‌‌‌‌　　英：science; 法：science; 德：Vissenschaft

‌‌‌‌　　弗洛伊德与拉康两人皆以单数形式来使用“科学”这一术语，因而便暗示存在着一种可以被称作“科学性”(scientific)的特别带有统一性与同质性的话语。根据拉康的说法，此种话语开始于17世纪 (Ec, 857), 伴随着现代物理学的发端而出现。

‌‌‌‌　　弗洛伊德把科学 (德：Wissenschaft: 该词在德语中带有一种明显不同的意涵)看作文明化的最高成就之一，并将其对立于宗教 (RELIGION)的反对力量。拉康对于科学的态度是更加暖昧不明的。一方面，他批评现代科学忽视了人类存在 (human existence)的象征性维度，且因而怂惠现代人“遗忘了自己的主体性”(E, 70). 此外，他还把现代科学比作一种“充分实现的偏执狂”，因为从某种意义上说，其整体化的建构便类似于一种妄想的架构 (Ec, 874).

‌‌‌‌　　另一方面，这些批评却并非针对的是科学本身，而针对的是科学的实证主义模型。拉康暗示说，实证主义实际上是对“真正科学”的一种背离，而他自己的科学模型则更多归功于柯瓦雷、巴什拉2与康吉莱姆3的理性主义，而非经验主义。换句话说，对拉康而言，把一种话语标记为科学话语的是一种高度的数学形式化。这就是拉康试图根据各种数学公式来形式化精神分析理论的背后原因之所在 (见：数学[MATHEMATICS]、代数学[ALGEBRA]). 这些公式同样压缩了科学话语的更深一层特征（在拉康看来或许是最根本的特征），也就是说它应当具有可传递性 (Lacan, 1973a:60).

‌‌‌‌　　拉康指出，科学是以与真理 (TRUTH)的一种特殊关系为特征的。一方面，它企图（拉康认为是不合法的）将真理垄断为自己的独有财产 (Ec, 79): 而另一方面（正如拉康后来所指出的那样），科学的基础事实上乃在于对作为原因的真理概念的排除 (Ec, 874).

‌‌‌‌　　科学同样是以与知识 (KNOWLEDGE, 即savoir)的一种特殊关系为特征的，因为科学的基础即在于它排除了任何通过诉诸直觉而抵达知识的通路并因而迫使所有对于知识的探寻都仅仅遵循于理性的途径 (Ec, 831)。现代主体即“科学的主体”，因为从某种意义上说，唯一通往知识的这条理性的道路现在已然是一项共同的前提。拉康声称精神分析只能作用于科学的主体 (Ec, 858), 他同时指出精神分析的基础并不在于诉诸任何不可言说的经验或直觉的闪现，而是在于一种合乎理性的对话过程，即便是当理性在疯癫中面对其界限的时候也依然如此。

‌‌‌‌　　一方面，尽管人文科学 (human sciences)与自然科学 (naturalsciences)之间的区分在I9世纪末时便已然得到了稳固的确立（由于狄尔泰的著作），但是它并未出现在弗洛伊德的著作当中。另一方面，拉康则极其重视这一区分。然而，拉康不喜欢讲“人文科学”(这是拉康强烈反感的一个术语一见：Ec, 859)与“自然科学”，反而是更喜欢讲“推测科学”(conjectural sciences)（抑或主体性的科学）与“精确科学”(exact sciences)。精确科学即涉及没有人在其中使用能指的那些现象的领域 (S3,186), 而推测科学则是根本不同的，因为它们涉及的是那些居住于象征秩序的存在 (beings)。然而，在1965年，拉康又使推测科学与精确科学之间的这一区分变得问题化了：

自从推测容易受到精确计算（或然率）的影响，以及精确性仅仅立基于将符号集合的公理与法则分离开来的形式体系的那一时刻以来，精确科学与推测科学之间的对立便不再能够得到维系了。

(Ec, 863)

‌‌‌‌　　虽然物理学在19世纪给精确科学提供了一种精确性的范式，从而使推测科学在相比之下显得有些粗制滥造，但是结构语言学的登场给推测科学提供了一种同样精确的范式，从而重新调整了此种不平衡。当弗洛伊德借用来自其他科学的术语的时候，他都总是借鉴自然科学 (主要是生物学[BIOLOGY]、医学与热力学)，因为在弗洛伊德的时代，只有这些科学提供了严密的调查与思维的模型。拉康不同于弗洛伊德的地方即在于他主要是从“主体性的科学”(主要是语言学[LINGUISTICS])中输入概念，并且让精神分析理论与这些科学而非自然科学结盟。拉康指出，此种范式的转变，事实上便隐含在弗洛伊德自己对于他从自然科学中借用的那些概念的重新阐释之中。换句话说，每当弗洛伊德从生物学中借取概念的时候，他都会如此彻底地重新阐释那些概念，以至于他创造出了相当异化于其生物学来源的一种全新的范式。因而，根据拉康的说法，弗洛伊德便预期了索绪尔等现代语言学家的发现，而且他的著作也可以根据这些语言学概念而得到更好的理解。

‌‌‌‌　　精神分析是一门科学吗？弗洛伊德相当明确地肯定了精神分析的科学性地位，他曾在1924年写道：“虽然它原本只是一种特殊治疗方法的名称，但是它现在也变成了一门科学的名称一有关无意识心理过程的科学。”(Freud, 1925a: SEXX, 70)然而，他也同样坚持强调精神分析的独特性特征，因为正是这一独特性特征使它有别于其他的科学，“每种科学皆建立在经由我们的精神装置的中介而抵达的那些观察与经验的基础之上。但是因为我们的科学把那一装置本身当作它的主体，这个类比便在此终结了”(Freud, 1940a:SEXXⅡ，159)。至于精神分析的地位及其与其他学科之间的关系，也同样是拉康投入极大关注的一个问题。在他“二战”前的作品中，精神分析便是毫无保留地根据科学来看待的 (例如：Lacan, 1936)。然而，在1950年以后，拉康对于这一问题的态度变得更加复杂了。

‌‌‌‌　　在1953年，他宣称在科学与艺术 (ART)的对立中，精神分析可以被定位在艺术的一边，只要“艺术”一词在其中世纪使用的意义上来理解，当时的“博艺学科”(liberal arts)包括算术、几何、音乐与文法 (Lacan, 1953b:224)。然而，在科学与宗教的对立中，拉康遵循弗洛伊德的观点认为，精神分析与科学话语而非宗教话语有着更多的共同之处：“精神分析不是一门宗教，它发端自与科学本身同样的地位。”(S11,265)

‌‌‌‌　　如果正如拉康所指出的那样，一门科学就其本身而言都仅仅是通过孤立并界定其特殊研究对象而建立的 (见：Lacan, 1946; 他在那里指出，通过给心理学提供一种适当的研究对象一意象[见：Ec, 188]一精神分析实际上便给心理学奠定了一个科学的立足点)，那么，当他在1965年把对象小a孤立出来作为精神分析的对象的时候，他实际上便是在宣称精神分析所具有的科学性地位 (Ec, 863).

‌‌‌‌　　然而，从此刻起，拉康越来越质疑这种把精神分析视作一门科学的见解。同年，他又声称精神分析不是一门科学，而是一门带有“科学禀性”(scientific vocation)的“实践”(pratique)(Ec, 863), 尽管他同年也还在讲“精神分析的科学”(Ec, 876)。到了1977年，他更加直截了当地说道：

精神分析不是一门科学。它不具有任何科学性的地位一它只是在等候并期望这一地位而已。精神分析是一种妄想一期待产生一门科学的妄想…它是一种科学的妄想，然而这并不意味着分析的实践将会产生一门科学。

(Lacan, 1976-7; 1977年1月11日的研讨班；0icar?,14:4)

‌‌‌‌　　然而，即便当拉康做出此番陈述的时候，他也从未放弃根据语言学和数学来形式化精神分析理论的计划。实际上，数元/数学型 (MATHEME)的科学形式化与呀呀儿语 (lalangue)的语义丰富性之间的张力，便构成了拉康晚年著作中最为有趣的特征之一。

‌‌‌‌　　(science) Both Freud and Lacan use the term 'science'in the singular, thus implying thatthere is a specific unified, homogeneous kind of discourse that can be called 'scientific'. This discourse begins, according to Lacan, in the seventeenth century (Ec, 857), with theinauguration of modern physics (Ec, 855).

‌‌‌‌　　Freud regarded science (Ger. Wissenschafi-a term with markedly differentconnotations in German) as one of civilisation's highest achievements, and opposed it tothe reactionary forces of RELIGION. Lacan's attitude to science is more ambiguous. On the one hand, he criticises modern science for ignoring the symbolic dimension of humanexistence and thus encouraging modern man 'to forget his subjectivity' (E, 70). He alsocompares modem science to a 'fully realised paranoia', in the sense that its totalisingconstructions resemble the architecture of a delusion (Ec, 874).

‌‌‌‌　　On the other hand, these criticisms are not levelled at science per se, but at thepositivist model of science. Lacan implies that positivism is actually a deviation from'true science', and his own model of science owes more to the rationalism of Koyre, Bachelard and Canguilhem than to empiricism. In other words, for Lacan, what marks adiscourse as scientific is a high degree of mathematical formalisation. This is what liesbehind Lacan's attempts to formalise psychoanalytic theory in terms of variousmathematical formulae (see MATHEMATICS, ALGEBRA). These formulae alsoencapsulate a further characteristic of scientific discourse (perhaps the most fundamentalone in Lacan's view), which is that it should be transmissible (Lacan, 1973a:60).

‌‌‌‌　　Lacan argues that science is characterised by a particular relationship to TRUTH. Onthe one hand, it attempts (illegitimately, thinks Lacan) to monopolise truth as itsexclusive property (Ec, 79); and, on the other hand (as Lacan later argues), science is infact based on a foreclosure of the concept of truth as cause (Ec, 874).

‌‌‌‌　　Science is also characterised by a particular relationship to KNOWLEDGE (savoir), inthat science is based on the exclusion of any access to knowledge by recourse to intuitionand thus forces all the search for knowledge to follow only the path of reason (Ec, 831). The modem subject is the 'subject of science'in the sense that this exclusively rationalroute to knowledge is now a common presupposition. In stating that psychoanalysisoperates only the subject of science (Ec, 858) Lacan is arguing that psychoanalysis is notbased on any appeal to an ineffable experience or flash of intuition, but on a process ofreasoned dialogue, even when reason confronts its limit in madness.

‌‌‌‌　　Although the distinction between the human sciences and the natural sciences hadbecome quite well-established by the end of the nineteenth century (thanks to the work of Dilthey), it does not figure in Freud's work. Lacan, on the other hand, pays greatattention to this distinction. However, rather than talking of the 'human sciences' (a termwhich Lacan dislikes intensely-see Ec, 859) and the 'natural sciences', Lacan prefersinstead to talk of the 'conjectural sciences' (or sciences of subjectivity) and the 'exactsciences'. Whereas the exact sciences concem the field of phenomena in which there isno one who uses a signifier (S3,186), the conjectural sciences are fundamentallydifferent because they concem beings who inhabit the symbolic order. In 1965, however, Lacan problematises the distinction between conjectural and exact sciences:

The opposition between the exact sciences and the conjectural sciencescan no longer be sustained from the moment when conjecture issusceptible to an exact calculation (probability) and when exactitude isbased only on a formalism which separates axioms and laws of groupingsymbols.

(Ec, 863)

‌‌‌‌　　Whereas in the last century physics provided a paradigm of exactitude for the exactsciences which made the conjectural sciences seem sloppy by comparison, the arrival onthe scene of structural linguistics redressed the imbalance by providing an equally exact paradigm for the conjectural sciences. When Freud borrowed terms from other sciences, it was always from the natural sciences (principally BIOLOGY, medicine andthermodynamics) because these were the only sciences around in Freud's day thatprovided a model of rigorous investigation and thought. Lacan differs from Freud byimporting concepts mainly from the 'sciences of subjectivity' (principallyLINGUISTICS), and by aligning psychoanalytic theory with these rather than with thenatural sciences. Lacan argues that this paradigm shift is in fact implicit in Freud's ownreformulations of the concepts that he borrowed from the natural sciences. In otherwords, whenever Freud borrowed concepts from biology he reformulated those conceptsso radically that he created a totally new paradigm which was quite alien to its biologicalorigins. Thus, according to Lacan, Freud anticipated the findings of modern structurallinguists such as Saussure, and his work can be better understood in the light of theselinguistic concepts.

‌‌‌‌　　Is psychoanalysis a science? Freud was quite explicit in affirming the scientific statusof psychoanalysis: While it was originally the name of a particular therapeutic method,'he wrote in 1924, it has now also become the name of a science-the science ofunconscious mental processes' (Freud, 1925a: SE XX, 70). However, he also insisted onthe unique character of psychoanalysis that sets it apart from the other sciences;'Everyscience is based on observations and experiences arrived at through the medium of ourpsychical apparatus. But since our science has as its subject that apparatus itself, theanalogy ends here' (Freud, 1940a: SE XXIII, 159). The question of the status ofpsychoanalysis and its relationship with other disciplines is also one to which Lacandevotes much attention. In his pre-war writings, psychoanalysis is seen unreservedly inscientific terms (e.g.Lacan, 1936). However, after 1950 Lacan's attitude to the questionbecomes much more complex.

‌‌‌‌　　In 1953, he states that in the opposition science versus ART, psychoanalysis can belocated on the side of art, on condition that the term 'art'is understood in the sense inwhich it was used in the Middle Ages, when the 'liberal arts'included arithmetic, geometry, music and grammar (Lacan:1953b:224). However, in the opposition scienceversus religion, Lacan follows Freud in arguing that psychoanalysis has more in commonwith scientific discourse than religious discourse: 'psychoanalysis is not a religion. Itproceeds from the same status as Science itself (S11,265).

‌‌‌‌　　If, as Lacan argues, a science is only constituted as such by isolating and defining itsparticular object of enquiry (see Lacan, 1946, where he argues that psychoanalysis hasactually set psychology on a scientific footing by providing it with a proper object ofenquiry-the imago-Ec, 188), then, when in 1965 he isolates the objet petit a as theobject of psychoanalysis, he is in effect claiming a scientific status for psychoanalysis (Ec, 863)

‌‌‌‌　　However, from this point on Lacan comes increasingly to question this view ofpsychoanalysis as a science. In the same year he states that psychoanalysis is not ascience but a 'practice' (pratique) with a 'scientific vocation' (Ec, 863), though in thesame year he also speaks of 'the psychoanalytic science' (Ec, 876). By 1977 he hasbecome more categorical:

Psychoanalysis is not a science. It has no scientific status-it merely waitsand hopes for it. Psychoanalysis is a delusion-a delusion which isexpected to produce a science.... It is a scientific delusion, but this doesn'tmean that analytic practice will ever produce a science.

(Lacan, 1976-7; seminar of 11 January 1977; Ornicar?,14:4)

‌‌‌‌　　However, even when Lacan makes such statements, he never abandons the project offormalising psychoanalytic theory in linguistic and mathematical terms. Indeed, thetension between the scientific formalism of the MATHEME and the semantic profusionof lalangue constitutes one of the most interesting features of Lacan's later work.