‌‌‌‌　　英：phobia; 法：phobie

‌‌‌‌　　在精神病学上，恐怖症通常被定义为对于某一特殊对象（诸如某种动物）或是某一特殊情境（诸如离家）的极端恐惧。那些患有恐怖症的人倘若遭遇到恐怖症的对象或是置身于所恐惧的情境，他们便会体验到焦虑 (ANXIETY), 而且会发展出一些“避免策略”(avoidance strategies)以防止这样的事情发生。这些避免策略可能会变得如此精心制作，以至于主体的生活会受到严重的限制。

‌‌‌‌　　弗洛伊德对于恐怖症研究的最重要贡献，便涉及一个被他昵称为“小汉斯”的小男孩。在小汉斯的五岁生日之前不久，他产生了一种对马的强烈恐惧，而且变得不愿出门，以免在街上遇到一匹马。在弗洛伊德有关小汉斯的个案研究中，他曾区分了焦虑的初始发作（不依附于任何对象）与特别聚焦于马的继发恐惧，唯有后者才构成了严格意义上的恐怖症。弗洛伊德指出，焦虑是由小汉斯与其母亲的关系而在他身上生产的性兴奋的转化，而马则代表着小汉斯所恐惧的会惩罚他的父亲 (Freud, 1909b)。

‌‌‌‌　　在其1956一1957年度的研讨班上，拉康针对小汉斯的个案提供了一份详细的解读，从而提出了他自己有关恐怖症的见解。遵循弗洛伊德的观，点，他也强调恐怖症与焦虑之间的差异：焦虑首先出现，而恐怖症则是通过聚焦于一个特定对象而把焦虑转化为恐惧的一种防御性构成 (S4,207,400)。然而，拉康并未像弗洛伊德所做的那样把恐怖症的对象视同对于父亲的代表，相反他认为，恐怖症对象的基本特征即在于它并非只是代表着某一个人而是轮流代表着不同的人 (S4,283-8)。拉康指出，小汉斯在其恐怖症的不同时刻上描述怕马的方式是极其不同的，例如，在某一时刻上，小汉斯害怕马会咬他：而在另一时刻上，又害怕马会倒下（S4,305-6)。拉康宣称，在这些不同的时刻上，马代表着小汉斯生活中的不同的人 (S4,307)。因而，马便并非作为一个单独所指的等价物，而是作为一个能指而运作的，这一能指没有任何单一确指的意义，而且被轮流移置到不同的所指之上 (S4,288).

‌‌‌‌　　拉康认为，小汉斯之所以会发展出怕马恐怖症，便是因为他的实在的父亲未能作为阉割的动因而介入进来，而作为阉割的动因则是实在的父亲在俄狄浦斯情结 (OEDIPUS COMPLEX)中应有的角色 (S4,212)。当小汉斯开始在幼儿手淫中感受到其性欲的时候，前俄狄浦斯三角（母亲一孩子一想象的阳具）便从作为其享乐的源泉而转变成了某种在他身上激起焦虑的东西。实在的父亲的干预性介入本应通过向他施加象征性阉割而把小汉斯从此种焦虑中解救出来，但是由于此种干预性介入的缺位，小汉斯便被迫要在恐怖症中寻找某种替代。恐怖症的作用即在于利用一个想象的对象（马）来重新组织小汉斯的象征性世界，从而帮助他从想象秩序过渡到象征秩序 (S4,230,245-6,284)。因而，恐怖症便远非一种纯粹消极的现象，相反，经由引入一个象征性的维度，恐怖症便使这一创伤性情境变成了可以思考乃至可以经受的东西，即便它只是一种暂时性的解决 (S4,82)。

‌‌‌‌　　恐怖症的对象因而是一个想象的元素，它被用来代表主体世界中的任何可能元素，从而便能够起到一个能指的作用。对小汉斯而言，马便在不同的时刻上代表着他的父亲、他的母亲、他的朋友乃至他自己，以及除此之外的很多其他事物 (S4,307)。在围绕着“其恐怖症的能指化结晶”而发展出所有可能排列的过程中，小汉斯便能够穷尽所有那些阻碍他从想象界过渡到象征界的不可能性，因而通过诉诸一个能指性方程而找出了应对此种不可能性的解决办法 (E, 168)。换句话说，恐怖症恰恰扮演着克劳德·列维-斯特劳斯指派给神话的同样的角色，只不过是在个体的层面上而非在社会的层面上。列维-斯特劳斯指出，对于神话而言，重要的不是构成神话的那些孤立元素的任何“自然的”或“原型的”意义，而是这些元素被组合并重组的这样一种方式，即虽然这些元素的位置发生了改变，但是这些位置之间的关系是不变的（LéviStrauss, 1955)。上述元素的此种反复重组，便通过依次链接于其不可能性的所有不同形式，而使人们敢于面对那一不可能的情境 (S4,330).

‌‌‌‌　　在对患有恐怖症的主体的治疗方面，拉康理论的实践结果是怎样的呢？它既不是简单地给主体脱敏 (例如：在行为主义疗法中)，也不是简单地就恐怖症的对象提供某种解释 (例如：“马是你的父亲”)，其治疗的目标应当是帮助主体来修通所有那些涉及恐怖症能指的不同排列。通过帮助主体发展出与其自身法则相一致的个人神话，治疗便能够使他最终得以穷尽这些能指元素的所有可能的组合，从而消除恐怖症 (S4,402)(应当谨记的是，拉康有关小汉斯个案的讨论只是明确处理了童年恐怖症的问题，而这些评判是否也同样适用于成人恐怖症则仍然是留待解决的问题）。

‌‌‌‌　　正如弗洛伊德自己在他有关小汉斯的个案研究中所注意到的那样，恐怖症先前并未在精神病学的病情学中被指派以任何明确的位置。虽然弗洛伊德曾试图修补围绕着恐怖症归类的此种不确定性，但是他所提出的解答也带有某种歧义性。一方面，因为在神经症患者与精神病主体身上皆同样可以发现那些恐怖症的症状，弗洛伊德便声称恐怖症无法被看作一种“独立的病理性过程”(Freud, 1909b: SEX, 115)。另一方面，在同一本著作中，弗洛伊德又的确孤立出了一种特殊形式的神经症，而其核心的症状即恐怖症。弗洛伊德将此种全新的诊断范畴称作“焦虑型癔症”(anxiety hysteria), 以便将它与“转换型癔症”(conversion hysteria)区分开来 (弗洛伊德在先前都只是简单地将后者指称为“癔症”)。弗洛伊德的这些评论因而是带有歧义性的，它们意味着恐怖症既可能是一种症状，同时又可能是一种潜在的临床实体。同样的歧义性也被重复在拉康的著作当中，这一问题在拉康那里被重新改述为：恐怖症究竟是一种“症状”(symptom)还是一种“结构”(STRUCTURE)。通常，拉康都只是区分两种神经症结构（即癔症与强迫型神经症），而将恐怖症描述为一种症状而非一种结构 (S4,285)。然而，在拉康的著作中同样有一些地方，他将恐怖症列为除癔症与强迫型神经症之外的第三种神经症形式，从而暗示存在着一个恐怖症的结构 (例如：E, 321), 例如，在1961年，拉康就把恐怖症描述为“神经症的最根本形式”(S8,425)。直到1968一1969年度的研讨班上，这一问题才得到了解决，拉康在那里陈述道：

‌‌‌‌　　我们无法在其【恐怖症】中看到一个临床的实体，而毋宁说它是一个中转的枢纽 (plaque tournante), 某种必须在它与其往往所趋向的东西神经症的两种主要秩序：癔症与强迫症一的关系中来加以阐明的事物，此外它也同性倒错实现了某种交叉。

‌‌‌‌　　(Lacan, 1968-9, 摘自：Chemama, 1993:210)

‌‌‌‌　　因而，根据拉康的观点，恐怖症便不是同癔症与强迫型神经症处在同一水平上的一种临床结构，而是能够通往其中任何一者的一道关口，而且也与性倒错的结构具有某些关联。此种与性倒错的联系可见于物神与恐怖症对象之间的相似之处，两者皆是对于一个丢失的元素的象征性替代，而且两者也皆服务于结构化周围的世界。此外，恐怖症与性倒错也皆起因于从想象的前俄狄浦斯三角过渡至象征的俄狄浦斯四元组的困难。

‌‌‌‌　　(phobie)A phobia is usually defined in psychiatry as an extreme fear of a particularobject(such as an animal)or a particular situation(such as leaving the home).Those whosuffer from a phobia experience ANXIETY if they encounter the phobic object or areplaced in the feared situation,and develop 'avoidance strategies'so as to prevent thisfrom happening.These avoidance strategies may become so elaborate that the subject'slife is severely restricted.

‌‌‌‌　　Freud's most important contribution to the study of phobias concerned a young boywhom he dubbed Little Hans. Shortly before his fifth birthday, Hans developed a violentfear of horses and became unwilling to go outdoors lest he encounter one in the street. Inhis case study of Hans, Freud distinguished between the initial onset of anxiety (whichwas not attached to any object) and the ensuing fear which was focused specifically onhorses; only the latter constituted the phobia proper. Freud argued that the anxiety wasthe transformation of sexual excitement generated in Hans by his relationship with hismother, and that the horses represented his father who Hans feared would punish him (Freud, 1909b).

‌‌‌‌　　Lacan, in his seminar of 1956-7, offers a detailed reading of the case of Little Hans, and proposes his own view of phobia. Following Freud, he stresses the differencebetween phobia and anxiety: anxiety appears first, and the phobia is a defensiveformation which turns the anxiety into fear by focusing it on a specific object (S4,207,400). However, rather than identifying the phobic object as a representative of the father, as Freud does, Lacan argues that the fundamental characteristic of the phobic object isthat it does not simply represent one person but represents different people in turn (S4,283-8). Lacan points out the extremely diverse ways in which Hans describes the fearedhorse at different moments of his phobia; for example, at one point Hans is afraid that ahorse will bite him and at another moment that a horse will fall down (S4,305-6). Ateach of these different moments, Lacan argues, the horse represents a different person in Hans's life (S4,307). The horse thus functions not as the equivalent of a sole signifiedbut as a signifier which has no univocal sense and is displaced onto different signifieds inturm (S4,288).

‌‌‌‌　　Lacan argues that Hans develops the horse phobia because his real father fails tointervene as the agent of castration, which is his proper role in the OEDIPUS COMPLEX (S4,212). When his sexuality begins to make itself felt in infantile masturbation, thepreoedipal triangle (mother-child-imaginary phallus) is transformed from being Hans'ssource of enjoyment into something that provokes anxiety in him. The intervention of thereal father would have saved Hans from this anxiety by symbolically castrating him, butin the absence of this intervention Hans is forced to find a substitute in the phobia. Thephobia functions by using an imaginary object (the horse) to reorganise the symbolicworld of Hans and thus help him to make the passage from the imaginary to the symbolicorder (S4,230,245-6,284). Far from being a purely negative phenomenon, then, aphobia makes a traumatic situation thinkable, livable, by introducing a symbolicdimension, even if it is only a provisional solution (S4,82).

‌‌‌‌　　The phobic object is thus an imaginary element which is able to function as a signifierby being used to represent every possible element in the subject's world. For Hans, thehorse represents at different moments his father, his mother, his little sister, his friends, himself, and many other things besides (S4,307). In the process of developing all thepermutations possible around 'the signifying crystal of his phobia', little Hans was able toexhaust all the impossibilities that blocked his passage from the imaginary to thesymbolic and thus find a solution to the impossible by recourse to a signifying equation (E, 168). In other words, a phobia plays exactly the same role which Claude Levi-Straussassigns to myths, only on the level of the individual rather than of society. What isimportant in the myth, argues Levi-Strauss, is not any'natural'or'archetypal'meaningof the isolated elements which make it up, but the way they are combined and re-combined in such a way that while the elements change position, the relations betweenthe positions are immutable (Levi-Strauss, 1955). This repeated re-combination of thesame elements allows an impossible situation to be faced up to by articulating in turn allthe different forms of its impossibility (S4,330).

‌‌‌‌　　What are the practical consequences of Lacan's theory in the treatment of subjectswho suffer from phobias? Rather than simply desensitising the subject (as in behaviouraltherapy), or simply providing an explanation of the phobic object (e.g.the horse is yourfather'), the treatment should aim at helping the subject to work through all the variouspermutations involving the phobic signifier. By helping the subject to develop theindividual myth in accordance with its own laws, the treatment enables him finally toexhaust all the possible combinations of signifying elements and thus to dissolve thephobia (S4,402). (It should be bome in mind that Lacan's discussion of the case of Little Hans only explicitly addresses the question of childhood phobias, and leaves open thequestion of whether these remarks also apply to adult phobias.)

‌‌‌‌　　As Freud himself noted in his case study of Little Hans, phobias had not previouslybeen assigned any definite position in psychiatric nosographies. He attempted to remedythis uncertainty surrounding the classification of phobia, but his proposed solution is preyto a certain ambiguity. On the one hand, since phobic symptoms can be found amongboth neurotic and psychotic subjects, Freud argued that phobias could not be regarded asan 'independent pathological process' (Freud, 1909b: SE X, 115). On the other hand, inthe same work Freud did isolate a particular form of neurosis whose central symptom is aphobia. Freud called this new diagnostic category 'anxiety hysteria'in order todistinguish it from'conversion hysteria' (which Freud had previously referred to simplyas 'hysteria'). Freud's remarks are thus ambiguous, implying that phobia can be both asymptom and an underlying clinical entity. The same ambiguity is repeated in Lacan'sworks, where the question is rephrased in terms of whether phobia is a symptom or aSTRUCTURE. Usually, Lacan distinguishes only two neurotic structures (hysteria andobsessional neurosis), and describes phobia as a symptom rather than a structure (S4,285). However, there are also points in Lacan's work where he lists phobia as a thirdform of neurosis in addition to hysteria and obsessional neurosis, thus implying that thereis a phobic structure (e.g.E, 321); in 1961, for example, he describes phobia as 'the mostradical form of neurosis' (S8,425). The question is not resolved until the seminar of1968-9, where Lacan states that

‌‌‌‌　　One cannot see in it [phobia]a clinical entity but rather a revolving junction [plaque tournante], something that must be elucidated in itsrelations with that towards which it usually tends, namely the two greatorders of neurosis, hysteria and obsessionality, and also the junctionwhich it realises with perversion.

‌‌‌‌　　(Lacan, 1968-9, quoted in Chemama, 1993:210)

‌‌‌‌　　Thus phobia is not, according to Lacan, a clinical structure on the same level as hysteriaand obsessional neurosis, but a gateway which can lead to either of them and which alsohas certain connections with the perverse structure. The link with perversion can be seenin the similarities between the fetish and the phobic object, both of which are symbolicsubstitutes for a missing element and both of which serve to structure the surrounding world.Furthermore,both phobia and perversion arise from difficulties in the passagefrom the imaginary preoedipal triangle to the symbolic Oedipal quatemary.