英：frustration; 法：frustration; 德：Versagung
在1950年代，英文的“挫折”一词，连同从俄狄浦斯三角转向母子关系的强调一起，在精神分析理论的某些分支中变得越来越突出。在这一语境下，挫折通常都被理解为母亲 (MOTHER)拒绝给予孩子可满足其生物性需要 (NEEDS)的对象的行为。一些分析家们认为，以这样的方式让孩子受挫，在神经症的病因学中是一个主要的因素。
“挫折”也是在《标准版》中用来翻译弗洛伊德的Versagung词的术语。虽然此一术语在弗洛伊德的著作中并不极其突出，但是它确实也是构成其理论词汇的一部分。乍看上去，实际上，似乎弗洛伊德就是以上述的方式来讨论挫折的。例如，他确实把症状病因学的一个重要位置归于挫折，并且声称“让患者生病的正是一个挫折”(Freud, 1919a:SEXVⅡ，162)。因此，当拉康指出“挫折”这个术语是“在弗洛伊德的著作中完全缺位”的时候（S3,235), 他的意思是说弗洛伊德的Versagung概念并不符合在上一段话中所描述的挫折概念。拉康认为，那些以此种方式来对挫折概念加以理论化的人，皆因背离了弗洛伊德的著作，而导致精神分析理论陷入了一系列的僵局 (S4,180)。因而，在1956一1957年度的研讨班上，他便寻求某种方式，试图根据弗洛伊德理论的逻辑来重新阐述此一概念。
拉康首先将挫折归类为“对象缺失”(lack of object)的三种类型之一，有别于阉割与剥夺 (见：缺失[LACK])。虽然他承认挫折处在母亲与孩子之间原初关系的核心 (S4,66), 但是他认为挫折并不关涉生物学的需要，而是关乎对爱的要求 (DEMAND)。这并不是说挫折丝毫无关于能够满足需要的一个实在的对象 (例如：乳房或者奶瓶)：相反，这样的一个对象必定是牵涉其中的，至少是在最初的时候 (S4,66)。然而，重要的是，此一对象的实在功能（即满足某种需要，诸如饥饿等）很快便会受到其象征功能的完全遮蔽，也就是说，事实上它是作为一种母爱的象征而运作的 (S4,180-2). 这个对象之所以被赋予价值，更多的是因为它是某种象征的礼物，而较少的是因为其满足某种需要的能力。作为一个礼物，它被铭写在调节交换环路的那些法则的象征网络之中，且因而被看作主体对其拥有某种合法性要求的东西 (S4,101)。严格地讲，挫折只能发生在这一合法性秩序的脉络之下，因而当幼儿所要求的对象没有被提供的时候，唯有在幼儿觉得这是不公正（自己受委屈）的时候，我们才能够说这是一个挫折 (S4,101)。在这样一种情况下，当对象最终被提供的时候，这种 (违背承诺的、爱被拒给的)不公正的感觉继续存在于孩子身上，孩子于是通过享乐继原始需要得到满足之后的那些感受来聊以自慰。因而，挫折远非是关系满足某种生物性需要的失败，而是往往涉及恰恰相反的东西：真正的挫折是对爱的拒绝，而生物性需要的满足则是对于真正的挫折进行补偿的一种徒劳的尝试。
挫折在精神分析治疗中扮演着一个重要的角色。弗洛伊德曾经注意到，那些令人烦恼的症状会随着治疗的进展而消失，就此而言，病人继续治疗的动机便相应地减少。因此，为了避免病人完全丧失动机且过早中断治疗的危险，弗洛伊德便劝告分析家必须“以某种可感知的剥夺的形式在别的地方重新安置【病人的痛苦】”(Freud, 1919a:SEVXⅡ，163)。这一技术上的忠告通常以节制规则 (ule of abstinence)而著称，并且意味着分析家必须通过拒绝满足病人对爱的要求而不断地使病人感到挫折。这样一来，“病人的需要与渴望便得以继续留存在她身上，以便充当驱策她进行工作并做出改变的力量”(Freud, 1915a: SEXI, 165).
虽然拉康在分析家不应当满足分析者对爱的要求这一点上赞同弗洛伊德的看法，但是他也指出这种挫折的行动就其本身而言不应该被看作一种目的。相反，挫折必须被仅仅看作让先前那些要求的能指得以出现的一种手段。“分析家是支撑着要求的人，并非像人们所说的那样是为了使主体遭受挫折，而是为了让其挫折所牵涉的那些能指得以重新出现”(E, 225)。通过把分析者的要求维持在一种挫折的状态下，分析家的目的在于超越要求并且引起分析者的欲望出现 (E, 276).
拉康在其对于节制规则加以理论化的方式上有别于弗洛伊德。对弗洛伊德而言，节制规则主要关涉分析者对于性欲活动的节制：如果一位病人恳求分析家同她做爱，那么分析家就必须通过拒绝这么做来使她受挫。虽然拉康赞同这一忠告，但是他也强调分析家同样能够挫败一种更加常见的要求一分析者对于一个回应的要求。分析者会期待分析家遵循那些日常交谈的规则。通过拒绝这些规则一在分析者提问的时候保持沉默，或者是不按分析者的意图来对待分析者的话语一分析家便在自己使主体遭受挫折的处理上拥有了一种强有力的手段。
在1961年，拉康还提到了分析家让分析者遭受挫折的另一种方式。这就是分析家拒绝把焦虑的信号给予分析者一焦虑在分析家那里始终是缺位的，即便是当分析者要求分析家体验焦虑的时候。拉康提出，在精神分析治疗中，这可能在挫折的所有形式中是最富有成效的。
(frustration) The English term 'frustration'came into increasing prominence in certainbranches of psychoanalytic theory in the 1950s, together with a shift in emphasis fromthe Oedipal triangle to the mother-child relation. In this context, frustration was generallyunderstood as the act whereby the MOTHER denies the child the object which wouldsatisfy one of his biological NEEDS. To frustrate a child in this way was thought bysome analysts to be a major factor in the aetiology of neurosis.
Frustration'is also the term which the Standard Edition uses to translate Freud's term Versagung. While this term is not extremely prominent in Freud's work, it does form partof his theoretical vocabulary. At a first glance, indeed, it may appear that Freud discussesfrustration in the way described above. For example he certainly attributes to frustrationan important place in the aetiology of symptoms, stating that 'it was a frustration thatmade the patient ill' (Freud, 1919a: SE XVII, 162). Hence when Lacan argues that theterm'frustration'is 'quite simply absent from Freud's work' (S3,235), what he means isthat the Freudian concept of Versagung does not correspond to the concept of frustrationas described in the above paragraph. Lacan argues that those who have theorised theconcept of frustration in this way have, by deviating from Freud's work, ledpsychoanalytic theory into a series of impasses (S4,180). Thus in the seminar of 1956-7he seeks a way of reformulating the concept in accordance with the logic of Freudiantheory.
Lacan begins by classifying frustration as one of the three types of 'lack of object', distinct from both castration and privation (see LACK). Although he concedes thatfrustration is at the heart of the primary relations between mother and child (S4,66), heargues that frustration does not concern biological needs but the DEMAND for love. Thisis not to say that frustration has nothing to do with a real object capable of satisfying aneed (e.g.a breast, or a feeding bottle); on the contrary, such an object is certainlyinvolved, at least at first (S4,66). However, what is important is that the real function ofthis object (to satisfy a need, such as hunger) is soon completely overshadowed by itssymbolic function, namely, the fact that it functions as a symbol of the mother's love (S4,180-2). The object is thus valued more for being a symbolic gift than for its capacity tosatisfy a need. As a gift, it is inscribed in the symbolic network of laws which regulatethe circuit of exchanges, and thus seen as something to which the subject has a legitimateclaim (S4,101). Frustration, properly speaking, can only occur in the context of this legalorder, and thus when the object which the infant demands is not provided, one can onlyspeak of frustration when the infant senses that it has been wronged (S4,101). In such acase, when the object is eventually provided, the sense of wrong (of broken promises, oflove withheld) persists in the child, who then consoles himself for this by enjoying thesensations which follow the satisfaction of the original need. Thus, far from frustrationinvolving the failure to satisfy a biological need, it often involves precisely the opposite; a biological need is satisfied as a vain attempt to compensate for the true frustration, which is the refusal of love.
Frustration plays an important role in psychoanalytic treatment. Freud noted that, tothe extent that distressing symptoms disappear as the treatment progresses, the patient'smotivation to continue the treatment tends to diminish accordingly. In order, therefore, toavoid the risk of the patient losing motivation altogether and breaking off the treatmentprematurely, Freud recommended that the analyst must 're-instate [the patient'ssuffering]elsewhere in the form of some appreciable privation' (Freud, 1919a: SE XVII, 163). This technical advice is generally known as the rule of abstinence, and implies thatthe analyst must continually frustrate the patient by refusing to gratify his demands forlove. In this way,'the patient's need and longing should be allowed to persist in her, inorder to serve as forces impelling her to do work and to make changes' (Freud, 1915a: SEXIL, 165).
While Lacan agrees with Freud that the analyst must not gratify the analysand'sdemands for love, he argues that this act of frustration is not to be seen as an end in itself. Rather, frustration must be seen simply as a means to enable the signifiers of previousdemands to appear.'The analyst is he who supports the demand, not, as has been said, tofrustrate the subject, but in order to allow the signifiers in which his frustration is boundup to reappear' (E, 255). The aim of the analyst is, by supporting the analysand'sdemands in a state of frustration, to go beyond demand and cause the analysand's desireto appear (E, 276).
Lacan differs from Freud in the way he theorises the rule of abstinence. For Freud, therule of abstinence primarily concemned the analysand's abstinence from sexual activity; ifa patient implores the analyst to make love to her, the analyst must frustrate her byrefusing to do so. While Lacan agrees with this advice, he stresses that there is a muchmore common demand that the analyst can also frustrate-the analysand's demand for areply. The analysand expects the analyst to follow the rules of everyday conversation. By refusing to follow these rules-remaining silent when the analysand asks a question, ortaking the analysand's words in a way other than that in which they were intended-theanalyst has a powerful means at his disposal for frustrating the analysand.
There is another way that the analyst frustrates the analysand which Lacan mentions in1961. This is the analyst's refusal to give the signal of anxiety to the analysand-theabsence of anxiety in the analyst at all times, even when the analysand demands that theanalyst experience anxiety. Lacan suggests that this may be the most fruitful of all formsof frustration in psychoanalytic treatment (S8,428).