英：language; 法：langue/langage
需要注意的是，英文单词“language”对应着两个法文单词：“langue'”与“langage”。这两个单词在拉康的著作中有着截然不同的意义：“langue'”往往指涉的是某种具体的语言系统，如法语或英语等；而“langage”则指涉的是从所有特殊语言中抽象出来的普遍的语言结构。从根本上说，引起拉康兴趣的正是这一普遍的语言结构 (langage), 而非各种特殊的语言系统 (langues)之间的差异。因此，在阅读拉康著作的英文译本时，就有必要搞清楚在法语原文中使用的是哪一项术语；而在绝大多数时间，这一法文术语都是“langage"。
拉康对于语言现象的兴趣，可以追溯至他早年对于超现实主义诗歌的兴趣，以及他对爱美 (Aimee)的精神病式语言的着迷，爱美是一个患有偏执狂的女人，拉康曾在其博士论文中分析过她的写作 (Lacan, 1932)。在此之后，拉康有关语言本质的思考经历了一个漫长的发展过程，我们可以从中区辨出四个大致的阶段（见：Macey, 1988:121-76).
(1)在1936一1949年，拉康对于语言的提及只有寥寥几处，但是它们都有着重要的意义。例如，早在1936年，拉康便强调语言是精神分析经验的构成性要素 (Ec, 82), 而在1946年，他又声称倘若不处理语言的问题就不可能理解疯癫 (Ec, 166)。拉康在此时有关语言的这些评论，并不包含任何对于某种特定语言学理论的参考，反而是受到了一些哲学性影射的主导，这些影射主要源自黑格尔的哲学。因而，语言便主要被看作可以使主体从他人那里获得承认的一种中介性元素 (见：E, 9)。在其传达信息的用途之上及之外，语言首先且最重要的是向对话者发出的一种诉求；用雅各布森的话说，拉康注重意动功能更甚于指称功能。因而，他便坚持强调语言不是一套命名法 (Ec, 166).
(2)在1950一1954年，语言便开始占据了它在拉康其后的著作中将有的那一核心的地位。在此一时期，拉康有关语言的讨论皆主要是参照海德格尔的现象学，而且更为重要的是参照（莫斯①、马林诺夫斯基以及列维-斯特劳斯等人的）语言人类学。语言因而被看作社会交换的结构性法则，被看作一种象征性契约，等等。偶尔也会有一些对于修辞学的提及，但是这些参照并未被详加阐述 (例如：E, 169)。尽管还有寥寥几处对于索绪尔的影射（例如：S1,248), 然而在其著名的《罗马报告》中，拉康却在parole（言语）与langage（语言结构）之间建立了一种对立 (而非像索绪尔所做的那样，在parole【言语】与langue【语言系统】之间建立一种对立；见：Lacan, 1953a)(见：言语[SPEECH]).
(3)在1955一1970年，语言则登上了舞台的中心，同时拉康也展开了他的“无意识如同语言一般被结构”(S11,20)的经典命题。正是在这一时期中，费尔迪南·德·索绪尔和罗曼·雅各布森的名字开始在拉康的著作中占有举足轻重的地位。
拉康继承了索绪尔的理论，认为语言是由各种差异性元素组成的一个结构，但是索绪尔以“langue”（语言系统）来对此加以阐述，拉康则将其规定为“langage”（语言结构）。对拉康而言，“语言结构”(langag©)变成了所有结构的单一范例。于是，拉康便转而开始批判索绪尔的语言概念，指出语言的基本单位不是符号，而是能指 (SIGNIFIER)。拉康继而声称，无意识 (UNCONSCIOUS)如同语言一样，是一个能指的结构，这一结构也允许拉康更加精确地阐释象征界的范畴。1969年，拉康又发展出了作为一种社会联结 (social bond)的话语 (DISCOURSE)的概念。
(4)自1971年开始，拉康便从语言学 (LINGUISTICS)转向把数学作为科学性的范例，这一转变伴随着一种强调语言的诗意性与歧义性的倾向，此种倾向在拉康对于詹姆斯·乔伊斯的“精神病式语言”(psychotic language)与日俱增的兴趣中可见一斑（见：Lacan, 1975a: 1975-6)。拉康自己的风格便反映了此种转变，他开始愈加频繁地使用双关语和新词。拉康创造了“呀呀儿语”(法：lalangue; 来自法语定冠词la和名词langue)这一新词，以指涉在语言中借由玩味歧义性和同音词而诞生出某种“享乐”的那些非交流性 (non-communicative)的面向 (S20,126)。至此，“语言”这一术语就变得同“呀呀儿语”相对立了起来。“呀呀儿语”就好像是语言从中被构筑起来的那种原初混沌的多义性的基底，而语言则几乎如同坐落在这一基底顶端的某种秩序化的上层结构：“毫无疑问，语言是由‘呀呀儿语'所构成的。语言是精心炮制出来的一种有关呀呀儿语的知识 (savoir)。”(S20,127)
正是拉康派精神分析放置在语言上面的此种强调，往往被看作其最具区分性的特征。拉康批判其他形式的精神分析所采取的方法，诸如克莱因派精神分析与对象关系理论之流，就倾向于贬低语言的重要性，并且以牺牲分析者的言语为代价而强调分析者的“非言语交流”(non-verbal communication)(诸如强调分析者的身体语言[body language]等)。根据拉康的观点，这是一种根本性的错误，主要的原因有以下三点。
首先，所有的人类交流皆是被铭写在一个语言结构之中的，即便是“身体语言”(body language), 正如这一措辞所隐含的那样，从根本上也是一种“语言”(language)的形式，且带有同样的结构性特征。
其次，精神分析治疗的全部目标，即旨在以言语而非任何其他的媒介来道出 (articulate)某人欲望的真理：精神分析的基本规则，便是被建立在言语是通往此种真理的唯一途径这一原则的基础之上的。
最后，言语是分析家所拥有的唯一工具；因此，任何不理解言语与语言的运作方式的分析家，便无从理解精神分析本身（见：E, 40).
拉康强调语言的一个结果，便是他劝告分析家必须专注于分析者言语的那些形式特征（即能指），而非岔入基于对内容（即所指）的想象性理解而产生的一种共情/神入性态度之中。
对于拉康的一种常见的误解，便是把语言当作象征秩序的同义词。然而，这是不正确的：拉康指出，语言同时具有一个象征性的维度和一个想象性的维度：“在人类话语的象征功能之中存在着某种无法得到根除的东西，而那就是想象界在其中扮演的角色。”(S2,306)语言的象征性维度，即能指与真言的维度。语言的想象性维度，则是所指、意指与空言的维度。L图式 (SCHEMA L)便经由相交的两轴而表现了语言的这两个维度。A一S轴是语言的象征性维度，是大他者的话语，即无意识。想象轴a’一a则是语言的想象性维度，是阻断、扭曲并颠倒大他者的话语的“语言之墙”。用拉康的话说，便是“语言把我们建立在大他者之中，同时又彻底地阻止我们对于大他者的理解”(S2,244).
拉康在语言与编码 (CODES)之间做出了区分，与编码不同的是，无论在符号与指涉物之间，抑或在所指与能指之间，在语言中都没有任何稳定的一一对应的关系。正是语言的这一特性，引发了所有话语的内在歧义性。此种歧义性明显可见于只能通过玩味同音异义 (I'homophonie)与其他形式的模棱两可 (I'equivoque)来进行解释的那些无意识的构形 (见：解释[NTERPRETATION])。
(langue, langage) It is important to note that the English word 'language'corresponds totwo French words: langue and langage. These two words have quite different meaningsin Lacan's work; langue usually refers to a specific language, such as French or English, whereas langage refers to the system of language in general, abstracting from allparticular languages. It is fundamentally the general structure of language (langage), rather than the differences between particular languages (langues) that interests Lacan. When reading Lacan in English it is therefore essential to be aware of which term is usedin the original French; most of the time the French term will be langage.
Lacan's interest in linguistic phenomena can be traced back to his early interest insurrealist poetry and to his fascination with the psychotic language of Aimee, a paranoiacwoman whose writings Lacan analyses in his doctoral dissertation (Lacan, 1932). Afterthis, Lacan's thinking on the nature of language goes through a long process ofdevelopment, in which four broad phases can be discemned (see Macey, 1988:121-76):
- Between 1936 and 1949 references to language are sparse, but they are significant; already in 1936, for example, Lacan emphasises that language is constitutive of thepsychoanalytic experience (Ec, 82), and in 1946 he argues that it is impossible tounderstand madness without addressing the problem of language (Ec, 166). Lacan'scomments on language at this time do not contain any references to a specific linguistictheory, and instead are dominated by philosophical allusions, mainly in terms derivedfrom Hegel. Thus language is seen primarily as a mediating element which permits thesubject to attain recognition from the other (see E, 9). Above and beyond its use forconveying information, language is first and foremost an appeal to an interlocutor, in Jakobson's terms, Lacan stresses the connative function above the referential. Thus heinsists that language is not a nomenclature (Ec, 166).
- From 1950 to 1954 language begins to occupy the central position that it will holdin Lacan's work thereafter. In this period, Lacan's discussion of language is dominatedby references to Heideggerian phenomenologyand, more importantly, to theanthropology of language (Mauss, Malinowski and Levi-Strauss). Language is thus seenas structuring the social laws of exchange, as a symbolic pact, etc. There are alsooccasional references to rhetoric, but these are not elaborated (e.g.E, 169). There are afew allusions to Saussure (e.g.S1,248), but in his famous Rome discourse'Lacanestablishes an opposition between parole and langage (and not, as Saussure does, between parole and langue; see Lacan, 1953a)(see SPEECH).
- Between 1955 and 1970 language takes centre stage and Lacan develops his classicthesis that 'the unconscious is structured like a language' (S11,20). It is in this periodthat the names of Ferdinand de Saussure and Roman Jakobson come to the fore in Lacan's work.
Lacan takes up Saussure's theory that language is a structure composed of differentialelements, but whereas Saussure had stated this of langue, Lacan states it of langage. Langage becomes, for Lacan, the single paradigm of all structures. Lacan then proceedsto criticise the Saussurean concept of language, arguing that the basic unit of language isnot the sign but the SIGNIFIER. Lacan then argues that the UNCONSCIOUS is, likelanguage, a structure of signifiers, which also allows Lacan to formulate the category ofthe symbolic with greater precision. In 1969 Lacan develops a concept of DISCOURSEas a kind of social bond. 4. From 1971 on, the shift from LINGUISTICS to mathematics as the paradigm ofscientificity is accompanied by a tendency to emphasise the poetry and ambiguity oflanguage, as is evident in Lacan's increasing interest in the psychotic language'of James Joyce (see Lacan, 1975a; 1975-6). Lacan's own style reflects this change as it becomesever more densely populated with puns and neologisms. Lacan coins the term lalangue (from the definite article la and the noun langue) to refer to these non-communicativeaspects of language which, by playing on ambiguity and homophony, give rise to a kindof jouissance (S20,126). The term 'language'now becomes opposed to lalangue. Lalangue is like the primary chaotic substrate of polysemy out of which language isconstructed, almost as if language is some ordered superstructure sitting on top of thissubstrate: 'language is without doubt made of lalangue. It is an elucubration ofknowledge [savoir]about lalangue' (S20,127).
It is the emphasis placed by Lacanian psychoanalysis on language that is usuallyregarded as its most distinctive feature. Lacan criticises the way that other forms ofpsychoanalysis, such as Kleinian psychoanalysis and object-relations theory, tend to playdown the importance of language and emphasise the 'non-verbal communication'of theanalysand (his body language', etc.) at the expense of the analysand's speech. This is afundamental error, according to Lacan, for three main reasons.
Firstly, all human communication is inscribed in a linguistic structure; even 'bodylanguage'is, as the term implies, fundamentally a form of language, with the samestructural features.
Secondly, the whole aim of psychoanalytic treatment is to articulate the truth of one'sdesire in speech rather than in any other medium; the fundamental rule of psychoanalysisis based on the principle that speech is the only way to this truth.
And thirdly, speech is the only tool which the analyst has; therefore, any analyst whodoes not understand the way speech and language work does not understandpsychoanalysis itself (see E, 40).
One consequence of Lacan's emphasis on language is his recommendation that theanalyst must attend to the formal features of the analysand's speech (the signifiers), andnot be sidetracked into an empathic attitude based on an imaginary understanding of thecontent (the signified).
One common misconception of Lacan is that language is synonymous with thesymbolic order. This is, however, not correct; Lacan argues that language has both asymbolic and an imaginary dimension: 'there is something in the symbolic function ofhuman discourse that cannot be eliminated, and that is the role played in it by theimaginary' (S2,306). The symbolic dimension of language is that of the signifier and truespeech. The imaginary dimension of language is that of the signified, signification, andempty speech. SCHEMA L represents these two dimensions of language by means of twoaxes which intersect. The axis A-S is language in its symbolic dimension, the discourseof the Other, the unconscious. The imaginary axis a'-a is language in its imaginarydimension, the wall of language which interrupts, distorts and inverts the discourse of the Other. In Lacan's words,'language is as much there to found us in the Other as todrastically prevent us from understanding him' (S2,244).
Lacan distinguishes between languages and CODES; unlike codes, in language thereis no stable one-to-one correspondence between sign and referent, nor between signifiedand signifier. It is this property of language which gives rise to the inherent ambiguity ofall discourse. This ambiguity is evident in the formations of the unconscious, which canonly be interpreted by playing on homophony and other forms of equivocation (l'equivoque)(see INTERPRETATION).