‌‌‌‌　　英：imaginary; 法：imaginaire

‌‌‌‌　　拉康把“想象界”这一术语作为一个名词来使用，可以追溯至1936年 (Ec, 81)。从一开始，该术语便具有幻象 (usion)、迷恋 (fascination)与诱惑 (seduction)等意涵，而且特别联系着自我 (EGO)与镜像 (SPECULAR IMAGE)之间的二元关系（DUAL RELATION)。然而，需要注意的是，虽然想象界始终保留着幻象与引诱的意涵，但是它并不完全同义于“虚幻”(the illusory),因为后一术语意味着某种不必要且不合理的事物 (Ec, 723)。想象界远非不合理的：它在现实中有着强大的效果，而并非完全是某种能够被免除或“克服”的事物。

‌‌‌‌　　从1953年开始，想象界就变成了同象征界与实在界相对立而言的三大秩序 (ORDERS)之一，它们构成了处在拉康思想核心的三重图式。想象秩序的基础仍然是自我在镜子阶段（MIRROR STAGE)中的形成。因为自我是通过认同相似者或镜像而形成的，所以认同 (DENTIFICATION)也是想象秩序中的一个重要的面向。自我与相似者构成了二元关系的原型，而且两者是可以互换的。自我借以认同小他者而构成的这一关系，便意味着自我乃至想象秩序本身，皆是一种根本性异化 (ALIENATION)的位点，“异化是想象秩序的构成性要素”(S3,146)。自我与相似者之间的此种二元关系在根本上是自恋性的，而自恋 (NARCISSISM)则是想象秩序的另一个特征。自恋始终都伴随着某种侵凌性（AGGRESSIVITY)。想象界是形象与空想，乃至欺骗与引诱的领域。想象界中的主要幻象，即那些涉及整体性、综合性、自主性、二元性，且尤其是相似性的幻象。想象界因而是那些表面显象的领域，即隐藏了潜在结构的那些欺骗性的、可观察的现象的领域：情感即这样的现象。

‌‌‌‌　　然而，想象界与象征界之间的对立，却并非意味着想象界是缺乏结构的。相反，想象界总是已经由象征秩序所结构。例如，在其1949年有关镜子阶段的讨论中，拉康便讲到了想象空间中的各种关系，这些关系都隐含着那一空间的某种象征结构化 (E, 1)。“想象性矩阵”(imaginary matrix)这一措辞也同样意味着想象界是由象征界所结构的 (Ec, 221), 而且在1964年，拉康也讨论了视觉领域是如何由象征法则所结构的 (S11,91-2)。

‌‌‌‌　　想象界同样涉及一个语言的维度。能指是象征秩序的基础，而所指 (SIGNIFIED)与意指 (SIGNIFICATION)则属于想象秩序。因而，语言便同时具有象征性与想象性的面向：在其想象性的面向，语言是颠倒并扭曲大他者的话语的“语言之墙”(wall of language)(见：L图式[SCHEMA L]).

‌‌‌‌　　基于镜像的那种近乎催眠式的效果，想象界会在主体身上施加一种迷惑性的力量。因而，想象界便根植于主体与自己身体 (或者更确切地说，是与其身体形象)之间的关系。此种迷惑性/捕获性的力量既是诱惑性的 (想象界尤其表现在性的层面上，诸如以性的展示与求偶仪式这样的形式：Lacan, 1956b:272), 又是致残性的：它把主体囚禁在一系列静态的固着之中（见：捕获[CAPTATION])

‌‌‌‌　　想象界是与动物行为学和动物心理学有着最密切联系的人类主体的维度 (S3,253)。因而所有那些根据动物心理学来说明人类主体性的企图，都是局限于想象界的 (见：自然[NATURE]).虽然想象界代表着人类主体性与动物行为学之间最密切的接触点 (S2,166), 但是两者并非是完全等同的：想象秩序对于人类而言是由象征界所结构的，而这就意味着“在人类身上，想象关系已然【从自然王国中】有所偏离”(S2,210).

‌‌‌‌　　对于把空想当作认识工具，拉康有着一种笛卡尔式的怀疑。如同笛卡尔一样，他也坚持纯粹理智的至高无上，强调只有不依赖于形象的纯粹理智，才是抵达某种知识的唯一途径。这一点正是拉康运用那些无法在空想中加以表征的拓扑学图形来探究无意识结构的根由之所在 (见：拓扑学[TOPOLOGY])。这种对于空想和感觉的怀疑，致使拉康坚定地站在了理性主义而非经验主义的一边 (见：科学[SCIENCE]).

‌‌‌‌　　拉康指责与他同时代的主要精神分析学派把精神分析缩减到了想象秩序；这些精神分析家们把对于分析家的认同变成了分析的目标，并且把分析化约成了一种二元关系(E,246-7)。拉康将此看作对精神分析的一种全然背叛，这样一种背离永远都只能在增加主体的异化方面取得成功。针对这样的想象还原论，拉康指出精神分析的本质在于其对象征界的运用。这种对于象征界的运用，是驱除想象界中那些令人丧失能力的固着的唯一途径。因而，对分析家而言，在想象界获得任何收益的唯一途径，便是把形象转化为言词，正如弗洛伊德把梦看作一个字谜那样：“想象界只有在被转译成象征符的时候才是可以破译的。”(Lacan,1956b:269)这种对于象征界的运用，对于分析的过程而言，便是“跨越认同层面”的唯一方式(S11,273)。

‌‌‌‌　　(imaginaire) Lacan's use of the term 'imaginary'as a substantive dates back to 1936 (Ec, 81). From the beginning, the term has connotations ofillusion, fascination and seduction, and relates specifically to the DUAL RELATION between the EGO and the SPECULARIMAGE. It is important to note, however, that while the imaginary always retainsconnotations of illusion and lure, it is not simply synonymous with 'the illusory'insofaras the latter term implies something unnecessary and inconsequential (Ec, 723). Theimaginary is far from inconsequential; it has powerful effects in the real, and is notsimply something that can be dispensed with or 'overcome'.

‌‌‌‌　　From 1953 on, the imaginary becomes one of the three ORDERS which constitute thetripartite scheme at the centre of Lacanian thought, being opposed to the symbolic andthe real. The basis of the imaginary order continues to be the formation of the ego in theMIRROR STAGE. Since the ego is formed by identifying with the counterpart orspecular image, IDENTIFICATION is an important aspect of the imaginary order. Theego and the counterpart form the prototypical dual relationship, and are interchangeable. This relationship whereby the ego is constituted by identification with the little othermeans that the ego, and the imaginary order itself, are both sites of a radicalALIENATION;'alienation is constitutive of the imaginary order' (S3,146). The dualrelationship between the ego and the counterpart is fundamentally narcissistic, andNARCISSISM is another characteristic of the imaginary order. Narcissism is alwaysaccompanied by a certain AGGRESSIVITY. The imaginary is the realm of image andimagination, deception and lure. The principal illusions of the imaginary are those ofwholeness, synthesis, autonomy, duality and, above all, similarity. The imaginary is thusthe order of surface appearances which are deceptive, observable phenomena which hideunderlying structure; the affects are such phenomena.

‌‌‌‌　　However, the opposition between the imaginary and the symbolic does not mean thatthe imaginary is lacking in structure. On the contrary, the imaginary is always alreadystructured by the symbolic order. For example in his discussion of the mirror stage in1949, Lacan speaks of the relations in imaginary space, which imply a symbolicstructuring of that space (E, 1). The expression 'imaginary matrix'also implies animaginary which is structured by the symbolic (Ec, 221), and in 1964 Lacan discusseshow the visual field is structured by symbolic laws (S11,91-2).

‌‌‌‌　　The imaginary also involves a linguistic dimension. Whereas the signifier is thefoundation of the symbolic order, the SIGNIFIED and SIGNIFICATION are part of theimaginary order. Thus language has both symbolic and imaginary aspects; in itsimaginary aspect, language is the 'wall of language'which inverts and distorts thediscourse of the Other (see SCHEMA L).

‌‌‌‌　　The imaginary exerts a captivating power over the subject, founded in the almosthypnotic effect of the specular image. The imaginary is thus rooted in the subject'srelationship to his own body (or rather to the image of his body). Thiscaptivating/capturing power is both seductive (the imaginary is manifested above all onthe sexual plane, in such forms as sexual display and courtship rituals; Lacan, 1956b:272) and disabling: it imprisons the subject in a series of static fixations (see CAPTATION).

‌‌‌‌　　The imaginary is the dimension of the human subject which is most closely linked toethology and animal psychology (S3,253). All attempts to explain human subjectivity interms of animal psychology are thus limited to the imaginary (see NATURE). Althoughthe imaginary represents the closest point of contact between human subjectivity andanimal ethology (S2,166), it is not simply identical; the imaginary order in human beingsis structured by the symbolic, and this means that 'in man, the imaginary relation hasdeviated [from the realm of nature]' (S2,210).

‌‌‌‌　　Lacan has a Cartesian mistrust of the imagination as a cognitive tool. He insists, like Descartes, on the supremacy of pure intellection, without dependence on images, as theonly way of arriving at certain knowledge. It is this that lies behind Lacan's use oftopological figures, which cannot be represented in the imagination, to explore thestructure of the unconscious (see TOPOLOGY). This mistrust of the imagination and thesensesputs Lacan firmly on the side of rationalism rather than empiricism (see SCIENCE).

‌‌‌‌　　Lacan accused the major psychoanalytic schools of his day of reducing psychoanalysisto the imaginary order; these psychoanalysts made identification with the analyst into thegoal of analysis, and reduced analysis to a dual relationship (E, 246-7). Lacan sees this asa complete betrayal of psychoanalysis, a deviation which can only ever succeedinincreasing the alienation of the subject. Against such imaginary reductionism, Lacanargues that the essence of psychoanalysis consists in its use of the symbolic. This use ofthe symbolic is the only way to dislodge the disabling fixations of the imaginary. Thusthe only way for the analyst to gain any purchase on the imaginary is by transforming theimages into words, just as Freud treats the dream as a rebus: 'The imaginary isdecipherable only if it is rendered into symbols' (Lacan, 1956b:269). This use of thesymbolic is the only way for the analytic process 'to cross the plane of identification' (S11,273)