‌‌‌‌　　英：Object-relations theory; 法: theorie du relation d'objet

‌‌‌‌　　弗洛伊德曾经把对象定义为冲动在它之中并通过它而抵达其目标的东西。在弗洛伊德逝世以后的那些年里，“对象”与“对象关系”这对概念便在精神分析的理论中获得了越来越多的重要性，以至于最终形成了以“对象关系理论”而著称的整个精神分析理论学派。对象关系理论的主要支持者有罗纳德·费尔贝恩2、温尼科特3以及迈克尔·巴林特等人，他们全都是英国精神分析学会的中间小组 (Middle Group)的成员。这些分析家在很多论点上持有分歧，因此对象关系理论便涵盖了相当广泛的理论观点。然而，尽管它缺乏精确的定义，但是对象关系理论可以与自我心理学（EGOPSYCHOLOGY)形成鲜明的对照，因为它的关注焦点在于对象，而非在于冲动本身。此种之于对象的关注即意味着对象关系理论更为注重精神的主体间构成，从而与自我心理学更为原子论的方法形成了反差。这两种取径之间的区分一直都被比较晚近的分析家所模糊，譬如奥托·科恩伯格就曾试图将对象关系理论整合进自我心理学的框架之中

‌‌‌‌　　尽管拉康派精神分析向来都被拿来与对象关系理论进行比较，因为这两个思想学派皆更加注重主体间性（NTERSUBJECIIVITY), 然而拉康自己反复批判对象关系理论。他的批判大部分都集中于对象关系理论在主体与对象之间所设想的一种完整且完美的满足关系的可能性之上。拉康反对这样一种见解，他指出，对于人类而言，在“某种需要与满足此需要的那一对象”之间根本没有这样一种“预先建立的和谐”(S1,209)。拉康认为，此种谬误的根源即在于，在对象关系理论中，“对象首先是一种满足的对象”(S1,2O9)。换句话说，由于把对象定位于满足与需要 (NEED)的辖域，对象关系理论便将精神分析的对象混淆于生物学的对象，从而忽视了欲望的象征性维度。由此产生的一个可怕后果即在于由欲望的象征性构成而引起的那些特定的困难遭到了忽视，结果就导致“成熟的对象关系”(mature object relations)与“生殖性爱" (genital love)的理想被提出米作为治疗的目标。因而，对象关系就变成了一种“谵妄性的道德教化”的场所（Ec, 716: 亦见：生殖[GENITAL]).

‌‌‌‌　　对象关系理论同样受到拉康批判的一个密切相关的方面，使在于它的重点从强调俄狄浦斯三角转向了强调母子关系，从而把后者构想为一种完全对称性的、互易性的关系。拉康的根本性关切之一，即在于重新强调父亲的重要性，以有别于对象关系理论对于母亲的强调，从而恢复俄狄浦斯三角对于精神分析而言的核心性。此种关切可以从拉康把对象关系理论视作一种对称性的二元关系 (DUAL RELATION)的批评，以及他认为对象关系是涉及三个项而非两个项的一种主体间关系的见解中窥见一斑。

‌‌‌‌　　拉康对于英国对象关系理论的批评，正如上文所概括的那样，是他第一年公众研讨班 (1953一1954)的主要论题之一。在以“对象关系”为题的第四年研讨班 (Lacan, 1956-7)中，拉康讨论的不是英国的对象关系理论学派 (巴林特、费尔贝恩、冈特里普等人)，而是法国的对象关系理论学派 (莫里斯·布韦) 。

‌‌‌‌　　(theorie du relation d'objet) Freud defined the object as that in which and through whichthe drive attains its aim. In the years following Freud's death, the twin concepts of the'object'and the 'object relation'attained a growing importance in psychoanalytic theory, and eventually a whole school of psychoanalytic theory came to be known as 'object-relations theory'. The main proponents of object-relations theory were Ronald Fairbairn,D.W.Winnicott and Michael Balint, all of whom were members of the Middle Group ofthe British Psycho-Analytical Society. These analysts differed on many points, and henceobject-relations theory covers a wide range of theoretical points of view. However, despite its lack of precise definition, object-relations theory can be contrasted with EGO-PSYCHOLOGY on account of its focus on objects rather than on the drives inthemselves. This focus on objects means that object-relations theory pays more attentionto the intersubjective constitution of the psyche, in contrast to the more atomisticapproach of ego-psychology. The distinction between these two approaches has beenblurred by more recent analysts, such as Otto Kernberg, who have attempted to integrateobject-relations theory within an ego-psychology framework.

‌‌‌‌　　Although Lacanian psychoanalysis has been compared with object-relations theory inthat both schools of thought place more emphasis on INTERSUBJECTIVITY, Lacanhimself criticises object-relations theory repeatedly. His criticisms focus most on the wayin which object-relations theory envisions the possibility of a complete and perfectlysatisfying relation between the subject and the object. Lacan is opposed to such a view, arguing that for human beings there is no such thing as a 'pre-established harmonybetween 'a need and an object that satisfies it' (S1,209). The root of the error is, argues Lacan, that in object-relations theory,'the object is first and foremost an object ofsatisfaction' (S1,209). In other words, by locating the object in the register of satisfactionand NEED, object-relations theory confuses the object of psychoanalysis with the objectof biology and neglects the symbolic dimension of desire. One dire consequence thatfollows from this is that the specific difficulties which arise from the symbolicconstitution of desire are neglected, with the result that 'mature object relations'andideals of 'genital love'are proposed as the goal of treatment. Thus object-relations theorybecomes the site of a 'delirious moralism' (Ec, 716; see also GENITAL).

‌‌‌‌　　A closely related aspect of object-relations theory which Lacan also criticises is itsshift of emphasis from the Oedipal triangle onto the mother-child relation, with the latterconceived of as a perfectly symmetrical, reciprocal relation. One of Lacan's fundamental concerns is to restore the centrality of the Oedipal triangle to psychoanalysis by re-emphasising the importance of the father in contrast to the object-relations emphasis onthe mother. This concern can be seen in Lacan's criticism of the object relation as asymmetrical DUAL RELATION, and his view that the object relationis anintersubjective relation which involves not two but three terms.

‌‌‌‌　　Lacan's criticism of British object-relations theory, as summarised above, is one of themain themes of the first year of his public seminar (1953-4). In the fourth year of theseminar, entitled 'Object relations' (Lacan, 1956-7), Lacan discusses not the Britishschool of object-relations theory (Balint, Fairbairn, Guntrip, etc.), but the French schoolof object-relations theory (Maurice Bouvet). A