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‌‌‌‌  英:law; 法:loi

‌‌‌‌  拉康有关“法则”(拉康通常将“L”大写)的讨论,在很大程度上归功于克劳德·列维-斯特劳斯的著作 (尤其参见:Lcvi-Strauss, 1951)。正如在列维-斯特劳斯的著作中所出现的那样,法则在拉康的著作中并不指涉某项特殊的法律规章,而是指涉奠定所有社会关系之基础的那些基本原则。法则是让社会存在 (socialexistence)成为可能的那些普遍原则的集合,也是支配着所有社会交换 (social exchange)形式的那些结构,无论是礼物馈赠、亲属关系还是契约形成。因为交换的最基本形式即交流本身,所以法则在根本上是一个语言性实体 (linguistic entity)一它是能指的法则:

‌‌‌‌  因而,这一法则便足够清晰地被揭示为等同于语言的秩序。因为倘若没有亲属关系的那些命名,便没有任何力量能够制定出那些偏好与禁忌的秩序,它们经由代代相传而缠绕并编织着血脉的纱线。

‌‌‌‌  (E, 66)

‌‌‌‌  事实上,这种“法则-语言”的结构,不多不少,正是象征秩序本身。

‌‌‌‌  拉康遵循列维-斯特劳斯的观点指出,法则在本质上是人类的,正是法则借由调节在动物界中不受规制的性关系,从而把人类与其他的动物区隔了开来:人类的法则是“原始的法则…它在规制婚姻联结之时把文化的界域叠加在隶属于交媾法则的自然的界域之上。乱伦禁忌只不过是其主观的枢轴”(E, 66).

‌‌‌‌  正是父亲 (FATHER)在俄狄浦斯情结 (OEDIPUS COMPLEX)中把这一法则强加在了主体的身上,这一父性动因(或是父性功能)只不过是对于此种禁止性兼立法性的角色的命名。在俄狄浦斯情结的第二时间上,父亲作为《图腾与禁忌》中的那一全能的“原始部落的父亲”(father of the primal horde)而出现 (Freud, I9I2-13); 然而这位立法者并未被包括在他自己的法则之中,因为他即法则一他拒绝其他人靠近部落中的女人,而他自己则享有她们全部。在俄狄浦斯情结的第三时间上,父亲则被包括在他自己的法则之中,法则在此时被显示为一种契约,而非一种律令。俄狄浦斯情结代表着法则对于欲望的规制。这便是快乐原则 (PLEASURE PRINCIPLE)的法则,它命令主体“尽可能少地享乐!”,因而把主体维持在同原物 (Ting)安全的距离上。

‌‌‌‌  然而,法则与欲望之间的关系是辩证性的,“欲望是法则的反面”(E℃,787)。如果在一方面,法则将诸多限制强加在欲望之上,那么在另一方面,法则也就确实通过创造禁止而首先创造出了欲望。欲望在本质上是想要僭越的欲望,而要有僭越的存在,就必须首先有禁止的存在 (S7,834)。因此,情况就并非是说先有一个预先给定的欲望,然后法则再对其加以规制,而是说欲望即诞生自这一规制的过程,“我们在此看到的是欲望与法则之间的紧密联结”(S7,177).

‌‌‌‌  如果说法则与父亲有着密切的联系,那么这就不仅是因为父亲是强加法则之人,而且也是因为法则即诞生自对于父亲的谋杀。这一点在弗洛伊德的《图腾与禁忌》中所讲述的原父神话里得到了清楚的阐明。在这则神话中,对于父亲的谋杀,非但没有使儿子们免于法则的约束,反而是加固了乱伦禁忌的法则。

‌‌‌‌  (loi) Lacan's discussions of'the Law' (which Lacan often writes with a capital 'L') owemuch to the work of Claude Levi-Strauss (see especially Levi-Strauss, 1951). As in thework of Levi-Strauss, the Law in Lacan's work refers not to a particular piece oflegislation, but to the fundamental principles which underlie all social relations. The lawis the set of universal principles which make social existence possible, the structures thatgovern all forms of social exchange, whether gift-giving, kinship relations or theformation of pacts. Since the most basic form of exchange is communication itself, thelaw is fundamentally a linguistic entity-it is the law of the signifier:

‌‌‌‌  This law, then, is revealed clearly enough as identical with an order oflanguage. For without kinship nominations, no power is capableofinstituting the order of preferences and taboos that bind and weave theyarn of lineage through succeeding generations.

‌‌‌‌  (E, 66)

‌‌‌‌  This legal-linguistic structure is in fact no more and no less than the symbolic order itself.

‌‌‌‌  Following Levi-Strauss, Lacan argues that the law is essentially human; it is the lawwhich separates man from the other animals, by regulating sexual relations that are, among animals, unregulated; human law is the primordial Law... Which in regulatingmarriage ties superimposes the kingdom of culture on that of a nature abandoned to thelaw of mating. The prohibition of incest is merely its subjective pivot' (E, 66).

‌‌‌‌  It is the FATHER who imposes this law on the subject in the OEDIPUS COMPLEX; the patemal agency (or paternal function) is no more than the name for this prohibitiveand legislative role. In the second time of the Oedipus complex the father appears as theomnipotent 'father of the primal horde'of Totem and Taboo (Freud, 1912-13); this is thelawgiver who is not included in his own law because he is the Law, denying others access to the women of the tribe while he himself has access to them all. In the third time of the Oedipus complex the father is included in his own law, the law is revealed as a pactrather than an imperative. The Oedipus complex represents the regulation of desire by thelaw. It is the law of the PLEASURE PRINCIPLE, which commands the subject to 'Enjoyas little as possible!', and thus maintains the subject at a safe distance from the Thing.

‌‌‌‌  The relationship between the law and desire is, however, a dialectical one;'desire isthe reverse of the law' (Ec, 787). If, on the one hand, law imposes limits on desire, it isalso true that the law creates desire in the first place by creating interdiction. Desire isessentially the desire to transgress, and for there to be transgression it is first necessaryfor there to be prohibition (S7,83-4). Thus it is not the case that there is a pregiven desirewhich the law then regulates, but that desire is born out of the process of regulation;'what we see here is the tight bond between desire and the Law' (S7,177).

‌‌‌‌  If the law is closely connected to the father, this is not only because the father is theone who imposes the law, but also because the law is bomn out of the murder of the father. This is clearly illustrated in the myth of the father of the primal horde which Freudrecounts in Totem and Taboo. In this myth, the murder of the father, far from freeing thesons from the law, only reinforces the law which prohibits incest.