‌‌‌‌　　英：ethics;法：ethique

‌‌‌‌　　拉康宣称伦理学思想“乃处在我们作为分析家的工作的中心”(S7,38),而且他的一整年研讨班也被专门用来讨论伦理学与精神分析的链接 (Lacan, 1959-60)。把问题稍微简单化一些，我们可以说伦理学问题是从两个方面汇聚于精神分析治疗的，即分析者的方面与分析家的方面。

‌‌‌‌　　在分析者的方面，是罪疚的问题与文明化道德的致病性本质。在弗洛伊德的早期著作中，他曾在“文明化道德”的种种要求与主体的那些本质上是非道德的性冲动之间构想了一种基本的冲突。当道德在此种冲突之中占据上风，而冲动又过于强大以至于无法升华的时候，性欲便要么会以性倒错的形式来获得表达，要么会遭到压抑，后者导致了神经症。因此，在弗洛伊德看来，文明化道德便是神经疾病的根源所在 (Freud, 1908d)。在他关于无意识的罪疚感的理论之中，以及在他后来关于超我的概念之中，弗洛伊德又进一步发展了他关于道德的致病性本质的思想：超我是一个变得愈发残酷以至于自我屈从于其要求的内部道德机构 (Freud, 1923b).

‌‌‌‌　　在分析家的方面，则是如何处理分析者的致病性道德与无意识罪疚的问题，以及如何处理在精神分析治疗中可能出现的整个伦理学范围的问题

‌‌‌‌　　伦理学问题的这两方面来源给分析家提出了很多不同的问题：

‌‌‌‌　　首先，分析家要如何对分析者的罪疚感做出回应呢？当然不是告诉分析者说他并非真的有罪，或是企图“软化、钝化或弱化”他的罪疚感 (S7,3), 或是将其当作一种神经症的幻象而加以分析性的消除。相反，拉康指出，分析家必须认真对待分析者的罪疚感，因为从根本上说，每当分析者感到罪疚的时候，都是因为在某一时刻上，他在自己的欲望上有所让步的缘故。“从一种分析的观点来看，我们可能会对其感到罪疚的唯一的事情，便是相对于自己的欲望而有所退却”(S7,319)。因此，当分析者向分析家呈现出某种罪疚感的时候，分析家的任务便是要发现分析者在何处对他的欲望做出让步。

‌‌‌‌　　其次，分析家要如何对经由超我而起作用的致病性道德做出回应呢？弗洛伊德把道德看作一种致病性力量的见解，也许看似意味着分析家仅仅需要帮助分析者摆脱那些道德的束缚。然而，虽然这样一种解释可以在弗洛伊德的早期著作中找到某种支撑 (Fr©ud, I9O8d), 但是拉康坚决反对弗洛伊德的这样一种见解，他更偏爱《文明及其不满》(Freud, 1930a)中的那个更加悲观的弗洛伊德，而且直截了当地声称“弗洛伊德绝非是一位进步论者”（S7,183)。故而，精神分析并不完全是一种自由放荡的社会风潮 (ibertine ethos).

‌‌‌‌　　这似乎便给分析家提出了一种道德的两难困境。一方面，他不能完全站在文明化道德的一边，因为这种道德是致病性的。另一方面，他也不能完全采纳一种自由放荡的相反取径，因为如此仍旧是处在道德的领域之内的 (见：S7,34)。中立的规则可能看似给分析家提供了一种解决此一两难困境的办法，然而事实上则不然，因为拉康指出根本没有这样一个在伦理学上是中立的位置。因而，分析家便无法避免，也必须面对这些伦理学的问题。

‌‌‌‌　　在指导精神分析治疗的每一种方式中都隐含某种伦理性立场，无论这一点是否为分析家所承认。分析家的伦理性立场可通过他阐述治疗目标的方式而得到最为清晰的揭示 (S7,207)。例如，自我心理学有关自我适应现实的那些阐述，便隐含了一种规范的伦理学 (S7,302)。正是在与此种伦理学立场的对立之中，拉康开始阐述他自己的分析性伦理。

‌‌‌‌　　拉康所阐述的分析性伦理，是把行动与欲望联系起来的一种伦理 (见：行动[ACT])。拉康把它概括成了一个问题：“你是否遵照自己内心中的欲望而行事？”(S7,314)。基于以下几点理由，他把此种伦理对比于亚里士多德、康德与其他道德哲学家的“传统伦理学”(S7,314).

‌‌‌‌　　第一，传统伦理学皆围绕着“善”(Good)的概念而运转，且提出各种不同的“诸善”皆是在角逐“至善”(Sovereign Good)的位置。然而，精神分析的伦理则把“善”看作欲望道路上的某种障碍；因而在精神分析中“对于某种善的理想的根本性弃绝是必然的”(S7,230)。精神分析的伦理拒绝一切的理想，包括“幸福”与“健康”的理想；而自我心理学怀抱这些理想的事实，便使它不能宣称自己是精神分析的一种形式 (S7,219)。因此，分析家的欲望不能是“行善”或“治愈”的欲望 (S7,218).

‌‌‌‌　　第二，传统伦理学总是倾向于把善联系于快乐；道德思想“是沿着那些在本质上属于快乐主义的问题路径而展开的”（S7,221)。然而，精神分析的伦理不能采取这样的一种取径，因为精神分析的经验业已揭示出了快乐的表里不一；快乐是有某种界限的，当这一界限遭到僭越的时候，快乐就会变成痛苦（见：享乐[JOUISSANCE]).

‌‌‌‌　　第三，传统伦理学皆围绕着“为善服务”(S7,314)而运作，它把工作与一种安全、有序的生存摆在欲望问题的前面；它告诉人们要让自己的欲望等待 (S7,315)。同时，精神分析的伦理则迫使主体在当下的即时性中去面对其行动与其欲望之间的关系。

‌‌‌‌　　在其1959一1960年度有关伦理学的研讨班之后，拉康继续把这些伦理学的问题定位在精神分析理论的中心。他把弗洛伊德的“它曾在之处，我必将抵达”(Wo es war, soll Ich werden)这句著名格言中的“必将”(so)解释为一种伦理性的义务 (E, 128), 而且他还指出无意识的地位不是本体论的，而是伦理学的 (S11,33)。在1970年代，他把精神分析伦理学的强调重点从行动的问题 (“你是否遵照你的欲望而行事？”)转向了言说的问题；现在，它则变成了一种“善言”的伦理 (1'ethique du Bien-dire)(Lacan, 1973a:65)。然而，这更多是一种侧重的不同，而非是一种对立，因为在拉康看来，“善言”本身也是一种行动。

‌‌‌‌　　从根本上讲，正是一种伦理学的立场把精神分析与暗示SUGGESTION)分离了开来：精神分析的基础便在于对病人有权抵抗控制的基本尊重，而暗示则把此种阻抗看作一种要被粉碎的障碍。

‌‌‌‌　　(ethique) Lacan asserts that ethical thought'is at the centre of our work as analysts' (S738), and a whole year of his seminar is devoted to discussing the articulation of ethics andpsychoanalysis (Lacan, 1959-60). Simplifying matters somewhat, it could be said thatethical problems converge in psychoanalytic treatment from two sides: the side of theanalysand and the side of the analyst.

‌‌‌‌　　On the side of the analysand is the problem of guilt and the pathogenic nature ofcivilised morality. In his earlier work, Freud conceives of a basic conflict between thedemands of 'civilised morality'and the essentially amoral sexual drives of the subject. When morality gains the upper hand in this conflict, and the drives are too strong to besublimated, sexuality is either expressed in perverse forms or repressed, the latter leadingto neurosis. In Freud's view, then, civilised morality is at the root of nervous illness (Freud, 1908d). Freud further developed his ideas on the pathogenic nature of morality inhis theory of an unconscious sense of guilt, and in his later concept of the superego, aninterior moral agency which becomes more cruel to the extent that the ego submits to itsdemands (Freud, 1923b).

‌‌‌‌　　On the side of the analyst is the problem of how to deal with the pathogenic moralityand unconscious guilt of the analysand, and also with the whole range of ethical problemsthat may arise in psychoanalytic treatment.

‌‌‌‌　　These two sources of ethical problems pose different questions for the analyst:

‌‌‌‌　　Firstly, how is the analyst to respond to the analysand's sense of guilt? Certainly notby telling the analysand that he is not really guilty, or by attempting 'to soften, blunt orattenuate'his sense of guilt (S7,3), or by analysing it away as a neurotic illusion. On thecontrary, Lacan argues that the analyst must take the analysand's sense of guilt seriously, for at bottom whenever the analysand feels guilty it is because he has, at some point, given way on his desire. From an analytic point of view, the only thing of which one canbe guilty is of having given ground relative to one's desire' (S7,319). Therefore, whenthe analysand presents him with a sense of guilt, the analyst's task is to discover wherethe analysand has given way on his desire.

‌‌‌‌　　Secondly, how is the analyst to respond to the pathogenic morality which acts via thesuperego? Freud's views of morality as a pathogenic force might seem to imply that theanalyst simply has to help the analysand free himself from moral constraints. However, while such an interpretation may find some support in Freud's earlier work (Freud, 1908d), Lacan is firmly opposed to such a view of Freud, preferring the more pessimistic Freud of Civilization and Its Discontents (Freud, 1930a) and stating categorically that Freud was in no way a progressive' (S7,183). Psychoanalysis, then, is not simply alibertine ethos.

‌‌‌‌　　This seems to present the analyst with a moral dilemma. On the one hand, he cannotsimply align himself with civilised morality, since this morality is pathogenic. On theother hand, nor can he simply adopt an opposing libertine approach, since this tooremains within the field of morality (see S7,3-4). The rule of neutrality may seem tooffer the analyst a way out of this dilemma, but in fact it does not, for Lacan points outthat there is no such thing as an ethically neutral position. The analyst cannot avoid, then, having to face ethical questions.

‌‌‌‌　　An ethical position is implicit in every way of directing psychoanalytic treatment, whether this is admitted or not by the analyst. The ethical position of the analyst is mostclearly revealed by the way that he formulates the goal of the treatment (S7,207). Forexample the formulations of ego-psychology about the adaptation of the ego to realityimply a normative ethics (S7,302). It is in opposition to this ethical position that Lacansets out to formulate his own analytic ethic.

‌‌‌‌　　The analytic ethic that Lacan formulates is an ethic which relates action to desire (seeACT). Lacan summarises it in the question 'Have you acted in conformity with the desirethat is in you?' (S7,314). He contrasts this ethic with the 'traditional ethics' (S7,314) of Aristotle, Kant and other moral philosophers on several grounds.

‌‌‌‌　　Firstly, traditional ethics revolves around the the concept of the Good, proposingdifferent 'goods'which all compete for the position of the Sovereign Good. Thepsychoanalytic ethic, however, sees the Good as an obstacle in the path of desire; thus inpsychoanalysis 'a radical repudiation of a certain ideal of the good is necessary' (S7,230). The psychoanalytic ethic rejects all ideals, including ideals of happiness'andhealth'; and the fact that ego-psychology has embraced these ideals bars it from claimingto be a form of psychoanalysis (S7,219). The desire of the analyst cannot therefore be thedesire to‘do good'or‘to cure' (S7,2l8)

‌‌‌‌　　Secondly, traditional ethics has always tended to link the good to pleasure; moralthought has 'developed along the paths of an essentially hedonistic problematic' (S7,221). The psychoanalytic ethic, however, cannot take such an approach becausepsychoanalytic experience has revealed the duplicity of pleasure; there is a limit topleasure and, when this is transgressed, pleasure becomes pain (see JOUISSANCE).

‌‌‌‌　　Thirdly, traditional ethics revolves around 'the service of goods' (S7,314) which putswork and a safe, ordered existence before questions of desire; it tells people to make theirdesires wait (S7,315). The psychoanalytic ethic, on the other hand, forces the subject toconfront the relation between his actions and his desire in immediacy of the present.

‌‌‌‌　　After his 1959-60 seminar on ethics, Lacan continues to locate ethical questions at theheart of psychoanalytic theory. He interprets the soll in Freud's famous phrase Wo eswar, soll Ich werden ('Where id was, there ego shall be', Freud, 1933a: SE XXII, 80) asan ethical duty (E, 128), and argues that the status of the unconscious is not ontologicalbut ethical (S11,33). In the 1970s he shifts the emphasis of psychoanalytic ethics fromthe question of acting ('Have you acted in accordance with your desire?') to the questionof speech; it now becomes an ethic of 'speaking well' (l'ethique du Bien-dire)(Lacan, 1973a:65). However, this is more a difference of emphasis than an opposition, since for Lacan to speak well is in itself an act.

‌‌‌‌　　It is fundamentally an ethical position which separates psychoanalysisfromSUGGESTION; psychoanalysis is based on a basic respect for the patient's right to resistdomination, whereas suggestion sees such resistance as an obstacle to be crushed.