英：love; 法：amour
拉康认为，关于爱，我们不可能说出任何有意义或是有判断的事情 (S8,57)。实际上，当我们开始谈论爱的时候，我们便会陷入低能 (imbecility)的状态 (S20,17)。鉴于这些看法，拉康自己恰恰在他的研讨班上用了大量的时间来谈论爱，可能看似就是令人惊讶的了。然而，在这么做时，拉康只不过是在示范分析者在精神分析治疗中所做的事情，因为“我们在分析话语中所做的唯一的事情，就是谈论爱”(S20,77).
爱在分析治疗中是作为转移 (TRANSFERENCE)的一种效果而出现的，而一种人为的情境何以会产生这样的一种效果，是在拉康的著作中始终令他着迷的问题。拉康指出，爱与转移之间的此种关系，即证明了欺骗在所有爱中的基本角色。拉康同样极其重视爱与侵凌性 (AGGRESSIVITY)之间的密切关联，一者的在场必然隐含着另一者的在场。弗洛伊德将其称作“矛盾情感”(ambiva-lence)的此种现象，被拉康看作精神分析的伟大发现之一
爱被拉康定位为一种纯粹想象性的现象，尽管它在象征秩序中也有其效果（其中的一个效果即是造成“象征界的真正潜没”一S1,142)。爱是自体情欲性的，而且从根本上带有一种自恋性的结构 (S11,186), 因为“我们在爱中所爱的正是我们自己的自我，是在想象层面上变得实在的我们自己的自我”（S1,142; 见：自恋[NARCISSISM])。爱的这一想象性本质，导致拉康反对所有那些把爱设定为精神分析治疗中的某种理想的分析家（诸如巴林特）(S7,8: 见：生殖[GENITAL]).
爱涉及一种想象的互易性，因为“爱，在本质上，是希望被爱”(S11,253)。正是“爱”与“被爱”之间的此种互易性构成了爱的幻象，而且也正是这一点使爱区别于冲动的秩序，因为在冲动的秩序中没有任何的互易性，有的只是纯粹的主动性 (S11,200).
爱是通过与所爱者相融合从而填补任何性关系（SEXUAL RELATIONSHIP)的缺位的一种虚假的幻想 (S20,44); 这一点在典雅爱情 (courtly love)的无性观念中尤其清晰 (S20,65).
爱是欺骗性的，“作为一种镜像反射的虚假幻境，爱在本质上是欺骗”(S11,268)。爱之所以具有欺骗性，是因为它涉及给出自己所没有的东西（即阳具）：爱即“给出自己所没有的东西”（S8,147)。爱所指向的并非是爱恋对象 (love-object)所拥有的东西，而是指向他所缺失的东西，指向超出他之外的虚无 (nothing)。这个对象之所以被赋予价值，是因为它来到了那一缺失的位置上（见：S4,156的面纱图式）。
拉康著作中最复杂的领域之一，便涉及爱与欲望 (DESIRE)之间的关系。一方面，这两个术语是截然对立的：另一方面，此种对立又因为两者之间的某些相似性而成了问题：
(1)爱是隶属于自我领域的一种想象现象，它明显对立于登陆到象征秩序（亦即大他者领域）的欲望 (S11,18991)。爱是一种隐喻 (S8,53), 而欲望则是一种换喻。我们甚至可以说是爱杀死了欲望，因为爱的基础是与所爱者融为一体的幻想 (S20,46), 而这便废除了促使欲望产生的那种差异。
(2)另一方面，拉康著作中的某些元素也动摇了爱与欲望之间的纯然对立。首先，它们的相似性在于两者皆无法得到满足。其次，爱是“希望被爱”的这一结构等同于欲望的结构，主体在其中欲望成为大他者欲望的对象 (实际上，在科耶夫对于黑格尔的解读之中，此种有关欲望的说法所基于的正是“爱”与“欲望”之间在某种程度上存在的语义模糊性；见：Kojeve, 1947:6)。最后，在需要/要求/欲望的辩证法中，欲望恰好诞生自要求 (DEMAND)中未被满足的那一部分，这一要求即是对爱的要求。因而，拉康自己有关爱的论述，便常常因为他自己在柏拉图的《会饮篇》(Symposium)这则文本中凸显的那种“欲望”对于“爱”的替代 (S8,141)而显得非常复杂。
(amour) Lacan argues that it is impossible to say anything meaningful or sensible aboutlove (S8,57). Indeed, the moment one starts to speak about love, one descends intoimbecility (S20,17). Given these views, it might seem surprising that Lacan himselfdedicates a great deal of his seminar precisely to speaking about love. However, in doingso, Lacan is merely demonstrating what the analysand does in psychoanalytic treatment, for the only thing that we do in the analytic discourse is speak about love' (S20,77).
Love arises in analytic treatment as an effect of TRANSFERENCE, and the problemof how an artificial situation can produce such an effect is one that fascinates Lacanthroughout his work. This relationship between love and transference is proof, Lacanargues, of the essential role of artifice in all love. Lacan also lays great emphasis on theintimate connection between love and AGGRESSIVITY; the presence of one necessarilyimplies the presence of the other. This phenomenon, which Freud labels 'ambivalence', isseen by Lacan as one of the great discoveries of psychoanalysis.
Love is located by Lacan as a purely imaginary phenomenon, although it has effects inthe symbolic order (one of those effects being to produce 'a veritable subduction of thesymbolic'-S1,142). Love is autorerotic, and has a fundamentally narcissistic structure (S11,186) since 'it's one's own ego that one loves in love, one's own ego made real onthe imaginary level' (S1,142; see NARCISSISM). The imaginary nature of love leads Lacan to oppose all those analysts (such as Balint) who posit love as an ideal inpsychoanalytic treatment (S7,8; see GENITAL).
Love involves an imaginary reciprocity, since 'to love is, essentially, to wish to beloved' (S11,253). It is this reciprocity between 'loving'and 'being loved'that constitutesthe illusion of love, and this is what distinguishes it from the order of the drives, in whichthere is no reciprocity, only pure activity (S11,200)
Love isis an illusory fantasy of fusion with the beloved which makes up for theabsence of any SEXUAL RELATIONSHIP (S20,44); this is especially clear intheasexual concept of courtly love (S20,65).
Love is deceptive;'As a specular mirage, love is essentially deception' (S11,268). Itis deceptive because it involves giving what one does not have (i.e.the phallus); to love is'to give what one does not have' (S8,147). Love is directed not at what the love-objecthas, but at what he lacks, at the nothing beyond him. The object is valued insofar as itcomes in the place of that lack (see the schema of the veil in S4,156).
One of the most complex areas of Lacan's work concerns the relationship betweenlove and DESIRE. On the one hand, the two terms are diametrically opposed. On theother hand, this opposition is problematised by certain similarities between the two:
- As an imaginary phenomenon which belongs to the field of the ego, love is clearlyopposed to desire, which is inscribed in the symbolic order, the field of the Other (S11,189-91). Love is a metaphor (S8,53), whereas desire is metonymy. It can even be saidthat love kills desire, since love is based on a fantasy of oneness with the beloved (S20,46) and this abolishes the difference which gives rise to desire.
- On the other hand, there are elements in Lacan's work which destabilise the neatopposition between love and desire. Firstly, they are both similar in that neither can everbe satisfied. Secondly, the structure of love as 'the wish to be loved'is identical to thestructure of desire, in which the subject desires to become the object of the Other's desire (indeed, in Kojeve's reading of Hegel, on which this account of desire is based, there is adegree of semantic ambiguity between 'love'and 'desire'; see Kojeve, 1947:6). Thirdly, in the dialectic of need/demand/desire, desire is born precisely from the unsatisfied partof DEMAND, which is the demand for love. Lacan's own discourse on love is thus oftencomplicated by the same substitution of'desire'for 'love'which he himself highlights inthe text of Plato's Symposium (S8,141).