‌‌‌‌　　英：Subject supposed to know; 法: sujet suppose savoir

‌‌‌‌　　“假设知道的主体”这一术语 (通常缩写作S.s.S)是很难翻译成英文的。谢里丹将其译作“假设知道的主体”（subject supposed toknow），而这也是大多数有关拉康的英文著作所采用的译法。然而，施耐德曼建议用另一种译法一一“假设的知识主体”（supposed subject of knowledge），其理由在于这里被假设的是主体，而不仅仅是知识（Schneiderman，1980：vii）。

‌‌‌‌　　拉康在1961年引人了这一措辞，以便指明在其认识活动上对其自身是明晰的一种自我意识（德：Selbstbewuβtsein）的幻象（见：意识[CONSCIOUSNESS]）。此种在镜子阶段中诞生的幻象，受到了精神分析的质疑。精神分析证明了知识（英：KNOWLEDGE，法：savoir)无法被定位于任何特殊的主体，而在事实上是主体间性的（Lacan，1961-2:1961年11月15日的研讨班）。

‌‌‌‌　　在1964年，拉康在其有关转移（TRANSFERENCE）的定义中采纳了这一措辞，把转移定义为将知识归于一个主体，“一旦假设知道的主体存在于某处，便发生了转移”（S11，232）。这则定义恰恰强调了开启分析过程的正是分析者对于一个知道的主体的假设，而非分析家所实际拥有的知识。

‌‌‌‌　　“假设知道的主体”这一术语并非指分析家本人，而是指分析家在治疗中所可能体现出来的一种功能。只有当分析家被分析者感知为体现了此种功能的时候，转移才可以说是被建立了起来。当这发生的时候，分析家被假设拥有的是何种知识呢？“他被假设知道的是一旦他对其加以阐述，便没有人能够从中逃脱的东西一一相当简单，即意指”（S11，253）。换句话说，分析家往往都会被认为是知道分析者话语的隐秘意义，即甚至连言说者都不知道的言语的意指。单凭这一假设（假设分析家是一个知道的人）便导致了那些原本不重要的细节（偶然的姿势、有歧义的评论）对那个“假设”的病人而言会回溯性地获得一个特定的意义。

‌‌‌‌　　虽然打从治疗的最初时刻开始，抑或甚至是在此之前，病人碰巧都可能会把分析家假设成一个知道的主体，但是为了让转移得以建立，往往还需要花费一些时间。就后一种情况而言，“当主体进入分析的时候，他远远没有给分析家赋予这个[假设知道的主体的]位置”(S11,233), 分析者起初可能会把分析家视作一个小丑，或是可能会向他隐瞒信息以便维持他的无知 (S11,135)。然而，“即便是遭到质疑的精神分析家，也会在某个时刻上被认为拥有某种绝对可靠性”(S11,234), 分析家的某些偶然的姿势，或早或晚都会被分析者当作某种秘密意图、某种隐秘知识的标志。在此时刻，分析家便渐渐化身成了假设知道的主体，转移就此建立。

‌‌‌‌　　当分析者不再假设分析家拥有知识，如此以至于分析家从假设知道的主体的位置上跌落下来的时候，分析结束的时刻便来临了。

‌‌‌‌　　“假设知道的主体”这一术语同样强调了这样一个事实，即正是与知识的一种特殊关系构成了分析家的独特位置，分析家明白在他自己与被归于他的知识之间存在一种分裂。换句话说，分析家必须认识到，他只是占据着一个（被分析者所）假设知道的人的位置，而不应欺骗自己，以为他真的确实拥有那种被归于他的知识。分析家必须认识到，关于分析者归于他的那种知识，他一无所知 (Lacan, 1967:20)。然而，分析过程的支柱是一种假设的知识，而非分析家所实际拥有的知识，这一事实并不意味着分析家因此便可以满足于一无所知；恰恰相反，拉康指出，分析家应当效仿弗洛伊德，努力变成文化、文学乃至语言学问题方面的专家。

‌‌‌‌　　拉康同样评论道，对于分析家而言，分析者也是一个假设知道的主体。当分析家向分析者说明自由联想的基本规则的时候，他实际上是在说：“来吧，说出来吧，一切都将是不可思议的。”(S17,59)换句话说，分析家告诉分析者要表现得好像他知道一切似的，从而把分析者也定立成一个假设知道的主体。

‌‌‌‌　　(sujet suppose savoir) The term sujet suppose savoir (often abbreviated to S.s.S.) isdifficult to translate into English. Sheridan translates it as 'subject suppposed to know', and this is the translation adopted in most English works on Lacan. However, Schneiderman suggests the alternative translation 'supposed subject of knowledge', onthe grounds that it is the subject, not just the knowledge, which is supposed (Schneiderman, 1980:vii).

‌‌‌‌　　The phrase is introduced by Lacan in 1961 in order to designate the illusion of a self-consciousness (Ger. SelbstbewuBtsein) which is transparent to itself in its act of knowing (see CONSCIOUSNESS). This illusion, which is born in the mirror stage, is put intoquestion by psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis demonstrates that KNOWLEDGE (savoir) cannot be located in any particular subject but is, in fact, intersubjective (Lacan, 1961-2: seminar of 15 November 1961).

‌‌‌‌　　In 1964, Lacan takes up the phrase in his definition of TRANSFERENCE as theattribution of knowledge to a subject; As soon as the subject who is supposed to knowexists somewhere there is transference' (S11,232). This definition emphasises that it isthe analysand's supposition of a subject who knows that initiates the analytic process, rather than the knowledge actually possessed by the analyst.

‌‌‌‌　　The term 'subject supposed to know'does not designate the analyst himself, but afunction which the analyst may come to embody in the treatment. It is only when theanalyst is perceived by the analysand to embody this function that the transference can besaid to be established (S11,233). When this occurs, what kind of knowledge is it that theanalyst is presumed to possess?'He is supposed to know that from which no one canescape, as soon as he formulates it-quite simply,signification' (S11,253). In otherwords, the analyst is often thought to know the secret meaning of the analysand's words, the significations of speech of which even the speaker is unaware. This supposition alone (the supposition that the analyst is one who knows) causes otherwise insignificant details (chance gestures, ambiguous remarks) to acquire retroactively a special meaning for thepatient who 'supposes'.

‌‌‌‌　　It may happen that the patient supposes the analyst to be a subject who knows fromthe very first moment of the treatment, or even before, but it often takes some time for thetransference to become established. In the latter case,'when the subject enters theanalsysis, he is far from giving the analyst this place [of the subject supposed to know]' (S11,233); the analysand may initially regard the analyst as a buffoon, or may witholdinformation from him in order to maintain his ignorance (S11,137). However,'even thepsychoanalyst put in question is credited at some point with a certain infallibility' (S11,234); sooner or later some chance gesture of the analyst's is taken by the analysand as asign of some secret intention, some hidden knowledge. At this point the analyst has cometo embody the subject supposed to know; the transference is established.

‌‌‌‌　　The end of analysis comes when the analysand de-supposes the analyst of knowledge, so that the analyst falls from the position of the subject supposed to know.

‌‌‌‌　　The term 'subject supposed to know'also emphasises the fact that it is a particularrelationship to knowledge that constitutes the unique position of the analyst; the analyst isaware that there is a split between him and the knowledge attributed to him. In other words, the analyst must realise that he only occupies the position of one who is presumed (by the analysand) to know, without fooling himself that he really does possess theknowledge attributed to him. The analyst must realise that, of the knowledge attributed tohim by the analysand, he knows nothing (Lacan, 1967:20). However, the fact that it is asupposed knowledge that is the mainstay of the analytic process, rather than theknowledge actually possessed by the analyst, does not mean that the analyst can thereforebe content with knowing nothing; on the contrary, Lacan argues that analysts shouldemulate Freud in becoming experts in cultural, literary and linguistic matters.

‌‌‌‌　　Lacan also remarks that, for the analyst, the analysand is a subject supposed to know. When the analyst explains the fundamental rule of free association to the analysand, he iseffectively saying;'Come on, say anything, it will all be marvellous' (S17,59). In otherwords, the analyst tells the analysand to behave as if he knew what it was all about, thereby instituting him as a subject supposed to know.