‌‌‌‌　　英：structure; 法：structure

‌‌‌‌　　当拉康在其1930年代的早期著作中使用“结构”这一术语的时候，该词指涉的是那些“社会结构”(social structures), 他借此来意指家庭成员之间一组特定的情感关系。相比于成人，孩子会更加深刻地觉察到这些关系，并且将它们内化到情结 (COMPLEX)之中 (Ec, 89)。这个术语起到了一颗钉子的作用，让拉康得以在上面悬挂他自己有关精神的“关系性”本质的那些见解，以反对当时在心理学中盛行的那些原子论学说 (Lacan, 1936)。从此时起，“结构”这一术语便同时保持着此种既带有主体间性 (intersubjective)又带有主体内性 (intrasubjective)的意义，即人际关系的内在表象。这一点始终是贯穿在拉康著作中的一个关键所在，拉康著作中对于结构的强调不断地提醒我们注意到，决定主体的并非某种假设的“本质”，而仅仅是主体相对于其他主体与其他能指而言的位置。早在1938年，我们便已经发现拉康指出了当时“分析学说的最显著缺陷”即在于它倾向于“忽视结构而支持动力学的方法”(Lacan, 1938:58)。这预期了他日后对于象征秩序的强调，即分析家们因为支持想象界而忽视的结构领域，“社会结构皆是象征性的”(Ec, 132).

‌‌‌‌　　在1950年代中期，当拉康开始以借自索绪尔的结构语言学的术语来重新阐述他的思想的时候，“结构”这一术语便渐渐被越来越多地联系于索绪尔的语言 (LANGUAGE)模型。索绪尔将语言 (la langue)作为一个系统而加以分析，其中没有任何肯定的词项，有的只是差异 (Saussure,. 1916:120)。这一系统中的每一单元皆是凭借着它与其他单元的差异而构成的，而正是这一系统的概念从此时起渐渐构成了“结构”这一术语在拉康著作中的核心意义。语言是结构的典范，而拉康的那句著名格言“无意识是像语言那样被结构的”因此便是同义反复的，因为“被结构”与“像语言那样”指的是同一回事。

‌‌‌‌　　索绪尔的结构语言学方法经由罗曼·雅各布森提出的音素理论而得到了进一步的发展；而后，雅各布森的著作又被法国人类学家克劳德·列维-斯特劳斯所采纳，他用结构化的音素模型来分析非语言性的文化资料，诸如亲属关系与神话等。把结构分析应用到人类学的这种做法，展示了索绪尔的结构概念如何能够被应用于除语言之外的调查对象，从而使结构主义运动兴起。以上三位思想家皆对拉康产生了极大的影响，而从此种意义上来说，他便可以被看作结构主义运动的一分子。然而，拉康则更喜欢使自己脱离于这场运动，并且声称他的研究取径在一些重要的方面上有别于结构主义的研究方法 (S20,93).

‌‌‌‌　　除了对于语言的参照，拉康同样把结构的概念参照于数学 (MATHEMATICS),主要是集合论与拓扑学 (TOPOLOGY)。例如，在1956年，他便声称“一个结构首先是一组元素构成的一个共变的集合”(S3,183)。两年之后，他再度把结构的概念联系于数学的集合论，并且又补充了一处对于拓扑学的参照 (Ec, 648-9)。到1970年代，拓扑学便取代了语言，对拉康而言变成了结构的主要范式。至此，他指出拓扑学并不仅仅是一种对于结构的隐喻，它就是结构本身 (Lacan, 1973b).

‌‌‌‌　　结构的概念经常被拿来暗指表面与深层之间的对立，即可直接观察到的现象与并非直观经验对象的“深层结构”之间的对立。拉康在症状 (SYMPTOMS)（表面）与结构（深层）之间做出的区分中似乎就隐含有这样一种对立。然而，拉康事实上并不同意在结构的概念中隐含有这样一种对立 (Ec, 649)。一方面，他拒绝“可直接观察到的现象”的概念，认为观察总是已经理论化的。另一方面，他也拒绝结构是某种“深层”或远离经验的思想，指出结构即存在于经验自身的领域当中，无意识是在表面上的，而到“深层”中去寻找它便会错失它。就很多其他的二元对立来说，拉康更喜欢的模型就是莫比乌斯带的模型，正如莫比乌斯带的两面其实是连通的，所以结构也是与现象连通的。

‌‌‌‌　　因而，结构分析的最重要特征并不在于表面与深层之间的任何假设的区分，而是正如列维-斯特劳斯在其有关神话的结构分析中所表明的那样，在于发现其本身是空的“位点”(oc)之间的固定关系 (Levi-Strauss, 1995)。换句话说，无论什么样的元素都可能被放置在由既定结构所指定的那些位置之上，这些位置之间的关系都是保持不变的。因而，各个元素之间的交互作用便不是基于它们所具有的任何内在的或固有的品质，而仅仅是基于它们在结构中所占据的位置。

‌‌‌‌　　同很多其他的精神分析家相一致，拉康区分了三种主要的病情学范畴，即神经症 (NEUROSIS)、精神病 (PSYCHOSIS)以及性倒错 (PERVERSION)。他的独创性在于，他把这些范畴视作结构，而非仅仅将其看作症状的集合 (注意：虽然拉康更喜欢用“弗洛伊德式结构”[Freudian structures]而非“临床结构”[clinical struc-tur©s]的措辞来讲，但是后一术语在现今的拉康派精神分析家的作品中居于主导地位)。

‌‌‌‌　　拉康的病情学是基于一种离散序列的范畴分类系统，而非基于一种连续统的次元级数系统。因此，三种主要的临床结构是相互排斥的，例如，一个主体不可能同时既是神经症患者又是精神病患者。此三种主要的临床结构共同构成了主体相对于大他者的所有三种可能的位置，因此，在精神分析治疗中所遇到的每个主体都可以被诊断为要么是神经症患者，要么是精神病患者，要么是性倒错者。每一种结构皆是经由一种不同的运作而得以区分的：神经症经由压抑 (repression)的运作，性倒错经由拒认 (disavowal)的运作，而精神病则经由排除 (foreclosure)的运作。拉康遵循弗洛伊德的观，点指出，精神分析治疗的经典方法（涉及自由联想与躺椅的使用）只适用于神经症主体与性倒错主体，而不适用于精神病患者。因而，当拉康派分析家们与精神病人一起工作的时候，他们会使用一种在实质上经过修改的治疗方法。

‌‌‌‌　　精神分析最基本的公理之一，即主体的临床结构是由他在生命最初几年中的经验所决定的。在这个意义上，精神分析是以某种“关键期假设”为基础的，生命的最初几年是主体的结构在其中被决定下来的关键时期。尽管人们现在尚不清楚这个关键期会持续多久，但是大家都认为在此关键期之后，临床结构就会永远固定且无法改变。例如，无论是精神分析治疗还是任何其他的疗法，皆无法使一个精神病患者变成神经症患者。在此三种主要临床结构的每一种之中，拉康又区分出了不同的亚型。例如，在神经症的临床结构中，他区分了两种神经症类型（强迫型神经症与癔症）：而在精神病的临床结构中，他则区分了偏执狂、精神分裂症与躁狂抑郁型精神病。

‌‌‌‌　　(structure) When Lacan uses the term 'structure'in his early work of the 1930s, it is torefer to 'social structures', by which he means a specific set of affective relationsbetween family members. The child perceives these relations much more profoundly thanthe adult, and intemalises them in the COMPLEX (Ec, 89). The term serves as a pegupon which Lacan can hang his own views of the 'relational'nature of the psyche, inopposition to the atomistic theories then current in psychology (Lacan, 1936). From thispoint on, the term 'structure'retains this sense of something both intersubjective andintrasubjective, the internal representation of interpersonal relations. This remains a keypoint throughout Lacan's work, in which the emphasis on structure is a constant reminderthat what determines the subject is not some supposed 'essence'but simply his positionwith respect to other subjects and other signifiers. Already in 1938, we find Lacanarguing that 'the most notable defect of analytic doctrine'at that time was that it tended'to ignore structure in favour of a dynamic approach' (Lacan, 1938:58). This anticipateshis later emphasis on the symbolic order as the realm of structure which analysts haveignored in favour of the imaginary;'social structures are symbolic' (Ec, 132).

‌‌‌‌　　In the mid-1950s, when Lacan begins to reformulate his ideas in terms borrowed from Saussurean structural linguistics, the term 'structure'comes to be increasingly associatedwith Saussure's model of LANGUAGE. Saussure analysed language (la langue) as asystem in which there are no positive terms, only differences (Saussure, 1916:120). It isthis concept of a system in which each unit is constituted purely by virtue of its differences from the other units which comes to constitute the core meaning of the term'structure'in Lacan's work from this point on. Language is the paradigmatic structure, and Lacan's famous dictum,'the unconscious is structured like a language', is thereforetautologous, since 'to be structured'and'to be like a language'mean the same thing.

‌‌‌‌　　Saussure's structural approach to linguistics was developed further by Roman Jakobson, who developed phoneme theory; Jakobson's work was then taken up by theFrench anthropologist, Claude Levi-Strauss, who used the structural phonemic model toanalyse non-linguistic cultural data such as kinship relations and myth. This applicationof structural analysis to anthropology launched the structuralist movement by showinghow the Saussurean concept of structure could be applied to an object of enquiry otherthan language. Lacan was heavily influenced by all three of these thinkers, and in thissense he can be seen as part of the structuralist movement. However, Lacan prefers todissociate himself from this movement, arguing that his approach differs in importantways from the structuralist approach (S20,93).

‌‌‌‌　　Alongside the references to language, Lacan also refers the concept of structure toMATHEMATICS, principally to set theory and TOPOLOGY. In 1956, for example, hestates that 'a structure is in the first place a group of elements forming a covariant set' (S3,183). Two years later he again links the concept of structure with mathematical settheory, and adds a reference to topology (Ec, 648-9). By the 1970s, topology hasreplaced language as the principal paradigm of structure for Lacan. He now argues thattopology is not a mere metaphor for structure; it is that structure itself (Lacan, 1973b).

‌‌‌‌　　The concept of structure is often taken to imply an opposition between surface anddepth, between directly observable phenomena and 'deep structures'which are not theobject of immediate experience. Such would seem to be the opposition implied in thedistinction Lacan draws between SYMPTOMS (surface) and structures (depth). However, Lacan does not in fact agree that such an opposition is implicit in the conceptof structure (Ec, 649). On the one hand, he rejects the concept of 'directly observablephenomena', arguing that observation is always already theoretical. On the other hand, healso rejects the idea that structures are somehow 'deep'or distant from experience, arguing that they are present in the field of experience itself; the unconscious is on thesurface, and looking for it in 'the depths'is to miss it. As with many other binaryoppositions, the model Lacan prefers is that of the moebius strip; just as the two sides ofthe strip are in fact continuous, so structure is continuous with phenomena.

‌‌‌‌　　The most important feature of structural analysis is not, then, any supposed distinctionbetween surface and depth, but, as Levi-Strauss shows in his structural analysis of myth, the discovery of fixed relations between loci which are themselves empty (Levi-Strauss, 1955). In other words, whatever elements may be placed in the positions specified by agiven structure, the relations between the positions themselves remain the same. Thus theelements interact not on the basis of any inherent or intrinsic properties they possess, butsimply on the basis of the positions which they occupy in the structure.

‌‌‌‌　　In line with many other psychoanalysts, Lacan distinguishes three principalnosographic categories; NEUROSIS, PSYCHOSIS and PERVERSION. His originalitylies in the fact that he regards these categories as structures rather than simply ascollections of symptoms. (N.B.Lacan prefers to speak in terms of 'Freudian structures'rather than 'clinical structures', but the latter term is the one which predominates in thewritings of Lacanian psychoanalysts today.)

‌‌‌‌　　Lacanian nosography is a categorical classification system based on a discrete series, rather than a dimensional system based on a continuum. The three major clinicalstructures are therefore mutually exclusive; a subject cannot be both neurotic andpsychotic, for example. The three major clinical structures together constitute all the threepossible positions of the subject in relation to the Other; every subject encountered inpsychoanalytic treatment can therefore be diagnosed as either neurotic, or psychotic, orperverse. Each structure is distinguished by a different operation: neurosis by theoperation of repression, perversion by the operation of disavowal, and psychosis by theoperation of foreclosure. Lacan follows Freud in arguing that the classical method ofpsychoanalytic treatment (involving free association and the use of the couch) is onlyappropriate for neurotic subjects and perverse subjects, and not for psychotics. Thuswhen Lacanian analysts work with psychotic patients, they use a substantially modifiedmethod of treatment.

‌‌‌‌　　One of the most fundamental axioms of psychoanalysis is that the subject's clinicalstructure is determined by his experiences in the first years of life. In this sense, psychoanalysis is based on a 'critical period hypothesis'; the first years of life are thecritical period in which the subject's structure is determined. Although it is not clear howlong this critical period lasts, it is held that after this critical period the clinical structure isfixed for ever and cannot be changed. Neither psychoanalytic treatment nor anything elsecan, for example, tumn a psychotic into a neurotic. Within each of the three major clinicalstructures Lacan distinguishes various subdivisions. For example within the clinicalstructure of neurosis, he distinguishes two kinds of neurosis (obsessional neurosis andhysteria), and within the clinical structure of psychosis he distinguishes betweenparanoia, schizophrenia and manic-depressive psychosis.