‌‌‌‌　　法：jouissance

‌‌‌‌　　法文单词“jouissance'”基本上是“享乐”(enjoyment)的意思，但是它具有英文单词“enjoyment'”中所缺乏的一种性的意涵 (即“高潮”)，因此该词在拉康的大多数英文译本中皆被保留了下来而非做翻译 (尽管有人业已指出，“jouissance”一词也确实出现在《牛津简明英语词典》之中；参见：Macey, 1988:288,n.129)。正如简·盖勒普所观察到的，“高潮”是一个可数名词，而“享乐”一词则总是被拉康以单数来使用，也总是在前面带有一个定冠词 (Glop, 1982:30).

‌‌‌‌　　这一术语直到1953年才出现在拉康的著作中，但是即便在当时，它也并不是特别突出 (E, 42,87)。在1953一1954年度与1954一1955年度的研讨班上，拉康偶尔会用到这个术语，而且通常都是在黑格尔的主人 (MASTER)与奴隶辩证法的语境之下：奴隶被迫去劳动，以便提供各种对象供主人“享乐”(S1,223: S2,269). 于是，直到1957年为止，此一术语似乎都仅仅意味着与某种生物性需要（诸如饥饿等）的满足相伴随而来的感官愉悦 (S4,125)。不久之后，性的内涵就变得愈发明显了；在1957年，拉康便用该术语来指涉对于性对象的享乐 (Ec, 453)以及手淫的快感 (S4,241), 而在1958年，他则明确指出“享乐”具有“高潮”的意味 (Ec, 727)(至于该术语在拉康著作中的发展的更充分描述，见：Macey, 1988:200-5).

‌‌‌‌　　只有在1964年时，拉康才发展了他在享乐 (jouissance)与快乐 (pleasure)之间做出的经典对立，这一对立影射的是黑格尔/科耶夫在“Genu”（享乐）与“Lust”（快乐）之间的区分 (参见：Kojeve, 1947:46)。快乐原则是作为对于享乐的一种限制而运作的，它是命令主体“尽可能少地享乐”的法则。与此同时，主体则不断地企图违反那些被强加在其享乐之上的禁止，企图“超越快乐原则”。然而，违反快乐原则的结果并非是更多的快乐，而是痛苦，因为主体只能承受一定量的快乐。超出这一界限，快乐就会变成痛苦，而这种“痛苦的快乐/痛快”(painful pleasure)即拉康所谓的“享乐”；“享乐是令人痛苦的”(S7,184)。“享乐”这一术语因而很好地表达出了主体得自其症状的悖论性满足，或者换一种说法，是他得自其自身满足的痛苦 (即弗洛伊德所渭的“来自疾病的初级获益”)。

‌‌‌‌　　对于“享乐”的禁止（快乐原则）是内在于语言的象征性结构的，这就是为什么“就其本身而言，对于言说之人，享乐是遭到禁止的”(E, 319)。主体进入象征界的条件便是在阉割情结中对于“享乐”的初始弃绝，即主体在此时放弃了他想要为母亲而成为想象的阳具的打算：“阉割即意味着享乐必须被拒绝，以便它能够在欲望法则的反转阶梯 (I'echelle renversee)上被抵达”(E, 324)。因而在俄狄浦斯情结中对于享乐的象征性禁止（即乱伦禁忌），便悖论性地是对某种已然不可能之物的禁止；其功能也因此在于维持神经症性的幻象：假如没有遭到禁止，享乐便会是可以抵达的。这样的禁止恰恰造成了僭越它的欲望，“享乐”也因此在根本上即是僭越性的 (见：S7, ch. 15).

‌‌‌‌　　死亡冲动 (DEATH DRIVE)便是给予在主体身上想要朝向原物 (THG)与某种过度享乐而冲破快乐原则的那种持续欲望的名称。因而，“享乐”是“通往死亡的道路”(S17,17)。因为冲动都是旨在冲破快乐原则以寻求享乐的企图，所以每一个冲动都是死亡冲动。

‌‌‌‌　　在拉康的“享乐”概念与弗洛伊德的力比多 (LBDO)概念之间具有一些强烈的亲缘性，这一点明显可见于拉康把享乐称作一种“肉体物质”(bodily substance)的描述(S20,26)。与弗洛伊德的只有一种力比多，即男性力比多的主张相一致，拉康也声称享乐在本质上是阳具性的：“享乐，就它是性欲化的而言，便是阳具性的，而这就意味着它就其本身而言与大他者并无关联”(S20,14).然而，在1973年，拉康又承认存在着一种明确是女性的享乐，即“超越阳具”(S20,69)的一种“增补性的享乐”(S20,58)。这一女性享乐是无法言喻的，因为女人们虽然体验到它，但对它一无所知(S20,71)。为了在这两种形式的“享乐”之间做出区分，拉康给它们分别引入了不同的代数学符号：Jp指代阳具性的享乐(phallicjouissance),而JA则指代大他者的享乐(jouissance of the Other)。

‌‌‌‌　　The French word jouissance means basically 'enjoyment', but it has a sexual connotation (i.e.'orgasm') lacking in the English word 'enjoyment', and is therefore left untranslatedin most English editions of Lacan (though it has since been pointed out that the word'jouissance'does actually figure in the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary; cf. Macey, 1988:288,n.129). As Jane Gallop observes, whereas orgasm is a countable noun, theterm jouissance is always used in the singular by Lacan, and is always preceded by adefinite article (Gallop, 1982:30).

‌‌‌‌　　The term does not appear in Lacan's work until 1953, but even then it is notparticularly salient (E, 42,87). In the seminars of 1953-4 and 1954-5 Lacan uses theterm occasionally, usually in the context of the Hegelian dialectic of the MASTER andthe slave: the slave is forced to work to provide objects for the master's enjoyment (jouissance)(S1,223; S2,269). Up to 1957, then, the term seems to mean no more thanthe enjoyable sensation that accompanies the satisfaction of a biological need such ashunger (S4,125). Soon after, the sexual connotations become more apparent; in 1957, Lacan uses the term to refer to the enjoyment of a sexual object (Ec, 453) and to thepleasures of masturbation (S4,241), and in 1958 he makes explicit the sense ofjouissance as orgasm (Ec, 727). (For a fuller description of the development of this termin Lacan's work, see Macey, 1988:200-5).

‌‌‌‌　　It is only in 1960 that Lacan develops his classic opposition between jouissance andpleasure, an opposition which alludes to the Hegelian/Kojevian distinction between Genup (enjoyment) and Lust (pleasure)(cf. Kojeve, 1947:46). The pleausure principlefunctions as a limit to enjoyment; it is a law which commands the subject to 'enjoy aslittle as possible'. At the same time, the subject constantly attempts to transgress theprohibitions imposed on his enjoyment, to go 'beyond the pleasure principle'. However, the result of transgressing the pleasure principle is not more pleasure, but pain, sincethere is only a certain amount of pleasure that the subject can bear. Beyond this limit, pleasure becomes pain, and this 'painful pleasure'is what Lacan calls jouissance; jouissance is suffering' (S7,184). The term jouissance thus nicely expresses theparadoxical satisfaction that the subject derives from his symptom, or, to put it anotherway, the suffering that he derives from his own satisfaction (Freud's 'primary gain fromillness').

‌‌‌‌　　The prohibition of jouissance (the pleasure principle) is inherent in the symbolicstructure of language, which is why 'jouissance is forbidden to him who speaks, as such' (E, 319). The subject's entry into the symbolic is conditional upon a certain initialrenunciation of jouissance in the castration complex, when the subject gives up hisattempts to be the imaginary phallus for the mother;'Castration means that jouissancemust be refused so that it can be reached on the inverted ladder (l'echelle renversee) ofthe Law of desire' (E, 324). The symbolic prohibition of enjoyment in the Oedipuscomplex (the incest taboo) is thus, paradoxically, the prohibition of something which isalready impossible; its function is therefore to sustain the neurotic illusion that enjoymentwould be attainable if it were not forbidden. The very prohibition creates the desire totransgress it, and jouissance is therefore fundamentally transgressive (see S7, ch. 15).

‌‌‌‌　　The DEATH DRIVE is the name given to that constant desire in the subject to breakthrough the pleasure principle towards the THING and a certain excess jouissance; thus, jouissance is the path towards death' (S17,17). Insofar as the drives are attempts tobreak through the pleasure principle in search of jouissance, every drive is a death drive.

‌‌‌‌　　There are strong affinities between Lacan's concept of jouissance and Freud's conceptof the LIBIDO, as is clear from Lacan's description of jouissance as a 'bodily substance' (S20,26). In keeping with Freud's assertion that there is only one libido, which ismasculine, Lacan states that jouissance is essentially phallic;'Jouissance, insofar as it issexual, is phallic, which means that it does not relate to the Other as such' (S20,14). However, in 1973 Lacan admits that there is a specifically feminine jouissance, a'supplementary jouissance' (S20,58) which is beyond the phallus' (S20,69), ajouissance of the Other. This feminine jouissance is ineffable, for women experience itbut know nothing about it (S20,71). In order to differentiate between these two forms ofjouissance, Lacan introduces different algebraic symbols for each; Jo designates phallicjouissance, whereas JA designates the jouissance of the Other.