拉：cogito
拉康的著作中充满着对于笛卡尔的那句著名格言“cogito ergosum”(即“我思故我在”一见：Descartes, I637:54)的提及。在拉康的著作中，这句话 (拉康常常简单地将其称作“我思”[cogo])于是便代表着笛卡尔的全部哲学。拉康对于笛卡尔主义的态度是极其复杂的，这里只能概述少数最重要的几点
(1)在某种层面上，“我思”代表着现代西方的自我 (EGO)概念，其基础乃在于意识 (CONSCIOUSNESS)的自足性 (self-sufficiency)与自明性 (sef-transparency)以及自我的自主性 (autonomyof the ego)等观念 (见：E, 6)。虽然拉康并不认为现代西方的自我概念是由笛卡尔或是任何其他人所发明的，但是他却指出这个概念诞生自笛卡尔进行写作的同一时期（即16世纪中叶至17世纪初叶），而且被笛卡尔特别清楚地表达了出来 (见：S2,6-7)。因而，尽管这个自我的概念在现今的西方人看来是那么的自然而永恒，然而事实上它是一个相当新近的文化性建构；其水恒与自然的显象其实是经由回潮作用而产生的一种幻象 (S2,45).
拉康认为，精神分析治疗的经验是“一种导致我们反对任何直接产生自‘我思哲学的经验”(E, 1: 见：S2,4)。弗洛伊德对于无意识的发现，颠覆了笛卡尔式的主体性概念，因为它对“主体=自我=意识”的这一笛卡尔式方程提出了质疑。拉康对于自我心理学与对象关系理论的主要批判之一，就是这些学派由于返回到把主体看作一种自主的自我的前弗洛伊德式概念而背叛了弗洛伊德的发现 (S2,11).
(2)在另一层面上，拉康的这些见解不仅可以被看作对于“我思”的某种颠覆，而且也可以被看作对于它的某种延伸，因为“我思”不但概述了拉康所反对的“主体=自我=意识”的这一错误等式，同时也把注意力集中在主体 (SUBJECT)的概念上，而这是拉康希望保留的。因而，“我思”便在其自身内包含有其自身颠覆的种子，因为它提出的主体性的概念削弱了现代自我概念的基础。这一主体性的概念指涉的是拉康所谓的“科学的主体”(the subjectof science): 通往知识的所有直觉性的通路皆是在拒绝这个主体，因而只给他留下理性以作为通往知识的唯一路径 (Ec, 831: 见：Ec, 858).
通过将主体对立于自我，拉康提出笛卡尔式的“我思”主体与无意识的主体其实是同一回事。精神分析因而能够以一种笛卡尔式的方法来操作，即从怀疑前进至确信，关键的差异在于它不是从宣称“我思”，而是从断言“它思”(ca pense)而开始的 (S11,35-6)。拉康以各种不同的方式改写了笛卡尔的这句格言，诸如“我在我不在之处思，故我在我不思之处在”(I think where I am not, thereforeI am where I do not think)等 (E, I66)。拉康同样用“我思”来区分所述的主体 (the subject of the statement)与能述的主体 (the subjectof the ENUNCIATION)(见：S11, I38-42: 见：SI7, I80-4)。
Lacan's works abound in references to the famous phrase by Descartes, cogito ergo sum (I think, therefore I am'-see Descartes, 1637:54). This phrase (which Lacan oftenrefers to simply as 'the cogito') comes to stand, in Lacan's work, for Descartes's entirephilosophy. Lacan's attitude to Cartesianism is extremely complex, and only a few of themost important points can be summarised here.
- On one level, the cogito comes to stand for the modern western concept of the EGObased as it is on the notions of the self-sufficiency and self-transparency ofCONSCIOUSNESS, and the autonomy of the ego (see E, 6). Although Lacan does notbelieve that the modern western concept of the ego was invented by Descartes or by anyother individual, he argues that it was born in the same era in which Descartes waswriting (the mid-sixteenth to the early seventeenth century), and is particularly clearlyexpressed by Descartes (see S2,6-7). Thus, although this concept of the ego seems sonatural and eternal to western man today, it is in fact a relatively recent cultural construct; its eternal-natural appearance is in fact an illusion produced by retroaction (S2,4-5).
Lacan argues that the experience of psychoanalytic treatment 'is an experience thatleads us to oppose any philosophy directly issuing from the Cogito' (E, 1; see S2,4). Freud's discovery of the unconscious subverts the Cartesian concept of subjectivitybecause it disputes the Cartesian equation subject=ego=consciousness. One of Lacan'smain criticisms of ego-psychology and object-relationstheory is that these schools betrayed Freud's discovery by returning to the pre-Freudian concept of the subject as anautonomous ego (S2,11). 2. On another level, Lacan's views can be seen not only as a subversion of the cogito. But also as an extension of it, for the cogito not only encapsulates the false equationsubject=ego=consciousness which Lacan opposes, but also focuses attention ontheconcept of the SUBJECT, which Lacan wishes to retain. Thus the cogito contains withinitself the seeds of its own subversion, by putting forward a concept of subjectivity whichundermines the modern concept of the ego. This concept of subjectivity refers to what Lacan calls the subject of science': a subject who is denied all intuitive access toknowledge and is thus left with reason as the only path to knowledge (Ec, 831; see Ec, 858)
By opposing the subject to the ego, Lacan proposes that the subject of the Cartesiancogito is in fact one and the same as the subject of the unconscious. Psychoanalysis canthus operate with a Cartesian method, advancing from doubt to certainty, with the crucialdifference that it does not start from the statement 'I think'but from the affirmation 'itthinks' (ca pense)(S11,35-6). Lacan rewrites Descartes's phrase in various ways, suchas 'I think where I am not, therefore I am where I do not think' (E, 166). Lacan also usesthe cogito to distinguish between the subject of the statement and the subject of theENUNCIATION (see S11,138-42; see S17,180-4).