英:gaze; 法:regard
拉康有关目光的最早评论出现于他第一年度的研讨班 (Lacan, 1953-4), 他在其中提到了让-保罗·萨特有关“注视”(look)的现象学分析(萨特与拉康的英文译者使用了“1ook”与gaze”两个不同的术语来翻译,从而将他们两人其实使用的是同一个法文术语“le regard”的情况模糊了)。对萨特而言,“注视”即允许主体认识到他者(他人)也是一个主体的东西:“我与作为主体的他者(他人)的根本联系必须能够回溯到我被他者(他人)看见的永久可能性”(Sartre, 1943:256一强调为原文所加)。当主体遭他者(他人)的注视突然侵袭的时候,主体便会沦于羞愧(Sartre, 1943:261)。此时,拉康并未发展出他自己的目光概念,而且似乎也在大体上赞同萨特有关主体的见解 (S1,215)。拉康尤其是被萨特有关注视并不必然涉及视觉器官的观点所吸引:
当然,最常表现出注视的,是两只眼球朝我的方向上的汇聚。但是,注视偶尔也会出现在当树枝瑟瑟作响,或是一阵脚步声之后又跟着寂静,或是百叶窗微微打开,又或是窗帘轻轻摆动的时候。
(Sartre, 1943:257)
直到1964年,随着作为欲望原因的对象小a (OBJET PETIT A)概念的发展,拉康才发展出了他自己的目光理论,这一理论截然不同于萨特的理论 (Lacan, 1964a)。萨特把目光与观看的行动合并在一起,而拉康现在则将两者分离开来;目光变成了观看行动的对象,或者更确切地说,是视界冲动的对象。因此,在拉康的说明中,目光便不再处于主体的一边;它是大他者的目光。萨特设想在看见他人与被他人看见之间有一种基本的互易性,而拉康现在则设想在目光与眼睛之间是一种二律背反 (antinomic)的关系:观看的眼睛是属于主体的,而目光则处在对象的一边,且两者之间没有任何的一致性,因为“你永远不会从我看见你的位置来注视我”(S11,103)。当主体注视一个对象的时候,这个对象便总是已经在回望着主体了,只不过是从主体无法看见它的一个地方。眼睛与目光之间的这一分裂,无非就是在视觉领域中表达出来的主体性的割裂本身。
在1970年代,目光的概念被精神分析式电影批评家(例如:Metz, 1975), 尤其是女性主义电影批评家们(例如:Mulvey, 1975; RosC, 1986)接受。然而,这些批评家中的很多人都把拉康的目光概念混同于萨特的注视概念以及其他有关视觉的思想,诸如福柯对于全景敞视主义(panopticism)的说明。因而,大多数所谓的“拉康式电影理论”都是重大概念混淆的地点(见:Joan Copjec,1989)。亦见:Jay(1993)。
(regard) Lacan's first comments on the gaze appear in the first year of his seminar (Lacan, 1953-4), in reference to Jean-Paul Sartre's phenomenological analysis of 'thelook' (the fact that the English translators of Sartre and Lacan have used different termsobscures the fact that both use the same term in French-le regard). For Sartre, the gazeis that which permits the subject to realise that the Other is also a subject;'myfundamental connection with the Other-as-subject must be able to be referred back to mypermanent possibility of being seen by the Other' (Sartre, 1943:256-emphasis inoriginal). When the subject is surprised by the gaze of the Other, the subject is reduced toshame (Sartre, 1943:261). Lacan does not, at this point, develop his own concept of thegaze, and seems to be in general agreement with Sartre's views on the subject (S1,215). Lacan is especially taken with Sartre's view that the gaze does not necessarily concemthe organ of sight;
Of course what most ofien manifests a look is the convergence of twoocular globes in my direction. But the look will be given just as well onoccasion when there is a rustling of branches, or the sound of a footstepfollowed by silence, or the slight opening of a shutter, or a lightmovement of a curtain.
(Sartre, 1943:257)
It is only in 1964, with the development of the concept of OBJET PETIT A as the causeof desire, that Lacan develops his own theory of the gaze, a theory which is quite distinctfrom Sartre's (Lacan, 1964a). Whereas Sartre had conflated the gaze with the act oflooking, Lacan now separates the two; the gaze becomes the object of the act of looking, or, to be more precise, the object of the scopic drive. The gaze is therefore, in Lacan'saccount, no longer on the side of the subject; it is the gaze of the Other. And whereasSartre had conceived of an essential reciprocity between seeing the Other and being-seen-by-him, Lacan now conceives of an antinomic relation between the gaze and the eye: theeye which looks is that of the subject, while the gaze is on the side of the object, andthere is no coincidence between the two, since 'You never look at me from the place atwhich I see you' (S11,103). When the subject looks at an object, the object is alwaysalready gazing back at the subject, but from a point at which the subject cannot see it. This split between the eye and the gaze is nothing other than the subjective division itself, expressed in the field of vision.
The concept of the gaze was taken up by psychoanalytic film criticism in the 1970s (e.g.Metz, 1975), especially by feminist film critics (e.g.Mulvey, 1975; Rose, 1986). However, many of these critics have conflated Lacan's concept of the gaze with the Sartrean concept of the gaze and other ideas on vision such as Foucault's account ofpanopticism.Much of so-called Lacanian film theory'is thus the site of great conceptualconfusion (see Joan Copjec,1989).See also Jay (1993).