‌‌‌‌　　英：need: 法：besoin

‌‌‌‌　　在1958年左右，拉康在三个术语之间发展了一个重要的区分：需要、要求 (DEMAND)与欲望 (DESIRE)。在此一区分的语境下，“需要”接近于弗洛伊德所谓的“本能”(NSTINCT: 德：Instinkt); 也就是说，是与“冲动”(德：Tib)的领域相对立的一个纯粹生物学的概念。

‌‌‌‌　　拉康把这一区分建立在这样一个事实的基础之上，即为了满足自己的需要，幼儿必须在语言中来表达它们：换句话说，幼儿必须用一个“要求”来表达自己的需要。然而，在这么做时，某种别的东西却被引入了进来，从而导致了需要与要求之间的某种分裂：这一事实即在于：每个要求不仅是一种对需要的表达，而且也是一种（无条件的）对爱的要求。至此，尽管要求所指向的小他者（首先是母亲）可以也能够提供满足幼儿需要的对象，然而她永远都不可能无条件地回应此种对爱的要求，因为她也同样是割裂的。需要与要求之间的这一分裂的结果，便导致了一个无法满足的剩余物，即欲望本身。需要因而是一种间歇性的张力，它是由于纯粹的器质性原因而升起的，而且是完全通过与特殊需要相对应的特定行动而获得释放的。另一方面，欲望则是永远无法得到满足的一种恒定的力量，它是位于冲动之下的那一恒定的“压力”。

‌‌‌‌　　这种说法在时序的方面其实提出了一个结构的问题。事实上，情况并非是首先存在着一个纯粹需要的主体，然后这个主体才试图在语言中来表达那一需要，因为这一纯粹需要与其在要求中的表达之间的区分，仅仅从其表达出来的那一时刻开始才是存在的，在这一时间之前我们不可能确定原先的那一纯粹需要到底是什么。一种前语言的需要的概念，因而便仅仅是一种假设，而这一纯粹需要的主体也只是一个神话的主体；即便是像饥饿这样的典型的需要，也从来都不是作为一种纯粹的生物学给定而存在的，而是由语言的结构所标记的。不过，此种假设也有助于拉康主张以下论点，即在人类的欲望与所有自然性或生物学的范畴之间存在着根本的分歧 (见：[[nature 自然]])。

‌‌‌‌　　(besoin) Around 1958, Lacan develops an important distinction between three terms: need, DEMAND and DESIRE. In the context of this distinc-tion,'need'comes close towhat Freud referred to as INSTINCT (Instinkt); that is, a purely biological conceptopposed to the realm of the drive (Trieb).

‌‌‌‌　　Lacan bases this distinction on the fact that in order to satisfy his needs the infant mustarticulate them in language; in other words, the infant must articulate his needs in a'demand'. However, in so doing, something else is introduced which causes a splitbetween need and demand; this is the fact that every demand is not only an articulation ofneed but also an (unconditional) demand for love. Now, although the other to whom thedemand is addressed (in the first instance, the mother) can and may supply the objectwhich satisfies the infant's need, she is never in a position to answer the demand for love unconditionally, because she too is divided. The result of this split between need anddemand is an insatiable leftover, which is desire itself. Need is thus an intermittenttension which arises for purely organic reasons and which is discharged entirely by thespecific action corresponding to the particular need in question. Desire, on the other hand, is a constant force which can never be satisfied, the constant 'pressure'which underliesthe drives.

‌‌‌‌　　This account presents in chronological terms what is in fact a question of structure. Intruth, it is not the case that there first exists a subject of pure need which then attempts toarticulate that need in language, since the distinction between pure need and itsarticulation in demand only exists from the moment of its articulation, by which time it isimpossible to determine what that pure need could have been. The concept of a pre-linguistic need is thus merely a hypothesis, and the subject of this pure need is a mythicalsubject; even the paradigmatic need of hunger never exists as a pure biological given, butis marked by the structure of desire. Nevertheless, this hypothesis is useful to Lacan formaintaining his theses about the radical divergence between human desire and all naturalor biological categories (see NATURE).