‌‌‌‌　　英：unconscious; 法：inconscient; 德：das UnbewuBte

‌‌‌‌　　尽管“无意识”这一术语早在弗洛伊德之前就已经为一些作者所使用，然而它在弗洛伊德的著作中获得了一种完全原创性的意义，而且构成了其中最重要的概念。

‌‌‌‌　　弗洛伊德在“无意识”一词的两种用法之间做出了区分 (Freud, I915e)。作为一个形容词，它仅仅指的是主体在特定的时刻上并未加以有意识注意的那些心理过程。作为一个名词（das UnbewuBte),它则指的是弗洛伊德在其有关心理结构的第一理论 (即“地形学模型”)中所描述的精神系统之一。根据此种理论，心灵被划分成了三个系统或是“精神位点”(psychical localities):意识 (Cs)、前意识 (Pcs)与无意识 (Ucs)。无意识系统并不仅仅是在特定的时间上处在意识领域之外的，而是经由压抑而与意识发生根本性的分离，因而也是倘若没有经过扭曲便无法进入意识一前意识系统的。

‌‌‌‌　　在弗洛伊德有关心理结构的第二理论 (即“结构模型”)中，心灵则被划分成了三个“机构”(agencies):自我 (cgo)、超我 (superego)与它我 (id)。在此一模型中，没有任何一种机构等同于无意识，因为即便是自我与超我也都具有一些无意识的部分。

‌‌‌‌　　在1950年以前，拉康主要是以其形容词的形式来使用“无意识”这一术语的，从而使它的早期著作在那些比较熟悉弗洛伊德作品的人们看来是特别奇怪的。然而，在1950年代，随着拉康开始他的“回到弗洛伊德”，这个术语则更加频繁地作为名词而出现，而且拉康也越来越注重弗洛伊德的无意识概念的原创性，强调它并不仅仅是意识的对立面；“尽管在排除了那些意识特征的意义上，大量的精神效应都可以被相当合法地命名为无意识，然而它们与弗洛伊德意义上的无意识丝毫没有任何关系”(E, 163)。此外，他还坚持认为，无意识不能仅仅被等同于“遭到压抑的事物”。

‌‌‌‌　　拉康指出，弗洛伊德的大多数追随者都严重误解了无意识的概念，他们将无意识化约为“仅仅是本能的所在地”(E, 147)。针对此种生物学的思维模式，拉康声称“无意识既非是原始性的，也非是本能性的”(E, 170), 它首先是语言性的。这一点被总结在拉康的著名格言之中，即“无意识是像一种语言那样被结构的”（S3,167; 见：语言[LANGUAGE]、结构[STRUCTURE])。拉康根据共时性结构对无意识的分析，后来又得到了他的另一种思想的补充，即无意识是在一种时间性的脉动上打开和关闭的 (S11,143,204).

‌‌‌‌　　一些精神分析家们反对拉康探究无意识的语言学取径，他们的理由是此种方法过度局限，而且弗洛伊德本人也把词表象排除在无意识之外（S7,44: 关于拉康针对这些异议的反驳，见：原物THNG])。拉康自己则证明了其语言学方法的合理性，他指出无意识有如语言般被结构的原因，恰恰是在于“只有当它被阐述出来的时候，只有在其经由言语化而道出的那个部分之中，我们才能够最终把握无意识”(S7,32).

‌‌‌‌　　拉康同样把无意识描述为一种话语：“无意识是大他者的话语。”(Ec, 16: 见：他者[OTHER])这个谜一般的句子变成了拉康的最著名格言之一，我们可以用很多方式来对其加以理解。或许，最重要的意义即在于“我们应当在无意识中看到言语作用在主体上的那些效果”(S11,126)。更确切地说，无意识是能指（SIGNIIER)作用在主体上的那些效果，因为能指恰恰就是受到压抑并且在那些无意识的构形 (症状、诙谐、过失行为、梦，等等)中返回的东西。

‌‌‌‌　　所有这些对于语言、言语、话语和能指的参照，皆明确地把无意识定位在了象征界 (SYMBOLIC)的秩序当中。实际上，“无意识是作为象征界的某种功能而被结构化的”(S7,12)。无意识是象征秩序对于主体的决定性作用。

‌‌‌‌　　无意识并非是内在的：恰恰相反，因为言语与语言皆是主体间的现象，所以无意识便是“超个人性”(transindividual)的 (E, 49), 可以说，无意识是“外在”(outside)的。“象征界相对于人类而言的此种外在性，恰恰就是无意识的概念本身。”(Ec, 469)如果说无意识看似是内在的，那么这便是一种想象性的效果，此种效果不但阻碍了主体与大他者之间的关系，而且还颠倒了大他者的信息。

‌‌‌‌　　尽管无意识尤其可见于那些无意识的构形，然而“无意识不会让我们的任何行为跳脱出它的领域之外”(E, 163)。无意识的法则，即那些有关重复和欲望的法则，就像结构本身一样是无所不在的。无意识是不可化约的，因此分析的目标便不可能是无意识的意识化

‌‌‌‌　　除了拉康借以对无意识进行概念化的各种语言学隐喻 (话语、语言、言语)之外，他还根据其他术语对无意识进行了构想：

‌‌‌‌　　·记忆 (MEMORY)因为是能指在主体的生命历程中决定着主体的命运，所以在这些能指所构成的象征性历史的意义上说，无意识也同样是一种记忆，“我们教导主体将其认作他的无意识的东西，恰恰就是他的历史。”(E, 52)

‌‌‌‌　　·知识 (KNOWLEDGE)因为知识是能指在能指链条上的链接，所以无意识也同样是一种知识 (即象征性的知识，或者“savoir'”)。更确切地说，它是一种“未知的知识”(或“不知道的知道”)。

‌‌‌‌　　(inconscient) Although the term 'unconscious'had been used by writers prior to Freud, itacquires a completely original meaning in his work, in which it constitutes the singlemost important concept.

‌‌‌‌　　Freud distinguished between two uses of the term 'unconscious' (Freud, 1915e). As anadjective, it simply refers to mental processes that are not the subject of consciousattention at a given moment. As a noun (the unconscious; das UnbewuBte), it designatesone of the psychical systems which Freud described in his first theory of mental structure (the 'topographical model'). According to this theory, the mind is divided into threesystems or psychical localities'; the conscious (Cs), the preconscious (Pcs) and theunconscious (Ucs). The unconscious system is not merely that which is outside the fieldof consciousness at a given time, but that which has been radically separated fromconsciousness by repression and thus cannot enter the conscious-preconscious systemwithout distortion.

‌‌‌‌　　In Freud's second theory of mental structure (the 'structural theory'), the mind isdivided into the three 'agencies'of ego, superego and id. In this model, no one agency isidentical to the unconscious, since even the ego and the superego have unconscious parts.

‌‌‌‌　　Lacan, before 1950, uses the term 'unconscious'principally in its adjectival form, making his early work seem particularly strange to those who are more familiar with Freud's writings. In the 1950s, however, as Lacan begins his 'return to Freud', the termappears more frequently as a noun, and Lacan increasingly emphasises the originality of Freud's concept of the unconscious, stressing that it is not merely the opposite ofconsciousness;'a large number of psychical effects that are quite legitimately designatedas unconscious, in the sense of excluding the characteristics of consciousness, arenonetheless with-out any relation whatever to the unconscious in the Freudian sense' (E, 163). He also insists that the unconscious cannot simply be equated with 'that which isrepressed'.

‌‌‌‌　　Lacan argues that the concept of the unconscious was badly misunderstood by most of Freud's followers, who reduced it to being 'merely the seat of the instincts' (E, 147). Against this biologistic mode of thought, Lacan argues that 'the unconscious is neitherprimordial nor instinctual' (E, 170); it is primarily linguistic. This is summed up in Lacan's famous formula,'the unconscious is structured like a language' (S3,167; seeLANGUAGE, STRUCTURE). Lacan's analysis of theunconsciousin terms of synchronic structure is supplemented by his idea of the unconscious opening and closingin a temporal pulsation (S11,143,204).

‌‌‌‌　　Some psychoanalysts have objected to Lacan's linguistic approach to the unconsciouson the grounds that it is overly restrictive, and on the grounds that Freud himselfexcluded word-presentations from the unconscious (S7,44; for Lacan's refutation ofthese objections, see THING). Lacan himself qualifies his linguistic approach by arguingthat the reason why the unconscious is structured like a language is that 'we only graspthe unconscious finally when it is explicated, in that part of it which is articulated bypassing into words' (S7,32).

‌‌‌‌　　Lacan also describes the unconscious as a discourse: 'The unconscious is the discourseof the Other' (Ec, 16; see OTHER). This enigmatic formula, which has become one of Lacan's most famous dictums, can be understood in many ways. Perhaps the mostimportant meaning is that 'one should see in the unconscious the effects of speech on thesubject' (S11,126). More precisely, the unconscious is the effects of the SIGNIFIER onthe subject, in that the signifier is what is repressed and what retumns in the formations ofthe unconscious (symptoms, jokes, parapraxes, dreams, etc.).

‌‌‌‌　　All the references to language, speech, discourse and signifiers clearly locate theunconscious in the order of the SYMBOLIC. Indeed,'the unconscious is structured as afunction of the symbolic' (S7,12). The unconscious is the determination of the subject bythe symbolic order.

‌‌‌‌　　The unconscious is not interior: on the contrary, since speech and language areintersubjective phenomena, the unconscious is 'transindividual' (E, 49); the unconsciousis, so to speak,'outside'.'This exteriority of the symbolic in relation to man is the verynotion of the unconscious' (Ec, 469). If the unconscious seems interior, this is an effect ofthe imaginary, which blocks the relationship between the subject and the Other and whichinverts the message of the Other.

‌‌‌‌　　Although the unconscious is especially visible in the formations of the unconscious, the unconscious leaves none of our actions outside its field' (E, 163). The laws of theunconscious, which are those ofrepetition and desire, are as ubiquitous as structure itself. The unconscious is irreducible, so the aim of analysis cannot be to make conscious theunconscious

‌‌‌‌　　In addition to the various linguistic metaphors which Lacan draws on to conceptualisethe unconscious (discourse, language, speech), he also conceives of the unconscious inother terms.

‌‌‌‌　　MEMORY The unconscious is also a kind of memory, in the sense of a symbolichistory of the signifiers that have determined the subject in the course of his life;'whatwe teach the subject to recognize as his unconscious is his history' (E,p.52).

‌‌‌‌　　KNOWLEDGE Since it is an articulation of signifiers in a signifying chain, theunconscious is a kind of knowledge (symbolic knowledge, or savoir). More precisely, itis an 'unknown knowledge'.