,防御处在主体的一边,而阻抗则处在对象的一边。也就是说,防御是主体性的相对稳定的象征性结构,而阻抗则是阻止对象被吸入能指链条的更具暂时性的力量。

‌‌‌‌  (resistance) Freud first used the term 'resistance'to designate the unwillingness to recallrepressed memories to consciousness. Since psychoanalytic treatment involves preciselysuch recollection, the term soon came to denote all those obstacles that arise during thetreatment and interrupt its progress: 'Whatever disturbs the progress of the work is aresistance' (Freud, 1900a: SE V, 517). Resistance manifests itself in all the ways inwhich the subject breaks the 'fundamental rule'of saying everything that comes into hismind

‌‌‌‌  Though present in Freud's work from the beginning, the concept of resistance beganto play an increasingly important part in psychoanalytic theory as a result of thedecreasingefficacy of analytic treatment in the decade 1910-20 (seeINTERPRETATION). As a consequence of this, ego-psychology placed increasingimportance on overcoming the patient's resistances. Lacan is very critical of this shift inemphasis, arguing that it easily leads to an 'inquisitorial'style of psychoanalysis whichsees resistance as based on the 'fundamental ill will' (S1,30) of the patient. Lacan arguesthat this overlooks the structural nature of resistance and reduces analysis to an imaginarydual relation (see E, 78; Ec, 333ff). Lacan does accept that psychoanalytic treatmentinvolves 'analysis of resistances', but only on condition that this phrase is understoodcorrectly, in the sense of 'knowing at what level the answer should be pitched' (S2,43). In other words, the crucial thing is that the analyst should be able to distinguish betweeninterventions that are primarily orientated towards the imaginary and those that areorientated towards the symbolic, and know which are appropriate at each moment of thetreatment.

‌‌‌‌  In Lacan's view, resistance is not a question of the ill will of the analysand; resistanceis structural, and it is inherent in the analytic process. This is due, ultimately, to astructural 'incompatibility between desire and speech' (E, 275). Therefore there is acertain irreducible level of resistance which can never be 'overcome';'after the reductionof the resistances, there is a residue which may be what is essential' (S2,321). Thisirreducible 'residue'of resistance is 'essential'because it is the respect for this residuethat distinguishes psychoanalysis from SUGGESTION. Psychoanalysis respects the rightof the patient to resist suggestion and indeed values that resistance;'When the subject'sresistance opposes suggestion, it is only a desire to maintain the subject's desire. As suchit would have to be placed in the ranks of positive transference' (E, 271).

‌‌‌‌  However, Lacan points out that while the analyst cannot, and should not try to, overcome all resistance (S2,228), he can minimise it, or at least avoid exacerbating it. Hecan do this by recognising his own part in the analysand's resistance, for 'there is noother resistance to analysis than that of the analyst himself (E, 235). This is to beunderstood in two ways:

  1. The resistance of the analysand can only succeed in obstructing the treatment whenit responds to and/or evokes a resistance on the part of the analyst,i.e.when the analyst isdrawn into the lure of resistance (as Freud was drawn into the lure of Dora's resistance).'The patient's resistance is always your own, and when a resistance succeeds it is becauseyou [the analyst]are in it up to your neck, because you understand' (S3,48). Thus the analyst must follow the rule of neutrality and not be drawn into the lures set for him bythe patient.
  2. It is the analyst who provokes resistance by pushing the analysand: 'There is noresistance on the part of the subject' (S2 228).'Resistance"is the present state of aninterpretation of the subject. It is the manner in which, at the same time, the subjectinterprets the point he's got to.... It simply means that he [the patient]cannot move anyfaster' (S2 228). Psychoanalytic treatment works on the principle that by not forcing thepatient, resistance is reduced to the irreducible minimum. Thus the analyst must avoid allforms of suggestion.

‌‌‌‌  The source of resistance lies in the ego: 'In the strict sense, the subject's resistance islinked to the register of the ego, it is an effect of the ego' (S2,127). Thus resistancebelongs to the imaginary order, not to the level of the subject;'on the side of what isrepressed, on the unconscious side of things, there is no resistance, there is only atendency to repeat' (S2,321). This is illustrated in SCHEMA L; resistance is theimaginary axis a-a'which impedes the insistant speech of the Other (which is the axis A-S). The resistances of the ego are imaginary lures, which the analyst must be wary ofbeing deceived by (see E, 168). Thus it can never be the aim of analysis to 'strengthen theego', as ego-psychology claims, since this would only serve to increase resistance.

‌‌‌‌  Lacan also criticises ego-psychology for confusing the concept of resistance with thatof DEFENCE. However, the distinction which Lacan draws between these two conceptsis rather different from the way in which they are distinguished in Anglo-Americanpsychoanalysis. Lacan argues that defence is on the side of the subject, whereasresistance is on the side of the object. That is, whereas defences are relatively stablesymbolic structures of subjectivity, resistances are more transitory forces which preventthe object from being absorbed in the signifying chain.